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A BSTRA CT
TOWARD EFFECTIVE AND ETHICAL DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION POLICIES: 
THE CASE AGAINST INDISCRIMINATE DRUG TESTING
by
R obert E. G ladd
D r. J e r ry  L. S im ich. E x a m in a tio n  C om m ittee  C h a ir 
P ro fesso r o f P o litica l Science 
U n iv e rs ity  o f N evada, L as V egas
For a n  in c re a s in g  b re a d th  of o rg a n iz a tio n a l dom ains, a  n eg a tiv e  illic it 
d ru g  screen  r e s u lt  h a s  becom e th e  f in a l a n d  p a ra m o u n t c rite rio n  for 
adm issio n  an d /o r c o n tin u in g  p a rtic ip a tio n . S uch  a  policy is v igorously  
p rom oted  to th e  p riv a te  sec to r by g o v e rn m en t a n d  vendors of te s t in g  serv ices 
as  a n  in expensive  a n d  v ita l tool for su p p re ss in g  d ru g  abuse . T h is  policy, 
how ever, can  b een  show n to be a t  once em p irica lly  u n w a rra n te d , 
m ethodologically  dubious, c o n s ti tu tio n a lly  im p erm issib le , an d  e th ic a lly  
u n su s ta in a b le . R educing  th e  h a rm  a ttr ib u ta b le  to  illic it in to x ica tio n  is  a 
leg itim a te  a n d  w o rth y  socia l goal. T he ends, how ever, can n o t ju s tify  such  
m ean s  o f in d isc rim in a te  a n d  in tru s iv e  su rv e illan ce .
m
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CHAPTER ONE
One hopes not only for the courage of on e’s convictions, 
but also for the courage o f on e’s doubts in a w orld o f dangerously passionate certainties.
-  Eric Sevareid. Not So Wild A Dream
Argument overview
Drug testing  is conventionally viewed as an effective and necessary means of 
both deterring  illicit d rug use and identiffdng those in need of “trea tm en t” for their 
“addictions.” Widely employed in competitive am ateur and professional sports, 
m andatory drug testing  program s are now policy in 80% of major U.S. corporations 
according to an Am erican M anagem ent Association report pubhshed in mid 1996. 
Recent federal legislative proposals have sought to extend m andatory testing to all 
branches of the federal government and to all direct or indirect recipients of federal 
funds (e.g.. welfare and pubhc housing cUents. students receiving government 
backed school loans, businesses with federal contracts, etc.). President Chnton last 
year proposed testing  for all probationers, parolees, and teen drivers' license 
applicants.
The U.S. Suprem e Court, after handing down three rulings declaring 
suspicionless drug testing  constitutional under a variety of arguably dubious 
circum stances, recently struck  down a Georgia law requiring drug tests of state  and
1
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local political candidates. See Chandler et al. c. Miller, Governor of Georgia et al. 
Docket 96-126. This 8-1 decision (Chief Justice Rehnquist dissenting) held th a t 
“symbolic” governm ent-adm inistered testing program s such as Georgia’s are 
unconstitutional. The Court rejected, among other assertions, the Marion-Barry- 
Made-Us-Do-It rationale cited by the Georgia counsel a t Orals. (Note: .Additional 
inform ation on th is latest case is available in the antecedent Chandler v. Miller,
Fed. i l t h  Circuit, No. 95-8230,^ 1996 appellate ruling, the ACLU Chandler v. M iller 
Suprem e Court Amicus Brief.- and a personal s tatem ent by W alker Chandler 
himself, as appended to an ACLU press release.^) Unhappily for those objecting to 
indiscrim inate private sector drug screening, however, m ajority opinion author 
Justice G insberg also re iterated  the Court's position th a t private sector drug testing
‘ Chandler v. Miller, Federal Appellate Court, 11th Circuit, No. 95-8230, 
[http://www'.law.em ory.edu/llcircuit/jan96/95-8230.m an.htm l]. March. 1998.
- ACLU Chandler et al, v. Miller, Governor o f Georgia et al. Amicus Curiae 
Brief, [http://ww w .aclu.org/court/chandler.htm l]. March. 1998.
‘ In Mr. Chandler's own words: " . . .  We may ask how such a law could be 
passed, one th a t makes a mockery of our country’s credo of “innocent until proven 
guilty.” .A brief look a t today's political chm ate is all we need to find the source of 
such a flawed sta tu te . Considering the m ounting pressure resulting from this 
nation's stagnating  w ar on drugs, we should not be surprised how this faulty bill 
could be passed. Legislators have attem pted to vent the ir frustrations by infringing 
upon the electoral arena through whimsical policy. This, perhaps, may be the most 
dangerous implication of all. Everyone who runs for office m ust agree w ith the 
majority-elect over certain  policy issues.
“However great the problem of drugs may be in th is country, th is does not 
give policy-makers free hcense to pass such a constitutionally flawed law. 
Regardless of our personal opinion of the crusade against drugs, we should not, as a 
society, m andate symbolic allegiance to the drug war. Refusal to undergo a 
suspicion-fi-ee test m ust be upheld as a valuable civil liberty. The Suprem e Court 
cannot allow the w ar on drugs to take our civil liberties hostage.” ( W alker 
Chandler, [http://www.aclu.org/news/n011497b.htm l], M arch, 1998. )
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opponents have no constitu tional standing—that, in her words, the private sector 
is “a domain unguarded by Fourth Am endm ent constraints." '
The pu tative efficacy and  propriety of drug testing  rest on four basic premises:
1. Prevalence and risk: The aggregate epidemiological and socioeconomic data 
estim ating  the nature, extent, and cost of drug abuse are sound, justifying 
concerted preventive m easures:
2. Preventive utility: Commercial analytical technologies are sufficiently accurate 
and precise—even in the face of already huge and growing specimen 
workloads—to unfailingly reveal recent drug use while avoiding significant 
problems of “false positive" accusation:
'  Some legislators simply refuse to listen w ith respect to the Chandler 
lim itation on goierninent-initiated  drug testing. Then-Republican House member 
Susan M olinari of New York (who recently resigned to become a CBS-T\' news 
anchor), flanked by fellow GOP Representatives Tom DeLay and Newt Gingrich, 
appeared a t a news conference less than  two weeks after the April 15th Chandler 
decision to announce her introduction of a legislative proposal to require drug tests 
of all U.S. newborns (in excess of 4 million annually), w ith positive lab results 
forwarded to child abuse agencies. Such, coming from an otherw ise get-government- 
off-our-backs “conservative.” exemplifies the confused policy clim ate of our w ar on 
drugs and the proper role of the indiscrim inate drug test. Critics might observe 
that, as a practical m atter, opting to w ait un til the in utero “dam age” is extant 
seems a bit odd: were M ohnari tru ly  serious she would be perhaps offering 
legislation m andating  th a t  all women be m onitored \da drug testing  throughout 
the ir pregnancies. Secondly, it is beyond dispute th a t illicit drug use is not 
random ly dispersed throughout obstetrical s tra ta  (or any socioeconomic stra ta). In 
Chandler, the Suprem e Court for once recognized an epidemiological commonplace: 
indiscrim inate screening m akes no scientific sense (for the host of reasons we will 
explore in these pages). In the wake of Chandler, Ms. M oUnaris proposal would 
appear to be constitutionally, well—stillborn: one more episode of ill-considered, 
photo-op political “J a rs  W ars” grandstanding, going nowhere.
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3. Legal theory and  case law precedent; Ju risp ru d en tia l foundation and practice 
validate the use of drug testing despite the Fourth  A m endm ent requirem ent of 
"probable cause” connected w ith the search for contraband: and
4. E thical justification: The contentious notion of “privacy.” to the extent that it can 
be considered a constitutional "right” a t all. is a relatively recent, derivative, and 
"weak” right, one th a t m ust defer to society's righ t to fair competition, safe and 
productive workplaces, and a healthy, sober citizenry.
My thesis is th a t such premises are by no m eans incontrovertible: tha t mass 
drug screening fails to meet basic em pirical criteria  of epidemiological vafidity. 
methodological so b rie t;. and economic utifity. while doing violence to both 
C onstitu tional and  ethical principles. As suspicionless drug testing  programs are 
m arketed  to ever-lower prevalence s tra ta , they become little  more than 50 milliliter 
loyalty oaths. Equitable competition, safe and prosperous work en\dronments. and a 
healthy citizenry are indeed noble ends—ends w orthy of m eans more ethical and 
effective than  those constituting little more than  Potem kin science in service of 
poUtical symbolism and private laboratory profits. Let us now briefly examine the 
foregoing list of prem ises, assertion by assertion.
Prevalence and risk:
First, we can stipulate  th a t recreational intoxication is no trivial m atter, yet 
am ple evidence exists th a t illicit drug use. as serious as it is on its own terms, is a 
relatively m inor epidemiological concern when viewed in the context of the major
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
categories of voluntary risk-taking behaviors we see fit to regulate through tort and 
crim inal laws and commercial risk underw riting  system s—despite equally 
“preventable” and far more costly contributions to health, safety, and economic 
losses by tobacco, alcohol, poor diet, lack of exercise, infections, toxic agents, 
firearm s, unsafe sex. motor vehicles, and  so forth .’ Moreover, much of the 
undeniable dam age attributable to illegal drugs (e.g.. toxicity, enforcement costs, 
crime) is a function of their very illegality. Yet, a selective neo-puritan hostility 
endures, im m une to both ratiocination and real num bers, so decrim inalization 
proposals continue to be dismissed out of hand—prim arily in ad hominem  fashion
’ One in ternet edition reviewer \igorously assailed  this thesis for 
characterizing iUicit drug use as “a relatively minor epidemiological concern.” This 
respondent chose to focus only on th a t clause in the sentence. Re-read the entire 
s tatem ent; there are ethically appropriate methods available to a society for dealing 
with risk and loss. It is the contention herein, however, th a t indiscrim inate drug 
testing is not among them. Even under a s tan d ard  and strictly u tilitarian  risk/cost- 
benefit analysis, mass drug testing fails to m easure up, as 1 shall show as th is work 
progresses. When you add in the legal and ethical considerations—in addition to the 
empirical context—you cannot but find a compeUing case against such measures.
Ron Kotulak. in his recent book Inside the B rain . (Kansas City. Andrews & 
McMeel. 1996) makes the following observation: “Lifestyle risks account for half of 
the 2.2 million deaths th a t occur annually  in the U nited S tates . . . [l]n an eye- 
opening 1993 article published in the Jo u rna l of the American Medical Association, 
the researchers described the deadly toll: tobacco. 400.000 annual deaths; bad diet 
and physical inactivity. 300.000 deaths; alcohol. 100.000; infections (mostly 
preventable) 90,000; toxic agents a t home or in the workplace, 60,000; firearms. 
35.000; unsafe sex. 30.000; motor vehicles. 25.000; and illicit use of drugs. 20.000.” 
(pg. 188)
In other words, the last item on the list constitu ted  less than  2% of the 
aggregate lifestyle-associated m ortality experience. One can legitimately 
characterize th a t as “a relatively m inor epidemiological concern,” particularly  in 
light of the massive resources devoted to the  suppression and rem ediation of the 
“iUicit drug problem.” Drug W ar opponents insist th a t these resources are being 
significantly misapplied in Quixotic fashion, to the  detrim ent of more rational 
preventive methods and more pressing social concerns.
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coincident w ith a larm ist sHppery-slope “logic”—by those com m itted to the “W ar On 
Drugs.” e.g.. w itness the recent rhetorical savaging of philan throp ist George Soros 
subsequent to his backing of Cahfornia’s Proposition 215. the Medical M arijuana 
Initiative:
Like many people. 1 was delighted this past November w hen voters 
in California and Arizona approved, by substan tia l m argins, two 
ballot in itiatives th a t represent a  change in direction in our drug 
policies. The California initiative legahzed the cultivation and use of 
m arijuana for medicinal purposes. The Arizona initiative went 
further, allowing doctors to prescribe any drug for legitim ate medical 
purposes and m andating treatm ent, not incarceration, for those 
arrested  for illegal drug possession. It also stiffened penalties for 
violent crimes com m itted under the influence of drugs.
These results are significant both in term s of the ir im m ediate 
impact and because they suggest th a t Am ericans are beginning to 
recognize both the futihty of the drug w ar and  the need to think 
realistically and openly about alternatives.
O ur drug w arriors responded by pushing the panic button. The 
drug czar. Gen. Barry McCaffrey, claimed th a t “these propositions are 
not about compassion, they are about legalizing dangerous drugs.” 1 
was severely a ttacked  for having supported the in itiatives financially. 
Joseph Califano described me in The Post as the “Daddy W arbucks of 
drug legalization” and accused me of “bamboozling” the voters with 
m isleading advertisem ents. I was denigrated in congressional 
hearings chaired by Sen. O rrin H atch (R-Utah), and in the New York 
Times. A.M. Rosenthal went so far as to imply th a t 1 represen t a new 
kind of “drug money.”®
Do the “d a ta” support a need for m ass suspicionless drug testing? The “d a ta” 
consist of long-term U.S. drug use history and more recent “m edical” statistics. In 
C hapter Two we review the history of the American experience with curren tly  illicit 
drugs and the evolution of anti-drug policy. In C hapter Three we exam ine the
® George Soros, The Drug War Debate . . .  It's  Time to Ju st Say No To Self- 
Destructive Prohibition, The W ashington Post. February 2, 1997, pg. C l.
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sources and m ethods of obtaining and analyzing the epidemiological and  "clinical" 
evidence proffered in justification of drug testing.
The preventive u tility  of m ass drug screening:
Laboratory resources are  finite: there  are much more pressing uses for the 
equipm ent and  skilled personnel required to perform high quality analytical 
chem istry. F urtherm ore, given the large disparity  betw'een official assertions of the 
prevalence of employee d rug  abusers and the percentage of confirmed positives 
reported in recent years, e ith e r the prevalence assertions are  grossly exaggerated or 
the labs are testing  a t probable-cause concentration levels, thereby trad ing  false 
negatives for false positives to avoid law suits from the falsely accused. If the la tte r 
is the case, we are egregiously w asting precious laboratory capacity in pu rsu it of 
drug w ar symbolism. Degraded quah ty  of lab results m ay be a consequence for all 
o thers requiring reliable chnical tests. My own long and in tense laboratory tenure 
indelibly persuaded  me of w hat any honest lab m anager will adm it: analytical 
quality  is a principal casualty  of specimen overload. We exam ine in detail the 
relevant analytical methodology concerns in C hapter Four.
Legal theory and case law history:
W ith respect to the th ird  assertion, the claim th a t the Fourth  A m endm ent does 
not apply is specious on its face. We review the history and political conditions 
leading to the fram ing and exact lexical construction of the Fourth A m endm ent— 
every word of which em erged from the forge of Colonial disdain for the Crown pohcy
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8
of forcibly deputizing m erchants in the unrestricted  pu rsu it of contraband. The 
claim th a t our governm ent cannot enforce the right of privacy in civil commerce is 
an unpersuasive apology from an authority  with the power to m andate the height of 
handrails in business facilities to the fraction of an inch, an  au thority  th a t can 
prohibit the production of feedstock for private use on a family farm, an authority  
th a t otherwise dictates in num bing detail the param eters of fair employment 
practice. Indeed, on th is last point. 1 argue th a t suspicionless employment drug 
testing violates Title M l of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 w ith respect to Fair 
Employment criteria: see Griggs c. Duke Power. 401 U.S. 424. 1971. which broadly 
addressed the issue of workplace justice. Griggs w as not merely concerned w ith  
protection of “m inorities” in the workplace: in vahdating Title M l the Court 
outlawed arb itrary , non job-skill related  “tests" having controlling force in 
employment practice. And a m andatory drug screen has ju s t that: controlhng force, 
irrespective of its dem onstrably feeble predictive utility  (particularly with respect to 
negative test results: a coin toss may have a higher “NPV,” or Negative Predictive 
Value). A person’s perhaps otherw ise extensive and ste llar curriculum vitae counts 
for nothing  should you refuse a required employment drug screen.
Worse, there is recent sen tim ent in Congress to make it effectively illegal to 
decline, by perm itting  the adm inistrative branding of those refusing to be tested as 
“drug positive.” Pay particu la r atten tion  to sections 2704(a)" and 2707(b)® of House
■ SEC. 2704. STANDARDS FOR DRUG TESTING, (a) APPLICANTS- 
Nothing in th is title  shall be construed to prohibit an employer from requiring, as a 
condition of employment, th a t an  applicant subm it to and pass a drug test based on 
criteria estabhshed by the employer th a t is designed to achieve a drug-free
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
o f Representatives 153 of the 104th Congress. This bill, ostensibly concerned with 
“quality assurance” in drug testing, has precious h ttle  to say regarding the specific 
technical elem ents of ensuring laboratory competence. It does, however, devote 
much language to the unrestricted  expansion of coercive drug testing throughout 
sectors public and private.
The sponsor of this and related drug testing legislative proposals is 
Representative G erald Solomon (R-NAl. a senior mem ber of the House and an 
aggressive proponent of escalating the W ar On Drugs. On the opening day of the 
104th Congress. Mr. Solomon “went nuclear” with a battle cry for bhtzkrieg in 
rem arks en titled  “Redeclare the Drug W ar’, (Congressional Record. 1-4-95) in which 
his in ten t to subject all workers pubhc and private to drug screening was utterly 
clear: "The best method  . . . involves testing in the workplace. By requiring the testing 
of all Government employees and officials we can set the standard for the private 
sector.”
Consider a scenario: You apply for a job. and as you open the application form to 
begin filling it in. you encounter the following:
workplace. Refusal by an apphcant to subm it to such a test may be treated  in the 
same m anner as a failure to pass a drug test.
8 SEC. 2707. EMPLOYER PRACTICES . . . ( b )  DRUG-FREE WORIxPLACE- 
Nothing in this title  shall be construed to prohibit an employer from taking action 
necessary, up to and including term ination, in the case of applicant or em ployee- 
(1) whose drug te s t resu lt is confirmed positive. (2) who refuses to take a drug test 
authorized under th is title  . . . House Resolution 153, Library of Congress: 
[ftp://ftp.loc.gov/pub/thomas/clG4/hl53.ih.txt], March. 1998.
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1. Have you ever com m itted a crime for which you were not apprehended?
2. Do you now engage in ongoing or periodic crim inal conduct?
3. Do you support the war against drug abuse?
4. Are you w illing to subm it proof o f the foregoing?
Ask any  hum an resources m anager w hether he or she would dare include such 
queries on a job application. A pre-em ploym ent drug screen, however, constitutes 
the exact bioassay equivalent of such patently  illegal questions. Ferreting out 
crim inal m iscreants is properly the function of law enforcem ent, not the Hum an 
Resources D epartm ent. The pohtical loyalty oath is a ju stly  discredited relic of the 
M cCarthy era. H aving to “prove” one’s innocence through suspicionless drug 
screening is the m oral and  methodological equivalent of witch dunking.
To sum up point three: Clearly, ours is a governm ent th a t in fact does undertake 
to compel observation of fundam ental civil rights by those whom it commercially 
charters and regulates; it can and should enforce the right to privacy in such 
domains ra th e r th an  w asting time and tax dollars composing C onstitutionally 
noxious legislation requiring asym ptom atic citizens to dem onstrate  the ir drug 
abstinence to avoid sum m ary  labeling as “drug abusers. ”
Ethical justification:
Finally, on the necessity of “privacy ”: W hether one believes th a t the Fourth 
Am endm ent phrase “ . . . secure in their persons . . . ” is synonymous with a 
proscriptive legal righ t to bodily and psychological privacy, it can be shown th a t the
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need for privacy is a fundam ental aspect of personality, one seen and respected in 
one form or ano ther throughout m illennia and across cultures. The cardinal 
elem ents of v irtuous moral character (e.g.. courage, tem perance, justness, 
industriousness, honesty) and the behaviors they guide are not m ere functions of 
the prod of ongoing surveillance. Indeed, one can m ake the case th a t v irtue is a 
m a tte r of behaving morally even in the absence of observation or th rea t of 
apprehension. Those who framed our Bill of Rights were far more noble than  a 
cynical conspiracy of tariff-averse fur traders and rum -runners motiv'ated by- 
nothing more th an  a desire to hog-tie authority . They knew th a t liberty—which we 
ostensibly revere as a founding principle— requires respect for individual moral 
agency: respect for the private absent probable cause justifying its breach.
It is ironic th a t the same 104th Congress th a t en tertained  a spate of harsh 
m andatory drug testing  bills also expressed legislative concern w ith the protection 
of “privacy” via House o f Representatives 184. the “Individual Privacy Protection .Act 
of 1995." This bill asserted  in Section 2(4) tha t “the right to privacy is a personal 
and fundam enta l right protected by the Constitution o f the United States.” The 
detailed  language of the proposal made clear the federal in ten t and authority  to 
regulate p rivate sector violations of “privacy.” WTiat the bill’s au thors and backers 
focused on, however, was the “confidentiality” of increasingly digitally stored and 
readily d issem inated  personal data  collected in the course of commerce, not 
“privacy” of the B randeis “right-to-be-left-alone” variety  implicit—or as 1 shall 
contend, exphcit—in the historical “stric t construction” of the Fourth  Amendment. 
On th is  la tte r, more fundam ental issue—strengthening  C onstitutional proscriptions
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against unw arran ted  snooping and data  acquisition—the legislative proposal was 
u tterly  silent.
We feel compelled to draw  a negative inference w hen someone voices opposition 
to indiscrim inate drug testing  on C onstitutional and ethical principles. Such is an 
unfortunate reaction, one th a t 1 hope my thesis will show to be unw arranted  and 
ultim ately counterproductive w ith respect to legitim ate social in terests, one tha t 1 
hope my effort wiU help serve to dispel.
Argum ent outline:
Chapter Two, drug policy history. A brief review of the pertinent particu lars of 
the American Drug War and the evolution of drug testing  pohcy. The history of 
currently  outlawed intoxicants in America is one of waves of often rehgion-driven 
intolerance atop a racist undertow —a bible-thum ping and xenophobic demonization 
of the indulgent. It has been a curious voyage from the laissez faire pharm acy to the 
sealed specimen vial.
A century ago, few could vote, but aU could self-medicate as they saw- fit. Today, 
anyone of majority age—irrespective of civic in te rest or acum en—can cast a ballot, 
but no one can self-medicate as he or she sees fit. Iconoclast libertarian  and 
psychiatrist Dr. Thomas Szasz views th is circum stance as one of our having traded 
a real right (personal autonomy) for a “fake” one (the right to select officeholders 
from cadres of candidates w ith only stylistically differing agendas for paternalism ).
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True? Or mere libertarian  rom anticism  regarding a past th a t was far less 
pharmacologically and epidemiologically benign th an  alleged?
We will examine the history and  spread of m ass drug screening, which began in 
earnest as then-President Richard Nixon looked to his advisors for tactics with 
which to divert pubhc atten tion  from his controversial prosecution of the Vietnam 
war. W idespread, flagrant drug use was seen as em blem atic of the anti- 
w ar/countercultural movement Nixon so despised. Moreover, m ih tary  personnel in 
Vietnam had begun smoking m arijuana and indulging in heroin use. A War on 
Drugs, complete w ith suspicionless drug testing, would be em braced w ith a fervor 
tha t has yet to abate in the face of substan tia l evidence of futihty.
Chapter Three, epidemiology and  risk assessment: E stim ating  the nature, 
extent, and cost of drug abuse. Upon close critical exam ination, serious questions 
emerge concerning the rehabihty of the data, most of which are gathered  and 
dissem inated by “W ar On Drugs” p a rtisans in ten t on bu ttressing  foregone 
conclusions. A sm all hors d ’eouvre tray  of some of the more outlandish  “factoid” 
allegations:
• “Recent government statistics reveal th a t 1 out of 6 w orkers has a drug 
problem.”
• “Estim ates of on-the-job cocaine use (including crack) range from 10% to 50% of 
ah employees.”
• “Today. 1 out of every 10 babies born in the U nited S ta tes  is addicted to drugs."
• “The nation’s health  care system  is s tra in ing  from the w ar on drugs w ith nearly 
500,000 drug-related hospital em ergencies a year."
• “Today’s m arijuana is 6 to 10 ten tim es more potent th an  th a t of 20 years ago.”
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“Except for some advocates of drug legalization, no one seriously doubts th a t 
drug abuse kills and  in jures millions of Americans and the ir children each
® W illiam J . B ennett, co-author of Body Count: Moral Poverty—and how to 
win America's w ar against crim e and drugs. (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996) 
page 19. Really? Aie Ron K otulak and JAJVLA. off the m ark by orders of magnitude? 
The au thors insist in Bodv Count th a t ‘[RJigorous and empirical data are the 
foundation for our analysis and  the discussion that follows. As you w ill see, this book 
is chock-full o f the latest and  most reliable facts, figures, charts, and  graphs about 
violent crime and drugs. To you the reader we say: bear with us. These num bers are 
crucial— crucial because we believe that any fru itfu l discussion about crime and  
punishm ent in Am erica should  proceed from a proper regard for facts."
No disagreem ent w ith respect to th a t last sentence. Body Count, however, 
offers up one correlation m istake after another. Bennett et a l begin w ith a lengthy 
and lurid recounting of unspeakable, headline-grabbing recent violent crimes: from 
drive-by shootings to thrill-k illings to horrific tales of child abuse. This is followed 
by a segm ent en titled  Liquor, Disorder, and  Crime, then a chap ter on Restraining  
a nd  Punishing Street Crim inals. Only after 136 num bing pages of poignant crime 
victim vignettes and “h a rd ” yet irrelevant data, do the authors get to the ir 
fundam ental assertion  (C hapter 4. Drugs, Crime, and  Character): th a t illicit drug 
use is caused by and  causes w hat they call “moral poverty." and by direct 
implication, th a t drug use causes the bulk of our crime problem: "If one wants to 
know the im m ediate causes o f much o f A m erica’s moral poverty, the destruction of 
large parts o f our inner cities, and  its record-high crime rates, it is impossible to 
overlook d ru s  use, (pg. 137, em phasis mine).
For these au thors, illicit drugs are more or less circularly bad  because they 
are illicit, illicit because they are  bad. More to the point, drugs are bad because they 
are "pleasurable” (pg. 141) and  th a t “drug use fosters moral poverty and 
rem orseless crim inahty; th a t drug use destroys character and brutafizes the lives of 
users and those around them ” (pg. 139). Total abstinence is the only solution for 
Bennett. Dilulio, and W alters.
Never m ind th a t the  vast majority of illicit drug users commit no crimes 
o ther th an  th e ir acquisition and use of drugs. Never m ind th a t the N ational 
Academy of Sciences recently  concluded (see U nder the Influence? Drugs and the 
Am erican Workforce) th a t "fMJost alcohol and  other drug users do not develop 
patterns o f clinically defined abuse or dependence."
This book is shot th rough  w ith vague words and phrases such as “fosters.” 
“associated with," “linked to,” “correlated with," and so forth ad nauseum . The “hard 
d a ta” come from the u sual lineup of suspect partisan  sources. The au thors ' 
conclusions? More enforcem ent; harsh  punishm ent for even occasional recreational 
drug use: drug testing; zero tolerance: dism issal out-of-hand of all ta lk  of “root
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AU of the foregoing “facts” came from ostensibly reputable sources. None of them  
can be substantiated .
Chapter Four, laboratory methodology: Suprem e court Justice  Antonin Scalia. 
in his m ajority opinion upholding random drug tests  for studen t athletes in 
Vernonia School District 47J  c. Acton et ux (Docket 94-590. 1995). writes th a t "[TJhe 
laboratory’s procedures are 99.94% accurate.’’ WTiat can such a claim possibly mean?
• That a production specimen result of 100 ng/mL. is consistently confirmable 
w ithin a range of ± 0.06 ng/mL. when divided into m ultiple aUquots for repUcate 
analyses?*®
• T hat the lab correctly identifies 9.994 out of 10,000 true  positives? (The “alpha 
erro r” level, or "sensitivity” criterion.)
• That the lab correctly identifies 9,994 out of 10,000 true  negatives? (The "beta 
erro r” level, or "specificity” criterion, analyticaUy the inverse of “alpha.”)
• T hat the ratio of true  positives to false positives is 9,994 to 6?
• T hat the ratio of true  negatives to false negatives is 9,994 to 6?"
• Any of the foregoing docum entably stratifiable by analytical param eters? .\cross 
a range of concentration levels, all the way down to the cut-off limits? For every 
in strum ent and technician? Across time?
• Or. (from the SAMHSA/NIDA federal lab certification protocol) tha t the lab can 
correctly identify and quantify external PT (“perform ance test”) specimens 
w ithin ± 20% of the reference values a t least 80% of the time, and w ithin ± 50%
causes" (other than  the ir own take on the topic): more Loving-Two-Parent-Norman- 
RockweU-Families teaching Just-D on t-Do-It: more God in our lives.
*® The abbreviation “ng/mL.” is short for “nanogram s per m illiliter.” A nanogram  is 
one-bülionth of a gram: a m illiliter is 1/1.000 of a h te r. An “aUquot” is simply a 
portion of the original sam ple prepared for analysis.
"  A “false positive” is one where the test indicates the presence of a drug 
when none is actually present. Conversely, a “false negative” m eans tha t the drug 
was indeed present but the analysis did not detect it.
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in the aggregate w ithout a false positive, given a  10% false negative allowance? 
What?
A lab reports, for example, “ 123 ng./mL.” of benzoylecgonine (cocaine 
metabohte*-) in a urine sample. For openers, th is impUes not " 122" or “124" 
(scientists call this the “significant figures” precision level). Minimally, such a 
finding asserts  a (production, mind you) repUcabihty of less than  ± I ng./mL. Any 
takers?
A detailed inquiry into the incredible complexity of analytical chem istry 
methodology compels the conclusion that, in the absence of precise operational 
definitions—independently verified by meticulous in te rna l quality control data and 
truly blind and rigorous ongoing external proficiency evaluations—Justice Scalia's 
“99.94%" m eans nothing, beyond a naive and unsustainable faith  in the exactitude 
of mass-production commercial science.
"In God We Trust: a ll others bring data." -  Brent Jam es. M.D.. M .Stat.
Chapter Five, Constitutional privacy issues: Why do we have a Fourth 
Amendment, and should it really apply in drug testing  pohcy cases? In her 
impassioned dissent in Vernonia v. Acton Justice O’Connor cited William J. 
Cuddihy’s 1990 Clarem ont G raduate University doctoral d issertation Origins and 
O riginal M eaning of the Fourth A m endm ent. Cuddihy's trea tise  is a seminal, 4- 
volume, 19 lb., nearly 1,700 page compendium of exhaustive detail recounting the
I- Drug tests detect “m etabohtes.” or biochemical derivatives of the 
originally ingested compounds. The word “param eter” refers to the particu lar class 
of m etabolites.
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custom s and codification of search and seizure procedure from ancient tim es 
through the period of raging pre-revolution colonial an tipathy  tow ard the aggressive 
and arbitrary ' Crown search and seizure tactics, practices the Fram ers specifically 
sought to prohibit via the Fourth Amendment. Cuddihy illum inates “Original 
In ten t” w ith a  vengeance. Dr. Bork. meet Dr. Cuddihy. Yes. the Fourth Am endm ent 
should apply to drug testing.
The still contentious question, however, revolves around the circum stances in 
which the C ourt finds justification for “adm inistrative exceptions” departures from 
the “probable cause” and “w arran ts” clauses of the Fourth  Amendment. In addition 
to Vernonia. the two principal suspicionless drug testing  cases prior to Chandler 
illum inate the inner turm oil of the Court w ith respect to the drug testing issue: 
Skinner v. R ailw ay Labor Executives Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (w arrantless post­
accident drug testing  of railroad employees: upheld), and Treasury Employees v. Von 
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (m andatory pre-employment and promotion drug 
screening of Custom s Dept, personnel: also upheld). Among the curiosities here is 
Justice  Scalia's m ajority opinion in Vernonia. which cites the C ourt’s m ajority 
conclusion in Treasury in support of his Vernonia rationale—somewhat 
disingenuously ignoring the fact th a t he wrote a lengthy and scathing dissent in 
T reasury  characterizing  the m ajority opinion thereof as “o k ind  o f immolation of 
privacy and  hum an dignity in symbolic opposition to drug  use.”*̂
* * In C handler v. M iller the Court finally found “symbohc” drug testing 
program s constitu tionally  im perm issible. Inexplicably, however, the m ajority 
refused to validate  a central Chandler claim; th a t such “symbolism” had a fatal 1st 
A m endm ent en tanglem ent in addition to the 4th A m endm ent “privacy” problem.
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Chapter Six, privacy as an ethical principle: “Privacy” is a term  w ith multiple 
connotations. We m andate by law and social norm s tha t certain  activities be 
conducted “in private.” The privacy synonyms “secluded” and “exclusive” are 
positive keywords in real esta te  advertising. A media microphone rudely th ru s t in 
the face of a grieving paren t who has ju s t lost a child to an accident is disdainfully 
viewed as an egregious “invasion of privacy." Similarly, celebrities bemoan (and 
frequently  litigate  against) the ir losses of privacy a t the hands of th e ir tabloid 
p ursuers. In some major pubhc pohcy contexts, however, privacy seems to be w hat
Consider the dissent by Justice B arkett in the 11th Circuit appellate case tha t led 
directly to the Chandler Suprem e Court case:
" . . .  Not only is the privacy surrounding  an individual’s bodily functions a t 
s take, but all of the rights associated w ith participating in a democracy—rights of 
association, freedom of speech, ballot access, and the right to cast an effective ballot. 
We are not deaUng merely w ith the denial of a job opportunity, but w ith the denial 
of opportunity  to participate in our dem ocratic form of government. In Ught of the 
interference w ith these hberty  in terests, giving the governm ental in terests here the 
g rea ter weight seems especially unreasonable.
■‘Finally. I am concerned about the m ajority’s conclusion th a t the 
governm ent’s actions in th is case do not \dolate the First Amendment. The majority 
m ain ta ins th a t the governm ent's purpose is not suppression of free expression. Yet. 
It supports its holding by citing the im portance of ensuring th a t elected officials are 
"persons appreciative of the perils of d rug  use” and “sym pathetic to drug 
interdiction efforts.” E stabhshing a certain  ideology as a “quahfication” for holding 
public office appears to be a content- based restriction on free expression. Drug 
policy is a politically charged issue confronting m any government officials who have 
d ispara te  points of view regarding the “D rug W ar” and the efficacy of the means 
employed in fighting it. It is the function of public office holders to write, enforce, 
and  in te rp re t the laws, including drug laws. By conditioning holding public office 
upon subm ission to drug screening, however, the Georgia legislature effectively 
bans from positions of political power not only those candidates who might disagree 
w ith the  cu rren t pohcy crim inalizing drug use, bu t also those who challenge the 
in trusive governm ental m eans to detect such use among its citizenry. This s ta tu te  is 
ne ither n eu tra l nor procedural, but, in the m ajority’s own characterization, 
a ttem p ts  to ensure th a t only candidates w ith a certain  point of view qualify for 
pubhc office.” ( Chandler c. M iller, 11th Circuit, Docket 95-8230: 
[http://w w w .law .em ory.edu/llcircuit/jan96/95-8230.m an.htm l], March, 1998. )
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we value most for ourselves, and w hat we would most like to deny others by casting 
aspersions on their privacy claims. *■'
How does a drug-abstinent individual counter the implication of cover-up motive 
in the question 'T f yo u ’ve nothing to hide, how can you object to being tested?’’— 
beyond the problematic retort. "It’s none o f your business." We will examine 
developments in U.S. legal privacy norms, including current concerns regarding 
confidentiality in a digital age. We will then survey ethological. anthropological, 
cultural, historical, psychological, and philosophical evidence supporting the role of 
privacy in the development and functioning of socially com petent citizens. Bentham  
got it wrong. The conventional fi-aming of the privacy issue— which posits an 
in tractable antagonism  between personal privacy rights and social im peratives—is 
inadequate. A deeper understanding  is required. Paradoxical though it may seem on 
a surface view, it can be shown th a t privacy is a t once a personal and civic ethical 
good. The Panopticon*^ is by wide m argin a net loser: devoid of enduring moral force 
with respect to the dissolute: irrelevant a t best with respect to the upright.
'•* Two excellent recently published resources address the m ultifaceted 
nuances of “privacy.” See The Right to Privacv by EUen Alderm an and Carohne 
Kennedy (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1995) and Private M atters: In Defense of 
the Personal Life by Jan n a  M alam ud Sm ith (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, Inc.. 
1997). WTiile the Adlerman-Kennedy book is principally a compendium of examples 
of privacy transgressions in a variety of contexts, the la tte r work is a detailed and 
eloquent defense of privacy as a psychological necessity and net moral good.
*5 “Panopticon” refers to the views of 18th century B ritish philosopher and 
penal reformer Jerem y Bentham , whose proposed model for the perfect correctional 
institu tion—for which he coined the term  “panopticon”—was one in which inm ates 
would be subjected to total, continual surveillance. He posited th a t such “panoptic” 
oversight would lead to the in ternalization  of socially acceptable values and 
behaviors among offender populations.
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Chapter Seven, addressing counter-arguments: Testing proponents insist tha t 
suspicionless screening is a t once indispensable, reliable, and “fairer" than  the 
alternatives. Their argum ents, while vulnerable to m ethodical criticism, are not 
entirely baseless; we m ust and shall address them  forthrightly. Some examples:
All of this high-m inded hand-w ringing over drug screening vis a vis the Fourth 
Amendment is ju st so much hot a ir—the 4th is not germ ane here: no job 
applicant, employee, athlete, or s tu d en t has ever had a positive test result 
forwarded to the au thorities for prosecution—the only circum stance which 
would rightfully bring the Fourth A m endm ent into play. A dm inistrative privacy 
violations are properly dealt w ith in to rt venues.
M anagers have ongoing and pressing production work to tend to; they cannot be 
expected to also don the role of drug detectives endlessly rum inating  over the 
legalistic nuances of “probable cause." Moreover, restric ted  to “cause” testing, 
m anagers m ight hesitate  to ever invoke it for fear of being sued by those 
claiming harassm en t—however frivolously—in the wake of subsequent negative 
assays.
The “democratic” natu re  of m andatory  testing: Everyone (ideally) from the CEO 
to the jan ito r is trea ted  equally.
Employers and co-workers have a right to safe and productive enterprises. 
Moreover, employers th a t fund Ufe and  health  insurance benefits have a 
justifiable im perative to minimize such expenses. If you apply for private life 
and/or health  insurance, you will be tested  for s tree t drugs in the course of the 
physical exam. Invasion of your privacy? W hat about the rights and obligations 
of the underw riter?
The irrelevance of prevalence: As Justice  Kennedy observed by the way of 
analog}' in Treasury, (subsequently echoed by Justice G insberg in Vernonia), the 
fact th a t airport passenger screening alm ost never tu rn s  up weapons in no way 
negates the u tility  of the policy. D eterrence is often necessary—critical, even,— 
and cannot be evaluated solely by post-hoc em pirical m easures. Drug abuse 
prevalence m ight very well be considerably higher absent m andatory testing.
With respect to the private sector, your argum ent fails to take into account the 
utterly  legal norm of “em ploym ent-at-w ill.” Employers have the right to monitor 
you a t will on the job, and term inate  you for any reason, however arbitrary.
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Such are indeed (in varying m easure) substantive rejoinders worthy of 
considered and  cogent responses. They will receive them.
Chapter Eight, conclusions and  policy recommendations: W hat if random  and/or 
blanket drug  te sts  were outlawed? Would we be left defenseless or seriously 
ham pered in the effort to a tten u a te  the dam age caused by overindulgence in 
recreational toxins? Em phatically, no! W ith respect to the employm ent context, such 
assum es the continuing inevitability  and optim al efficacy of the large and/or and 
im personal com m and-and-control organizational paradigm  in which employees are 
regarded as m ere production means, responsive only to coercion. We can. however 
(and we should), improve on th a t to enact and adm inister policies th a t are at once 
effective and ethical. Frederick Winslow Taylor's pessim istic and adversarial 
■‘Theory-X ’ labor-m anagem ent model has been revealed as the ossified 
organizational cadaver it tru ly  is, its  epitaph w rit large by a legion of progressive 
leadership practitioners.
We need not destroy the polis in order to "save " it.
A final thought: This w ork is not is an apology for drug legalization. The 
argum ent herein  is addressed  to those who are in fact drug-free. While I am quite 
fam iliar w ith  the decrim inahzation/legalization h te ra tu re  and find much of it well- 
argued and  thought-provoking (see. for example, the excellent and extensive work 
compiled online a t New York’s Lindesm ith Center*®), I, like many, continue to have
*® L indesm ith  C enter for D rug Policy Research, [http://www.lindesm ith.org/], 
March, 1998.
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serious reservations, and if society insists on retaining draconian remedies for drug 
transgressions, so be it. Foolish, perhaps; counterproductive, perhaps; unjust, 
perhaps—but such is the subject of another thesis, and is mostly irrelevant to my 
pohcy argum ent. Some assum e th a t if they are drug-abstinent (“ . . . nothing to hide 
. . . ”). they have no real stake in drug testing pohcy.
They are wrong.
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Introduction to drug testing policy environm ent and history
W hat of the “d a ta” supplying the foundation for an ti-drug  pohcy? Close scrutiny 
reveals much foggery and contradiction tha t can hardly be said to provide sohd 
e\"idence for rational pohcy and lawmaking. In this chap ter we briefly survey the 
history of the Am erican experience w ith currently proscribed intoxicants. In 
Chapter 2 we investigate contemporary methods of drug abuse assessm ent.
We begin w ith an excerpt of a recent H arper’s essay by Michael PoUan.
The w ar on drugs is in tru th  a w ar on some drugs, their enemy 
s ta tu s the resu lt of historical accident, cultural prejudice, and 
institu tional imperative. The taxonomy on behalf of which this w ar is 
being fought would be difficult to explain to an e x tra te r re s tr ia l. . .  Is 
it the quahty  of addictive ness th a t renders a substance ilhcit? Not in 
the case of tobacco, which 1 am free to grow in th is garden. Curiously, 
the cu rren t campaign against tobacco dwells less on cigarettes’ 
addictiveness th an  on their th rea t to our health. So is it toxicity tha t 
renders a substance a public menace? Well, my garden is full of 
p lan ts—d atu ra  and euphorbia, castor beans, and even the stem s of 
my rhubarb— th a t would sicken and possibly kill me if 1 ingested 
them, but the government tru s ts  me to be careful. Is it then the 
prospect of pleasure—of “recreational use ”—th a t pu ts a substance 
beyond the pale? Not in the case of alcohol: 1 can legally produce wine 
or hard  cider or beer firom my garden for my personal use (though 
there are regulations governing its distribution to others). So could it 
be a drug’s “m ind-altering” properties th a t m ake it evil? Certainly not 
in the case of Prozac, a drug that, much like opium, mimics the 
chemical compounds m anufactured in the brain . . .
23
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Someday we may marvel a t the power we’ve invested in these 
categories, which seems out of all proportion to the ir artifice. Perhaps 
one day the government won’t care if I w ant to m ake a cup of poppy 
tea for a m igraine, no more th an  it presently  cares if I make a cup of 
valerian tea  (a tranquilizer made from the roots of Valeriana 
officinalis) to help me sleep, or even if I w ant to make a quart of hard 
apple cider for the express purpose of getting  drunk. After all, it 
w asn’t such a long time ago th a t the fortunes of the apple and the 
poppy in th is  country were reversed. *'
VVTiüe Mr. Pollan’s opening sentence is beyond dispute (as we shall confirm 
below), 1 will not be holding my breath  w ith respect to his speculative m using in the 
la tte r paragraph  above.
For. our governm ent “finds, ” on the basis of m yriad reports—derived principally 
from news stories and  social science investigative m ethods of wildly varian t 
quality—th a t the use of ilhcit drugs, particularly  in the workplace, is a sufficiently 
adverse social and economic phenomenon to justify  the  coerced participation of 
millions of asym ptom atic citizens as “donors” of bioassay specimens for chemical 
metabolite analysis to uncover the presence of forbidden psychoactive recreational 
toxins. Willing, even eager submission to non-cause drug testing is coming to be 
seen as the la test varian t of the Loyalty Oath, w ith aspersions cast upon the 
motives and charac te r of dissenters. Legions of survey researchers provide an 
endless outpouring of statistics purporting to dem onstrate  the alarm ing prevalence 
and horrific economic and epidemiological costs of drug abuse. Vendors of laboratory
*" Michael Pollan, Opium, M ade Easy: One gardener's encounter with the war 
on drugs, H am er’s M agazine. March, 1997.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
services assure us th a t the ir technologies are u tterly  rehable, th a t only the “guilty" 
need be concerned. It’s “For O ur Own Good. ” we are soothingly told.
Is any of this so? Are the enabling laws and policies ethical and wise, grounded 
in coherent history and viable scientific data? Are such m easures critical to public 
health  and safety? Are the analytical procedures and technologies tru ly  effective, 
and fail-safe to the point of negating reasonable concerns over the possibility of false 
accusation? Can the nation’s laboratory in frastructure  deal com petently w ith the 
already huge and rapidly increasing sam ple workload? Is such a forcible deterrence 
strategy- the only feasible option available to us for promoting the health  and 
welfare of both individuals and society as a whole?
These questions are tim ely ones. A spate of expansive and harsh  new drug 
testing  legislative proposals is under consideration by the 105th Congress and  sta te  
legislatures around the nation, and commercial vendors of analytical technologies 
are rush ing  to m arket pa ten ted  (and, as such, potentially enormously lucrative) 
a lte rnatives to the conventional urine and blood tests  traditionally used in drug 
bioassay. There now exist methods th a t use ha ir and saliva samples, as well as a 
recently introduced “patch ” tha t, when worn on the skin, ostensibly reveals the 
presence of illicit compounds. Also recently in the news were reports on the 
comm ercial availability of a S20 drug testing  “sm ear k it” called DrugAlert™  th a t 
pa ren ts  are being encouraged to use on the ir children’s clothing, furniture, and 
possessions if they suspect the ir kids of drug use. The kits are re tu rned  to the
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vendor for analysis, a fter which a “confidential” report of findings is mailed back to 
the parents.
How did we arrive at such a sta te  of alarm ? The path  leading to proposals for an 
ongoing m etabohte surveillance sta te  is a perplexing one.
A bit of historical perspective
While reflexive prohibitionists have waxed ascendant since the early 1980’s to 
dominate the official U.S. drug pohcy agenda, much scholarly, even-handed, and 
nuanced historical research is available from the federal governm ent itself. One 
example will suffice here to provide an overview of d rug  use history and pohcy 
evolution in the U nited S tates. A 1979 monograph en titled  Themes in Chemical 
Prohibition by WiUiam L. White*® sum m arizes the phenomenon clearly;
The study of the historical them es in chemical prohibition 
m ovements can provide a helpful tool in understanding  those 
institu tionahzed  behefs and m yths which pose powerful barriers to 
any alteration  in social pohcy on “drug abuse.” This paper identifies 
the natu re  of those them es and presents the author's perceptions of 
how these inherited  belief system  have severely lim ited our options 
for more enlightened and effective strategies for the social control of 
chemical intoxication.
Chemical intoxicants have been available to hum ans in alm ost ah 
cu ltures since the beginning of time. Each culture through succeeding 
generations has assum ed the task  of defining and  redefining which 
chemicals will be blessed, celebrated, or to lerated  and which 
chemicals will be forbidden, legally prohibited, and condemned. In 
like m anner each generation has confronted w hat the pohcy would be 
tow ard those persons who disobeyed the ru les about the use of
*® W ilham L. White, Themes in Chemical Prohibition, Drugs in Perspective. 
National In stitu te  on Drug Abuse, 1979, [http://ww w .drughbrary.org/schafier/
H istory/ticp.htm l]. March, 1998.
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chemical intoxicants. The conversion of these policy definitions into 
law has often followed prohibitionist m ass m ovem ents which sought 
through a variety  of propaganda techniques to instill in the culture at 
large a certain  set of behefs and fears about the drugs in  question. 
UTien these movements have been effective a t generating  statu to ry  
prohibition of specific drugs, th is set of behefs and feehngs toward 
certain  chemicals and persons who use them  evolves over time to the 
point where they are seen as flowing from unchaUengable sources. At 
this stage, a lternatives to the pohcies th a t reflect these prohibitionist 
them es are \newed as unthinkable.
This paper is based on the foUowing prem ises:
1. C urren t strateg ies toward the use and abuse of mood-altering 
drugs continue to be based on a set of behefs generated  from the 
prohibitionist movements of the late 19th and early  20th 
centuries.
2. The cem enting of these prohibitionist behefs into the very social 
fabric of American culture is one of the prim ary  barriers to 
changing an outmoded and nonfunctional social pohcy. The 
in tegration of these behefs into our culture has been so complete 
th a t to question them is im m ediately experienced by the culture at 
large as an a ttack  on the institu tions which have prohferated 
these behefs, e.g., our national leaders, the law, our educational 
and rehgious institutions, and the family.
3. The developm ent of national pohcies tow ard mood altering drugs 
has not and cannot be intehigently addressed until we expose and 
modify- the irrational fears and behefs upon which curren t pohcies 
are based.
W'Tiite exam ines eight core them es th a t drive the prohibitionist agenda:
1. The drug is associated w ith a hated  subgroup of the society or a 
foreign enemy.
2. The drug is identified as solely responsible for m any problems in 
the culture, i.e., crime, violence, and insanity.
3. The survival of the culture is pictured as being dependent on the 
prohibition of the drug.
4. The concept of “controlled” usage is destroyed and  replaced by a 
“domino theory” of chemical progression.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
5. The drug is associated w ith the corruption of young children, 
particu larly  th e ir sexual corruption.
6. Both the user and  supplier of the drug are defined as fiends, 
alw ays in search of new victims; usage of the drug is considered 
"contagious.”
7. Policy options are p resen ted  as total prohibition or to tal access.
8. Anyone questioning any of the above assum ptions is bitterly- 
a ttacked  and characterized as part of the problem, th a t needs to 
be ehm inated.
One cannot bu t be struck  by- how little  social and official a ttitudes have changed 
since 1979. Excerpts from each of the foregoing eight them es drive the point home:
1. The D rug is Associated W ith a H ated Subgroup of the Society or a 
Foreign Enemy
The association of p a rticu lar drugs w ith hated  m inority groups and 
foreign enem ies has a long and  colorful history in the U nited S tates. 
The association of opium w ith  the Chinese, of cocaine w ith Blacks, of, 
alcohol w ith urban  Catholic im m igrants, of heroin w ith urban  
im m igrants, of Latinos w ith m arihuana, the claim th a t a m yriad of 
foreign enem ies were using these drugs against the U.S., and the 
image of drug crazed bohem ians such as Ludlow, Baudelaire, and 
DeQuincy- all were in tegral to the propaganda th a t generated the 
prohibitionist policies on each of these drugs . . .
2. The D rug is Identified as Solely- Responsible for M any Problem in 
the C ulture, i.e.. Crime, Violence, Insanity.
The a ttrib u tin g  of crimes of \dolence, sexual assault, insanity , 
m oral decay, etc. have been an  integral part of efforts to prohibit the 
currently- illicit drugs. A key elem ent in this them e is the a rb itra ry  
designation of "good” and “evil” drugs with evil drugs possessing 
powers th a t can overwhelm all efforts a t hum an control. “The Devil 
made him  do it” is changed to “the drug made him do it.” . . .
3. Survival of the C ulture is P ictured  as D ependent on Prohibition or 
C ontinued Prohibition of the Drug
Im plicit in the a ttribu tion  of society’s problems to the use of 
p a rticu la r chemicals is the assum ption and implication th a t these 
problem s will d isappear as prohibition becomes effective The
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elim ination of the drug and its use is thus characterized as crucial for 
the survival of the  culture. Such claim have been characteristic of 
nearly all prohibitionist movements . . .
4. The Concept of “Controlled” Usage is Destroyed and Replaced by a 
“Domino Theory" of Chemical Progression
The history- of prohibitionist pronouncements is replete with 
examples which propose a “domino theory” of chem ical usage. Such a 
theory holds th a t the  use of a particular drug (usually- the one 
presently targeted  for prohibition) inevitably and w ith rare exception 
leads-to the use of o ther drugs (usually drugs already prohibited or 
drugs already defined as evil). For example, the pubhcation in 1798 of 
Essavs. Literary. Moral and Philosophical by Benjam in Rush includes 
the following com m ents from an anti-tobacco essay: “A desire o f course 
is excited for strong drink, (by smoking tobacco) and these (cigarettes) 
when taken between meals soon lead to intemperance and drunkenness
5. The Drug Is Associated with the Moral Corruption of the Young. 
Particularly  Their Sexual Corruption
Chemicals have long beep inextricably finked in prohibitionist 
h te ra tu re  w ith the sexual corruption of young people. Joan Fran 
Rauch a ttacked  chocolate in 1624 as a violent inflam er of passions. 
Tobacco was finked w ith sexual immorality in the 1850’s, and the 
association betw een opium and the corruption of young women began 
in the 1880’s w ith the publication in 1882 of H.H. K ane’s Opium 
Smoking in Am erica and China . . .
6. Both U ser and Supplier Are Defined as Fiends. Always in Search of 
New Victims; Usage of the Drug is Considered “Contagious”
The prohibition propaganda which has surrounded the presently 
illicit drugs represen ts a b la tan t m anipulation of the  sy-mbols of evil 
th a t would do credit to Jonathan  Edwards. N othing can so excite an 
adult population as can anything which appears to th rea ten  their own 
children. Since the H arrison Act of 1914, the user and the seller of 
illicit drugs have both been characterized as evil, crim inal, insane, 
and always in search of new victims, the victims are  characterized as 
young children. D rug usage is characterized as “contagious;” its 
increase (real or imagined) is characterized as an “epidemic.” Efforts 
to reduce drug usage are referred to as the “w ar” on or “battle  ” 
against drug abuse. Persons who sell are called “pushers” in spite of 
increasing evidence th a t most persons get drugs, particularly  their 
first drug, from friends and not some arch villain who seduced them 
on a s tree t corner.
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7. Policy Options are Presented as Total Prohibition or Total Access
Prohibitionists have always characterized them selves as being in a 
m oral/rehgious battle  against evil. This quality of the prohibitionist 
movements ehm inated  the option of compromise. The choice as they 
saw and presented it was total prohibition or total access to the hated 
drugs. It was not th a t o ther methods of controUing use did not exist or 
would not work: it was the idea th a t all usage was sinful and must be 
stopped. Like an ongoing m orality play, this same issue gets played 
out-repeatedly today w ith a new cast of characters. As bills are 
introduced to lower crim inal penalties for various illicit drugs, one can 
anticipate any num ber of legislators standing to a ttack  reduced 
penalties as an  invitation for use and a first step tow ard legalization 
of drug X.
8. Anyone Questioning Any of the Above Assumptions is B itterly 
A ttacked and C haracterized as Part of the Problem T hat Needs to be 
Elim inated
A reading of any num ber of works which trace the development and 
evolution of our narcotics pohcy, aU dem onstrate the personal hazards 
in challenging those pohcies. To a ttack  or challenge existing pohcies 
has opened one up for charges ranging fi-om a lack of patriotism  to 
charges th a t the critic is himself part of the in ternational drug 
conspiracy. To most persons, confronting the issues surrounding the 
inadequacies of existing drug pohcy is simply not worth the 
chaUenges to the ir own personal integrity.
Anyone even mildly fam üiar with present-day W ar On Drugs rhetoric will 
readily note th a t “the more things change, the more they rem ain the same." The 
graphic below (figure 1) is emblematic of anti-drug a ttitudes during the 1930’s and 
1940’s era of “reefer m adness.” Wliile current anti-m arijuana rhetoric is a good bit 
more m uted on the surface, modern drug prohibitionists continue to insist tha t 
cannibis is the “gateway drug” leading to inexorable “shame, horror, and despair."
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M A R IH U A #
W E E D  W I T H  R O O T S  IN H E L L
f  W£lf?DORC?fS WIID PARTIES J' 
UNLEASHED PASSIONS '
Figure 1: Early I990's “Reefer M adness” poster
The W ar on Drugs from Nixon through Reagan
In Smoke and M irrors former Wall S treet Journal reporter D an Baum dates the 
beginning of the m odern W ar on Drugs in 1967 as then-P residen tia l contender 
Richard Nixon and his advisors looked for a winning election stra tegy  in the face of 
the problematic V ietnam  w ar th a t so vexed the nation. A tough-on-crime posture 
would serve, w ith illicit drug use an opportune focus:
Two m onths before the election, Nixon stood in the shadow of 
D isneyland’s M atterhorn  and put the capstone in his law -and-order 
cam paign by conjuring up a W ar on Drugs. “As I look over the 
problems in th is country, I see one th a t stands out particu larly .” he 
told a rally  of Republican supporters. “The problem of narcotics.”
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Drugs, Nixon said, “are among the modern curse of the youth, ju s t 
like the  plagues and epidemics of former years. And they  are 
decim ating a generation of Am ericans.” H alf of all crime in New York. 
Nixon insisted, was com m itted by drug addicts. So his adm inistration, 
he promised, would “accelerate the development of tools and w eapons” 
to fight illegal drugs . . .
"1 believe in civil righ ts,” Nixon concluded. “But the first ci\dl right 
of every American is to be free from violence, and we are going to have 
an  adm inistra tion  th a t restores th a t right in the United S ta tes of 
Am erica.”*®
Among the tools the Nixon A dm inistration would soon employ were drug- 
sniffing canine searches for m arijuana possession by U.S. troops in V ietnam , a 
pohcy th a t begot the unforeseen consequence of increased heroin use (quoting a 
Pentagon researcher):
. . . “H um an ingenuity being w hat it is—and the desire for an 
intoxicant in Vietnam being w hat it was—many soldiers simply 
sw itched” to heroin, which was odorless, far less bulky th an  pot. and 
in V ietnam , extrem ely inexpensive.-®
Field com m anders would soon pine for the days w hen the relatively benign 
cannabis "weed" was the G.l. intoxicant of choice. The first drug testing  machine, an 
opiate-detecting “behem oth the size of an office desk,” would soon be deployed to 
address the  far more serious heroin problem, and the era of m ass drug screening 
was born.
The drug  issue proved to have sturdy domestic pohtical “legs” th a t to th is day 
stride w ith a forceful gait. In the early 1970’s, drug-related em pirical hyperbole also
*® Dan Baum , Smoke and M irrors. (1996, Little, Brown, & Co. NY), pp. 11-12. 
-® ibid., pg. 50.
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took off with a zest th a t shows no signs of abating (more on th is in  C hapter 2). 
Pohticians fell all over each o ther trying to up the ante. Senator C harles Percy of 
Illinois, trying to one-up the drug-crime statistics proffered by George McGovern, 
asserted th a t “[T]he to ta l cost of drug-related crime in the U nited S ta te s  today is 
around SIO billion to S15 billion.” V irtually unnoticed went some inconvenient 
countervailing data:
In fact only S I .28 billion w orth of property was stolen in the United 
S tates in 1972 (the figure had actually fallen slightly from the 
previous year). T hat includes everything except cars, which junkies 
don’t usually s tea l because they can’t easily fence them , and 
embezzlement, which also isn’t a junkie crime. The combined value of 
everything swiped in burglaries, robberies, and muggings, everything 
shoplifted, filched off the back of a truck, or boosted firom a 
warehouse, was 81.28 billion. Yet during the heroin panic of Nixon’s 
W ar on Drugs, junkies would be blamed for stealing as much as 
fifteen tim es the value of everything stolen in the U nited States.-*
Equally hyperbolic was the resurgence of the “gateway drug” theory of 
m arijuana use by the tim e Ronald Reagan took over the Presidency. Previously 
employed during the “reefer m adness ” antidrug campaigns prior to World War 11. 
the gateway theory is but the classic post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy. Baum notes 
more inconvenient data:
The gateway theory is lunatic. The number of Americans who have 
smoked pot has skyrocketed in the past 30 years—to as m any as 70 
million—while the num ber of heroin addicts is about the sam e in the 
m id-1990’s as it was in 1970: about half a miUion.--
-* ibid.. pg. 69. 
ibid., pg 70.
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Ju s t Say No
Ronald and Nancy Reagan would put the War on Drugs in high gear. First, 
there had to be a pohtical make-over to neutrahze the F irst Lady's image problem. 
As John GiUiom recounts:
Pubhc opinion polls suggested th a t Nancy Reagan was increasingly 
seen as a M arie Antoinette who partied with the w ealthy and aspired 
to h ttle  more than  expensive china and designer gowns . . . the White 
House s taff apparently  developed a consensus th a t the drug problem 
would provide a more useful and pohtically resonant issue for the first 
lady than  her soon-to-be-forgotten Foster G randparen ts program .
Soon Mrs. Reagan was widely seen meeting w ith concerned parents, 
a ttend ing  drug abuse conferences and counsehng centers, and urging 
children to “ju st say no. ’ Once her national Ju s t Say No campaign 
was under way. w riters for The New York Times and  The W ashington 
report [sic] th a t senior m anagem ent made it clear th a t Nancy Reagan 
was no longer a safe target for cynical news coverage.-®
Mrs. Reagan would subsequently be heard to opine during the course of her 
much-publicized “Ju s t Say No” campaign tha t “there is no m oral middle ground; 
indifference is not an option. ” and th a t drug users were “accomplices in m urder.”
Noted iconoclast author and Syracuse University Professor of Psychiatry. Dr. 
Thomas Szasz. in his recent book Our Right to Drugs, recounts in detail the I980’s 
history of w hat he views as an utterly  sin ister practice rem iniscent of the Soviet and 
Red Chinese practice of “denunciation.” one which got its “Joe M cCarthy” rebirth  in
John  GiUiom, SurveiUance. Privacv. and The Law: Emplovee Drug Testing 
and the Politics of Social Control. (University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 29.
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th is country during the  Reagan adm in istra tion , and a practice th a t continues to this 
dav:
P resident Reagan claim ed th a t he stood not only for family values, 
but also for less governm ent. As an ab strac t proposition, he surely 
would have agreed th a t a person’s loyalty- to his family is more 
im portan t and should be more enduring  th an  his loyalty to a 
tem porarily  expedient governm ent pohcy. But ta lk  is cheap. When the 
Reagans’ vaun ted  family values were pu t to the test of practical 
pohtics . . . They em braced one of the most characteristic  and most 
despicable practices of the g rea t socialist s ta tes  of the tw entieth  
century; tu rn in g  children against th e ir paren ts  in a holy w ar against 
the enem ies of the state.®^
Szasz recounts a num ber of widely publicized episodes of children tu rn ing  their 
paren ts  in to the au thorities  for drug  possession and  use, noting how such tactics 
were (and continue to be) encouraged by law enforcem ent and other au thorities. The 
Reagans them selves publicly applauded these acts, and the au thorities responded 
w ith gusto:
From paren ts  denouncing th e ir children, children denouncing th e ir paren ts, and 
studen ts denouncing each other, it is only a sm all step to people denouncing 
neighbors and even s trangers  they suspect of using illegal drugs. This public- 
sp irited  act is now encouraged in m any Am erican com m unities. In 1990, Chattooga 
(Georgia) County’s m ajor new spaper. The Sum m erville News, added “drug coupons ” 
to its pages, inviting readers “to fill in the nam es of suspected drug users and send 
them  to the sheriff.” In A nderson County, South Carolina, the sheriff pu t up
Thom as Szasz, O ur Right to Drugs: The Case for a Free M arket. (New 
York. Praeger, 1992), p. 78.
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billboards th a t read; “Need cash? T urn  in a drug dealer.” Inform ers were promised 
25 percent of the  assets seized from any dealer they help arrest.®®
The denunciation controversy continues, w ith recent allegations concerning the 
aggressive tactics used in the controversial D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance 
Education) program.®®
Reagan A dm inistration A ttorney G eneral Edwin Meese. long an opponent of 
crime-fighting restrictions hke the M iranda Rule, saw great potential in enlisting 
employers in the fight against illicit drug use through m andatory screening: “Since 
most Americans work, the workplace can be the chokepoint for halting drug 
abuse.”®"
Two additional key adm inistration operatives also added the ir efforts to the 
Reagan drug war. First. Dr. Robert L. DuPont, a psychiatrist and  Reagan “Drug 
Czar” who would go on to become a tireless advocate for the commercial drug testing 
industry  (more on Dr. DuPont elsewhere in th is thesis). Second, the highly visible 
and forceful Dr. William Bennett, also to become a Reagan “Drug Czar.” despite his
®5 ibid., p. 83.
®® Steven Glass, D on’t You D.A.R.E., M arch 3, 1997, The New Republic. 
[http://m agazines.enew s.com /m agazines/tnr/textonly/ 030397/ txtglass030397.html]. 
March, 1998.
GiUiom, op cit., p. 35, Meese quoted originaUy in NY Tim es. October 31, 
1986. Reagan adm inistration disdain for due process “technicalities” was no secret. 
P resident Reagan once dispatched his A ttorney G eneral to appear on ABC’s ‘T h is  
Week With D avid Brinkley, ’’ w hereupon Mr. Meese, arguing the case for 
em asculating the M iranda Rule, offered th a t “I’ve never known of too many suspects 
who w eren’t guilty; if you're not guUty, you’re not a suspect, by definition. That 
would be contradictory-. ”
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lack of tra in ing  and experience in areas such as law enforcem ent and pubhc health. 
Dr. B ennett saw ilhcit drug use in simple black and white: it was a moral issue, one 
bound to the dictates of authority. Once authority  had spoken on drug use by- 
declaring certain  substances off-hmits. users should suffer the penalties for 
transgressing. Bennett w ould brook no discussion of social or epidemiological "root 
causes" and “victimless crime” concepts. Drug users should pay dearly. Pay w ith 
their freedom, pay-with their jobs.
Comphance. not health, was the real issue. “Now th a t the 
governm ent has spoken to the subject th a t drugs are unlaw ful,” said 
Paul McNulty, a B ennettista soul-mate directing communications at 
the Justice D epartm ent, “a person who disobeys the law- has made a 
m oral choice and should be dealt w ith appropriately-.” B ennett freely- 
adm itted  drug enforcem ent was but an instrum ent of a w ider agenda, 
calling for “the reconstitution of legal and social authority- through the 
imposition of appropriate consequences for drug deahng and drug 
use.” “The drug crisis,” he told the W ashington Hebrew congregation, 
“is a crisis of authoritv. in everv sense of the term , ‘au thoritv ’.”®®
WTiile B ennett disdained any epidemiological analyses or addiction disease- 
model theories of drug use, he was not against using the epidemiological model 
when It suited his purpose. Dan Casse, a B ennett assistan t, one day proposed a 
"contagion” model th a t might prove useful:
1 studied under Jam es Q. Wilson a t the Kennedy School . . .  He 
posits a contagion model. It isn’t hard-core users th a t spread drug 
abuse, because everyone can see th a t they’re a mess and nobody 
w ants to be like them . Instead, it’s the casual user, the one whose Hfe 
hasn ’t  fallen ap art th a t is the vector for drug abuse, because he makes 
it look hke you can use drugs and not pay a price.®®
®® Baum, op cit., p. 266.
®® Baum, op cit., pp. 272-3.
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In Epi-speak a “vector” is an organism  th a t transm its a pathogen through the 
environm ent. The mosquito is the principal m alaria “vector.” and  so on. So. the 
otherwise prosperous and productive casual drug user could be targeted  as a disease 
"vector” th a t had  to be “quaran tined” through tactics like drug  screening and harsh 
economic legal sanctions. “I like it.” B ennett said.®®
In other words, "do not set a bad example, or we will ru in  your otherw ise nice 
life for you.”
In 1986 Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12564 (“D rug-Free Federal 
Workplace O rder”) which is generally regarded as a w atershed  event in the history 
of employee d rug  testing. A telling passage in E.G. 12564 m akes perfectly clear the 
in ten t of his action;
The use of illegal drugs, on or off duty, by Federal employees is 
inconsistent not only w ith the law-abiding behavior expected of all 
citizens, but also w ith the special tru s t placed in such employees as 
servan ts of the public.
The “law -abiding behavior expected of all citizens . . . ” Such comphance was to 
be enforced through the use of the employee drug test. S teven L. Nock observes:
Indeed, the testing com ponent is the only significant p a rt of th is 
executive order. Illegal drugs, by definition, are illegal, so there  was 
h ttle  an Executive O rder could do about enforcem ent of existing laws. 
Clearly, existing judicial practices were perceived by the  P resident to 
be ineffective. Executive O rder 12564 m ust be seen as a s ta tem en t
®® Baum, op cit., p. 273.
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th a t norm al judicial procedures were inadequate: only extrem e 
m easures, in th is  case drug tests, would do.^‘
Once federal employees were ordered into routine laboratory scrutiny, 
legislation aim ed a t the  private sector would not be far behind. The 1988 Drug-Free 
Workplace Act (41.USC.701 et seq.) is generally cited as justification for non-cause 
drug testing program s in the private sector. It requires th a t any business or 
institu tion  receiving 825,000 or more per year in federal funds—directly or 
“indirectly”—have in place a docum ented "drug-fi-ee work place” program . WTiile 
m ost adm in istra to rs and executives are led to assum e th a t the Act requires drug 
testing, the reality  is th a t there is not one word in the legislation requiring  nor even 
recommending testing. The act basically m andated th a t an e laborate  “J u s t  Say No" 
program  exist on paper. The authors of the National Academy of Science U nder the 
Influence? report observed th a t “Contractors were not required to im plem ent a 
drug-testing program , but could do so in order to dem onstrate com pliance.”
.As we shall see in detail elsew here in th is work, however, legislation is afoot in 
Congress to put some tee th  into workplace drug prevention by explicitly requiring 
drug testing throughout the public and private sectors. Leading the  charge in the 
effort is the self-appointed Field M arshal of the War on Drugs, New York 
Representative G erald B.H. Solomon.
Steven L. Nock, The Costs of Privacy: Surveillance and  R eputation in 
A m erica, (New York, Aldine DeGruyer, 1993), p. 100.
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Recent workplace drug abuse 
policy rhetoric environment
As noted earlier by W illiam W hite, policy advocates frequently employ the “W ar” 
m etaphor (e.g., “W ar on Poverty,” “W ar on Cancer,” etc.) to underscore the urgency 
of their causes. WTiere drug abuse is concerned, “war” goes far beyond rousing 
imagery, with C onstitutionally debatable param ilitary activities undertaken  in 
foreign nations and aggressive m ilitary-style armed actions against domestic drug 
m arketeer suspects.
Moreover, the political and  peer pressure to get on board and publicly 
dem onstrate a home-front com m itm ent to the War on Drugs causes otherwise 
reasonable people and organizations to indulge in ill-considered m easures. For 
example, in 1994 Mellon B ank in P ittsburgh  enacted a random drug testing  policy, 
complete with an anonymous tip phone line. Mellon officials insisted “Nothing is 
wrong. [The bank] hasn’t lost large sum s of money to fraud, or seen a sudden 
outbreak of violence in the w orkplace.” Jim  Fauzio, MeUon’s Employee Assistance 
Program (EAP) M anager, allowed th a t the program “was not in response to any 
specific problem or event.” Mellon officials claimed their in tent as simply tha t of 
good, concerned corporate citizens.■*- Sim ilarly, the Charlotte, North Carolina 
Cham ber of Commerce joined in 1994 in a hard-sell campaign to encourage all 
employers in the area to begin drug testing. Their Uterature included the
Steve Massey, Pittsburgh-based Mellon Bank to Start Drug Tests o f 
Employees Already Hired, Ju n e  23, 1994, and Mellon Bank Defends Anonym ous Tip 
Line, Drug Testing, June  27, 1994, P ittsburgh  Post-Gazette (Knight-Ridder/Tribune 
News Service).
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exhortation; “Don’t be the last company to s ta r t  drug testing .”^̂  H ew lett-Packard 
also succumbed, taking the policy a step fu rther to include even the company’s 
independent contractors: San Francisco-based technical w riter Bill K nutson had 
worked for HP for years in a contracting capacity, working offsite using his own 
com puter equipment. The company informed him in 1995 th a t henceforth he would 
have to subm it to drug testing  as a condition of fu rther work assignm ents. HP 
public relations official M ary Lou Sim m erm acher said simply th a t "the company 
decided to follow the lead of other com panies” in enacting the  drug testing  pohcy.
She offered no information indicating th a t a drug abuse problem existed a t Hewlett- 
Packard Corporation.
Drug and Alcohol trea tm en t centers, always on the lookout for opportunities to 
fill empty, expensive beds, eagerly joined in. A typical pitch is seen in the  media 
campaign by Peninsula Hospital of Ivnox County, Tennessee, whose prim ary 
advertising slogan in the late 1980’s and early 90’s was “We Can Help Even Those 
Who Don’t W ant Help.” Im phcit in the appeal: “Turn your loved ones and 
acquaintances in, for the ir own good. Ju s t rem em ber to bring the ir insurance 
cards.”*"’
Tawn Nhan, Drug Tests Becoming the Norm, Nou' Sm aller Firm s are 
Taking the Step, January  31, 1994, The Charlotte Observer Workplace Column 
(Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News).
"  San Francisco, Newsbvtes News N etw ork, Political Action On Internet 
Over H P Drug Tests, June  10, 1994, [http://www.nbnn.com/], March, 1998.
There is w hat should be an obvious reason why the typical residential 
“D&A” (drug and alcohol) trea tm en t program  involves a 30-day stay; the 
conventional health insurance “substance abuse” benefit clause pays for up to a 30- 
day encounter, irrespective of the longitudinal therapy needs of the patient.
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One last example of th is  phenomenon: The leading commercial drug  testing  
vendor in Las Vegas has repeatedly run a large, multi-column new spaper display ad 
adm onishing, in bold letters, th a t “If you’re not pre-em ploym ent drug testing, you're 
hiring the rejects of those companies th a t do. ” No da ta  are, however, provided to 
bu ttress such a blanket assertion, an  allegation some m ight consider a  hbel toward 
the predom inantly drug-free workforce. At the very least, such a broad claim 
constitutes false advertising, given w hat we know about reasonably estim ated  drug 
use prevalence rates in the work place.
D issent disallowed
Naive business policies aside, the more im portan t casualties of our d rug  siege 
policies include our democratic trad ition  of open debate of policy a lternatives. 
W artim e gag rules are advocated; Lee Brown, former head of the U.S. Office of Drug 
Control Policy, im m ediately reacts on national TV to reports of Surgeon G eneral 
Joycelyn E lders’ statem ent proposing scientific study of legalization issues by 
sta ting  th a t “there wül be no discussion of the legalization of drugs: even the 
discussion is harmful." Form er “D rug Czar’’ William B ennett asserts  th a t 
“responsible intellectuals shouldn’t discuss the possibüity of drug legalization. ” 
Form er Los Angeles Police Chief D arryl Gates, testifying before Congress, argues 
th a t even casual drug use is “treason ” and th a t such users ought be “tak en  out and 
shot.” (He la te r assures reporters th a t he is not merely indulging in hyqierbole.)
Or note the reaction to a federal commission report recom m ending the  
equalization of sentencing guidelines pertaining to crim inal convictions invoking
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“crack” a.k.a. “rock” cocaine versus the powdered form. The panel observes that, 
while the pharmacological effects of crack use are clinically equivalent to those of 
powdered cocaine, prison term s for crack offenders are m any tim es more severe 
than  are those involving powdered coke; in addition, nearly all crack cocaine 
convictions involve black defendants, w hereas the majoritv* of powdered cocaine 
offenders are white. Since white cocaine offenders are, on average, subject to far less 
severe prison sentences, and, are much more likely to be diverted to " treatm en t” 
than  are blacks, some have argued th a t the curren t policy is inherently  racist. 
P resident Clinton, sm arting  from charges of laxity and anxious to appear “tough” on 
the drug issue, curtly dism isses the commission’s recom m endation out of hand:
The W’liite  House 
Office of the Press Secretary 
For Im m ediate Release October 30, 1995 
S tatem ent By The President
Today 1 reject U nited S tates Sentencing Commission proposals th a t 
would equahze penalties for crack and powder cocaine d istribution by 
dram atically  reducing the penalties for crack . . .  1 am not going to let 
anyone who peddles drugs get the idea th a t the cost of doing business 
is going down.
President Clinton would soon thereafter exhort first-tim e teen-age driver’s 
license applicants to step up and show their support, and “do the right th ing” to set 
a good example by voluntarily subm itting to drug  testing as a condition of licensing.
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C hapter Sum m ary
The foregoing provides but a brief yet sufficient overview of the historv’ and 
pohtical chm ate th a t comprise the “background noise” of drug policy, a psychic 
pollution which contam inates and  fi-ustrates all a ttem pts at rational and ethical 
policymaking in th is area. We continue in C hapter Three w ith a look into the 
lam entable sta te  of recent and contem porary drug pohcy da ta  gathering  and 
analysis.
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CHAPTER THREE
Estim ating the extent and cost of workplace drug abuse:
The epidemiology of ülicit intoxication
In C hapter 2 we briefly reviewed the historical drug abuse policy "data" th a t 
help explain our social and  political readiness to adopt C onstitutionally  dubious 
surveillance m easures such as suspicionless drug testing. In th is chap ter we 
examine the techniques of drug use epidemiological analysis, principally as 
employed by pro-drug w ar partisans and their accomplices. Proponents of m ass 
drug testing insist th a t our nation is besieged by a horde of drug-im paired citizens. 
A close exam ination of the ir m ethods of data  collection and analysis refutes the 
claim.
Q uantification and assessm ent of the extent and im pact of illicit drug use 
involve analyses of em pirical data  culled from a variety of sources including 
databases of hospital and clinic encounters, epidemiological studies conducted by 
institu tions such as the U.S. C enters for Disease Control (CDC), the N ational 
Institu tes of H ealth  (NIH), the U.S. Substance Abuse and M ental H ealth  
A dm inistration (SAMHSA, formerly NIDA, the N ational In s titu te  for Drug Abuse), 
as well as studies undertaken  by a host of university research centers (e.g., CASA, 
the C enter for Alcohol and Substance Abuse research a t Columbia University) and
45
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advocacy groups and private foundations such as the Partnersh ip  for a Drug-free 
America and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
The scientific quality  of these investigations runs the gam ut, firom the 
dispassionately professional and m eticulous to the patently  absurd  and 
propagandistic. One encounters estim ates of the “prevalence” (i.e. proportion, or 
rate) of drug-using employees th a t vary wildly, from a low of one or two percent to 
sta tem en ts  asserting  th a t “Recent governm ent statistics reveal th a t 1 out of 6 
workers has a drug problem ” (from a Psychemedics hair test m arketing brochure) or 
th a t “E stim ates of on-the-job cocaine use (including crack) range from 10°o to 50°o o f 
all employees.”̂ ^
A favorite tactic of some an ti-d rug  advocacy groups seeking to inflate the 
apparen t ex ten t of the “problem ” involves the aggregation of data  covering 
prescription, over-the-counter, and illegal drugs, as well as alcohol and tobacco 
statistics, to be reported  under the hazy rubric of “substance abuse” or 
“consum ption of illegal and abused drugs.” For example, see "Alcohol and  Other 
Drugs in the Workplace." a page of sta tistica l assertions proffered by NCADD, the 
N ational Council on AlcohoUsm and Drug Dependence, Inc.^' Their data 
overwhelmingly concern alcohol abuse, w ith the word drugs seemingly throw n in 
the mix for its  m arquee value. No instructive breakdowns are provided, i.e.. alcohol
Angela B. M iller, W orking Dazed: Whv Drugs Pervade the Workplace and 
W hat Can Be Done About it, (New York, Plenum Press, 1991), pg. 15., em phasis 
mine.
N ational Council on Alcohol and  D rug Dependence, Inc., Alcohol and  Other 
Drugs in the Workplace, [http://ww w .ncadd.org/w orkplac.htm l], M arch, 1998.
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vs. “drugs.” and w ithin “drugs.” no stratification by type of drug (“Hcit” vs. “iUicit.” 
by each substance?). A nother example: Joseph Califano’s CASA reports th a t “92% of 
substance abuse-related health  en titlem ent costs is spent to trea t the consequences 
of tobacco, alcohol, and  drug abuse. Only 8% is spent to tre a t alcohol, drug, or 
tobacco dependence.” Note again the generality. Visit the CASA in ternet web page 
(www.casacolum bia.org/costs/m enuI.htm ) w herein these obfuscatory data  reside.^* 
Observe in particu lar the artsy  left-hand m argin w allpaper montage, replete with 
totemic rolled-up 8100 bill and powdered “cocaine” down the page aside the lengthy 
conglomerate litany of “tobacco, alcohol, and drug” statistics.
Where, one might rightfully wonder, are the Joe Camel™ and Johnny W alker 
Red™ renderings? A curious omission, given th a t a recent Califano article quotes 
the very sam e 1993 JAMA epidemiologic data  cited by Ron K otulak’s Inside the 
B rain . Recall our introductory chapter characterization of illicit drug m ortality 
experience as a “relatively minor epidemiological concern” in the context of other, 
much more prevalent and severe sources of substance abuse harm .
O ur leaders and citizens focus on the top killers: heart disease 
(720,000 deaths in 1990), cancer (505,000), stroke (144,000), accidents
(92.000), em physem a (87,000), pneum onia and influenza (80,000), 
diabetes (48,000), suicide (31,000), chronic liver disease and cirrhosis
(26.000), and AIDS (25,000). But they give scant a tten tion  to the 
causes of these killers, which, according to a 1993 Jou rna l of the
Center for Alcohol and Substance Abuse, Columbia University, 
[http://w w w .casacolum bia.org/costs/m enul.htm ], March, 1998.
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American Medical Association study, include tobacco (435.000 
deaths), alcohol (100,000) and iUicit drug use (20,000).'*®
A last and fairly recent example of tobacco/drugs/alcohol conflation reveals the 
in tractability  of th is “addiction” to da ta  fog. The 1997 book Drug-im paired 
Professionals, opens its Preface w ith the assertion tha t "[Djrug abuse is a t least as 
prevalent among highly regarded professionals as among the general pubUc.” This 
sentim ent is shortly thereafter echoed in a chapter one section heading entitled  
Addiction: An Equal Opportunity Destroyer. The body of this work, however, once 
again provides the vague, mostly alcohol-referent rhetorical goulash heretofore 
surveved:
Hickey (1990, p. 37) contends th a t many attorneys have difficulty 
adm itting to them selves th a t they cannot manage their drinking . . .
Airline pilots also “tend  to see themselves as invincible. They see 
them selves as different from the average citizen because they are in a 
super-responsible position” an airline employee-assistance program  
(EAP) representative rem arked. ’T m  a cracker-jack phot,” reasoned a 
pilot (age 45). “It can’t happen to me. I'm not a skid-row character.” A 
trea tm en t expert described the addicted pilot’s a ttitude hke this:
“How can I be an alcoholic when I'm the captain of a 747 aircraft." . . .
The im pact of substance abuse on professionals and th e ir associates 
can be devastating. Obsession w ith alcohol and other drugs 
underm ines physical and m ental health; it also dim inishes and 
destroys professional hves . . . An interview study of 86 pharm acists 
recovering from chemical dependency found th a t 44 had been 
arrested , and 24 had spent a t least one night in jail. Forty five had 
experienced unem ploym ent because of drinking or o ther drug use . . .
Millions of Am ericans suffer and die from alcohol and drug abuse 
th a t often goes undiagnosed and untreated. About 43 percent of U.S. 
adults (76 million people) have been exposed to alcoholism in the ir
*® Joseph Califano, It's  the Drugs, Alcohol, and Tobacco, Stupid , in ternet, 
http://www.casacolum bia.org/m edia/stupid.htm
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families. They e ither grew up with, m arried, or had a blood relative 
who was an  alcoholic or a problem drinker (Schoenborn 1991) . . .
A national probability sam ple of U.S. households . . . found th a t 52 
percent of Am ericans age 12 and older had used alcohol during the 
m onth preceding the survey . . .
Little is known about how m any commercial airline pilots use 
m arijuana and o ther illicit drugs, but a serious alcohol problem 
clearly exists . . .
A national study  of 3,338 law studen ts a t 121 accredited U.S. law 
schools found th a t 14 percent had drunk alcohoUc beverages 10 or 
more tim es during the previous month, and 3.8 percent adm itted  to 
dailv use.^°
The foregoing is but a sam pling of the m urky “substance abuse” assertions tha t 
purport to susta in  th is work. Speaking of “sam pling”—how, we m ight ask, did this 
author arrive at his conclusion th a t "[Djrug abuse is a t least as prevalent among 
highly regarded professionals as among the general public”? Coombs describes his 
epidemiological methodology in the th ird  paragraph  of his Preface:
From 1992 through 1995 my assis tan ts  and 1 spoke w ith 91 
addicted professionals (66 men and 25 women)—21 physicians and 
medical studen ts, 11 dentists, 13 pharm acists, 12 nurses, 21 
attorneys, and 13 pilots: 10 experts (12 men and 7 women) who assist 
them  in recovery: and 5 o ther people who felt th a t others might 
benefit from th e ir experiences . . . *̂
Under the Revival tent, such is called the “leap of faith .” U nder the Big Top, it is 
known as “w orking w ithout a net.” In science it is simply called “anecdotal”—an
Robert H. Coombs, D rug-im paired Professionals, (Cambridge, MA, The 
President and Fellows of H arvard College, Pubhshers, 1997), pp. 14-35.
ibid., preface.
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insufficient "n.” w ith  the corollary Uabihty of built-in sam pling bias; 
ungeneralizability, in  a word.
Coombs offers up a  curious conclusion in his Epilogue:
Tobacco an d  alcohol, the most widely used drugs, though legal 
cause more misery th an  all illicit drugs combined.^-
Precisely a cen tra l point of this thesis. W ar on Drugs p a rtisan s  are utterly 
d isin terested  in such an observation, however. They are certa in  to brandish this 
type of book (title  prom inently  displayed for the cam eras) as if it were one more 
(illicit) d rug abuse Dead Sea Scroll justifying extrem e counterm easures against 
everyone.
Valuing the drug abuse “losses”
Solid estim ates of drug abuse prevalence are difficult enough to come by, but when 
we get to the appra isa l of "economic losses” attribu tab le  to drug use, it often seems 
th a t policym akers ju s t pick a large round num ber out of th in  a ir  w ith which to 
argue for public and political support. In the preamble to the 1988 federal “Drug- 
Free W orkplace Act,” Congress sum m arily "finds” th a t drug abuse is “prevalent” 
and th a t it costs the U.S. SlOO billion dollars per year in health , safety, and 
productivity “losses.” W here does such a figure originate? Scientific American w riter 
John Horgan explains one way to derive it:
*** ibid., p. 281.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
Two years ago W alsh [J. Michael Walsh, then  NIDA Research 
Director] testified in federal court th a t the “cost of drug abuse to U.S. 
industry” was nearly $50 billion a year, according to “conservative 
estim ates.” This claim is a staple of anti-drug rhetoric. It is frequently 
quoted w ithout qualification by the media, and  last year P resident 
Bush rounded it up to “anywhere from $60 to $ 100 billion.” H ere’s 
how the figure w as derived. In 1982 NIDA surveyed 3,700 households 
around the country. The Research Triangle Institu te  (RTI). a NIDA 
contractor in N orth Carohna, then analyzed the data  and found th a t 
the household income of adults who had ever smoked m arijuana daily 
for a m onth (or a t least 20 out of 30 days) was twenty-eight percent 
less than  the income of those who hadn’t. The RTI analysts called this 
difference “reduced productivity due to daily m arijuana use.” They 
calculated the to ta l “loss.” when extrapolated to the general 
population, a t $26 billion. Adding the estim ated  costs of drug-related 
crimes, accidents, and medical care produced a grand total of $47 
bilhon for “costs to society of drug abuse.
Such em pirical “reasoning” is all too common, the “correlation = causality” 
disease of the statistically  credulous (many of whom are supposedly experts in their 
fields). Horgan wryly asked “ . . . by sim ilar logic, should we conclude tha t 
Thunderbird wine hu rts  productivity but Chivas Regal scotch helps it?”
This type of inept inquiry and baseless calculation is nothing new. Recall from 
C hapter 1 Dan Baum's account of impossible drug-related theft totals bandied about 
in the early I970’s. A nother example of this type of da ta  inflation is detailed in a 
1971 monograph en titled  The vitality o f mythical numbers,'*-* in which au thor Max
John Horgan, Y’our Analysis is Faulty. The New Republic, April 2, 1990, p.
9 9
Judgm ent U nder Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, K ahnem an, Slovic, 
and Tversky, Ed., (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 408-13. 
NOTE: W hen confronted w ith an assertion such as “70% of all crim inals used illegal 
drugs prior to a rre s t,” it is im portant to rem em ber th a t 100% of them  are also likely 
to have consumed w ater a short time prior to their a rrests  (and, all were “under the 
influence” of oxygen a t the time they were detained). W ith respect to “gatew ay” 
substances, virtually  all m arijuana sm okers s ta rted  out on breast milk or Similac.
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Singer evaluated a popular claim of the day alleging th a t “It is generally assum ed 
th a t heroin addicts in New York City steal some two to five bülion dollars worth of 
property a year . . . ” A careful look through all pertinen t sources of da ta  led Singer 
to the conclusion th a t the “S2-5 billion” figure, while not inconsequential in absolute 
term s, was high by about a factor of ten.
While no intellectually honest person can deny th a t drug abuse is a serious 
social problem, no one tru ly  knows w hat the prevalence and costs of illicit workplace 
drug use are w ith any sort of precision. The most disin terested, objective, and 
comprehensive study to date was recently concluded by the N ational Academy of 
Science’s (NAS) N ational Research Council and the In stitu te  of Medicine. Their 
1994 hardcover report U nder The Influence? Drugs and the American Workforce 
deUvered the following among their principal findings and  recommendations:
• Most alcohol and other drug users do not develop p a tte rn s  of 
clinically defined abuse or dependence.
• Any program  th a t addresses drug use by the work force should 
include a lcohol, the drug most associated with perceived 
detrim ental job performance, as a priority, (em phasis mine)
Moreover, it is, a fter aU, a blinding glimpse of the obvious th a t those who engage in 
crim inal activity will likewise have little regard for an ti-drug  laws. W hat is not 
clear, however, is th a t the ir drug use uniformly caused them  to pillage and plunder.
The confusion of correlation and causation is probably the most frequently 
com m itted inductive error. Illicit drug use may indeed correlate significantly with 
all m anner of workplace malaise, but it also correlates highly w ith alcohol use, 
tobacco use, poor diet, lack of exercise, and sleep disorders, to cite a handful of 
major factors. Such inter-correlations indicate a more global “factor”—caU it 
“dysfunctional lifestyle”—th a t predicts poor perform ance even more effectively. 
Singling out one elem ent of such a syndrome for coercive suppression will inevitably 
fail to lead to our indisputably laudable goals of improved health, safety, and 
productivity.
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Widely cited cost estim ates of the effects of alcohol and  o ther drug 
use on U.S. productivity are based on questionable assum ptions 
and  w eak m easures . . . B usiness decision m akers and  policy 
m akers should be cautious in m aking decisions on the  basis of the 
evidence currentlv  available.
W ith respect to this last point, it is c lear th a t some policy m akers have not 
gotten the m essage. W itness the rem arks m ade by R epresentative Gerald Solomon 
(R-NY) on the opening day of the first session of the 104th Congress, in a screed 
en titled  "Redeclare the Drug War":
Mr. Speaker, we cannot solve the  crim e and violence problems 
which plague this country w ithout an all-out w ar on drugs. M ake no 
m istake about it. This Republican-controlled Congress w ül play a 
m ajor role in the w ar on drugs . . . The root cause of crim e and 
violence in this country is illegal drugs. Look a t the facts. According to 
the P artnersh ip  For A D rug-Free America: Drug use is re la ted  to half 
of all violent crime; Illegal drugs play a p a rt in half of all homicides, 
in fact 48 percent of aU men a rre s ted  for homicide te st positive for 
ülicit drugs a t the tim e of a rrest; Over 60 percent of prison inm ates 
are there  for drug-related crim es: lUegal drug use is a factor in ha lf of 
aU fam üy violence. Most of th is  violence is directed against women; 
Over 30 percent of aU child abuse cases involve a p a ren t using illegal 
drugs: The num ber of drug exposed babies now accounts for 11 
percent of all births in the U nited  S tates: Over 75 percent of 
adolescent deaths are a resu lt of drug-related  violence. An im portant 
step in curbing drug dem and in th is  country is to m ake the so-caUed 
casual users and hard-core users accountable. The best m ethod to 
accomplish this involves testing  in the workplace . . . the legislation 
introduced today is a s ta rtin g  point of the  action this Congress m ust 
take to tu rn  around the w ar on drugs, including: A bill to require 
random  testing  of aU executive, judicial, and legislative branch 
G overnm ent employees and officials; A biU to deny certain  benefits 
upon conviction of certain  drug offenses; A biU to ensure  quality  
assurance of drug testing  program s; A bül to require employer 
notification for certain  drug crim es: A bül to require m andatory  drug 
testing  for aU Federal job applicants; A bül to provide the  death
J. Norm and, R. Lempert, R., C. O’Brien, ed.. U nder The Influence? Drugs 
and the A m erican Workforce, (W ashington DC, N ational Academy Press, 1994), pp 
3-13.
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penalty  for drug kingpins: A bill to deny higher education assistance 
to individuals convicted of using or selling drugs . . .
On April 6, 1995 Mr. Solomon repeated his h tany  of drug casualty statistics in 
ano ther House speech, with a couple of embeUishments: instead of I I  percent of all 
live U.S. b irths being “drug-exposed,” he now claimed th a t “Today, 1 out of every 10 
babies born in the United S tates is addicted to drugs" [emphasis mine] and asserted 
tha t "The nation's health  care system  is s tra in ing  from the w ar on drugs with 
nearly 500,000 drug-related hospital em ergencies a year.”^' Given th a t U.S. Census 
Bureau figures on hve births are 4,086,000 for 1994, Solomon implies an excess of 
400,000 “drug-addicted” American newborns annually, an obstetrical d isaster of 
major proportions th a t would be continuously blaring front-page news.
Were it in fact the case. Mr. Solomon acquires his “data” from The Partnersh ip  
For a D rug-Free America and, no doubt, from its kindred and empirically incestuous 
advocacy brethren . A half-million druggie newborns a year? (the foregoing 10-11% 
figures.) Well, if we re tu rn  for a m om ent to CASA and It's the Drugs, Alcohol, and  
Tobacco, S tupid , we find Mr. Califano claim ing th a t “[T]he more th an  500,000 
newborns exposed each year to drugs and/or alcohol during pregnancy is a slaughter 
of innocents of biblical proportions.” Once again: “Drugs-and/or-Alcohol.”
This is m antra, not m easurem ent; allegory posing as analysis. Respectable 
em pirical inform ation is more likely to come from places like the CDC (U.S. Centers
Hon. Gerald Solomon, Extension o f remarks. Congressional Record. 
Jan u a ry  4, 1995
Extension o f remarks. Congressional Record, April 6, 1995
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for Disease Control). On October 18. 1996, for example, CDC reported the findings 
of a 1994 Georgia D epartm ent of H um an Resources pregnancy drug abuse study. 
Georgia health  officials had anonymously tested every newborn in the  state  during 
a two-month period, and found 1 in 200 had been “exposed” to cocaine before birth. 
One half of one percent “exposed,” however arguably unrepresentative of the 
aggregate national obstetrical experience (and confined to assay for cocaine 
metabolite), is a very long leap from Solomon’s “10% addicted.”
The Georgia data  are available in full on the in ternet in the CDC Weeklv 
M ortality and Morbidity Report, Volume 45, No. 41, October 18, 1996, located on the 
in ternet a t ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/mmwr/wk,'mm4541.pdf.
Drug abuse data  “coding” issues
All medical encounters are recorded and classified through standardized coding 
protocols. Everything diagnosed about or done to a patient is coded. H ospitals use 
the 1CD-9-CM system, individual practitioners employ the CRT system . 
Computerized reim bursem ent system s rely on these codes for autom ated paym ent 
of charges, and “code gaming” (coding clinical episodes with an eye tow ard a t once 
minimizing oversight and maximizing payment) has evolved into a fine art. Those 
who research chnical da ta  repositories via computers face significant accuracy 
challenges.
To illustrate: VNTien we probe hospital records for cases coded as “drug-related” 
encounters, in addition to illicit drug traum a, we find everything from acute alcohol
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intoxication to accidental poisonings to suicide a ttem pts to “ADRs.” or “Adverse 
Drug Reactions. ' which often m eans allergic reactions to therapeutic  agents 
legitim ately adm inistered (the single largest category of “drug-related 
emergencies”). For example, a  search for “drug-related” episodes in the 152.964 
cases comprising the 1993 N evada statew ide hospital database tu rned  up 4.619 
cases, 3,730 of which tu rned  out to be alcohol-related, and of the 889 rem aining, 
only 237 could be legitim ately classified as “acute (iUicit) d rug  adm issions.” Lacking 
national data  at the moment, one could  extrapolate linearly  and m ultiply those 237 
by the ratio of the U.S. population to Nevada's (roughly 250/1.5 million, or 167), so 
237 X 167 = 39,579. We m ight even throw in a comfortable pad and round up to 
50,000, and, voUa—one ten th  of Representative Solomon’s estim ate. Recall 
D israeli’s lam ent: "Lies, dam ned lies, and  statistics."
Regarding “drug-addicted” neonates, the 1993 Nevada hospitalization da ta  
contain 19,997 records coded for “live b irth .” Of those, 104 had “fetal/newborn” drug- 
related  diagnostic codes, 30 of which were 1CD-9-CM code 760.71, or Fetal Alcohol 
Syndrome. In light of the foregoing CDC Georgia data  let us do a little quick m ath: 
104 less 30 is 74, which w hen divided by 19,997 is 0.0037, or slightly less th an  one 
half of one percent.^®
Tip: W ant to inflate the apparen t extent of drug abuse encounters? 
Hypothetical (and possibly representative?) case: A couple are out partying. They 
get quite drunk, smoke some pot, snort a bit of cocaine, and  become involved in an 
injury automobile accident on the way home (the proxim ate cause of which w as the 
alcohol). At the  hospital (not to m ention any and aU follow-up chnical encounters) 
they generate a host of ICD-9 codes for every diagnosis and  treatm ent. Two people 
involved in one incident have now contributed possibly dozens of “drug-related” 
codes th a t w ül become the g rist for drug abuse prevalence “researchers” eager (or
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In fairness, the  N evada Claims D atabase I used (Source: UNLV Center for 
Public D ata  Research) does not contain all possible diagnostic and procedural codes 
th a t could accompany a given encounter, so my queries may indeed undercount the 
phenom enon shghtly. B ut the principal codes are captured (including those 
pertain ing to em ergency room episodes), so these num bers are probably not off by 
much. The point is th a t  acquiring sohd epidemiological da ta  is no easy task, one 
beyond the grasp of C ongressm an Solomon and his “sources."
The in terested  reader can exam ine in detail the diagnostic codes of in terest in 
recent federal national hospitalization d a ta  contained in the Detailed Diagnoses and 
Procedures. N ational H ospital Discharge Survey. 1994.̂ ® pubhshed by the National 
Center for H ealth  S ta tis tics  (NCHS). This report tabulates an annual estim ate of 
acute-care hospital encounters, by “first-hsted” lCD-9 diagnostic codes (a.k.a. the 
"principal dx”). A couple of summary' observations: Legitim ate drug-related 
encounters were estim ated  a t 153.000. The alcohol-related estim ate  totaled 356,000. 
These represented  0.5% and 1.15% respectively of the total estim ated  30.843.000 
hospitalizations. Two conclusions should be evident after even brief consideration. 
First, there  is essentially  no such thing as an “acute tobacco-related adm ission.” 
(although we do in fact see a dx of 305.1, w ith 8,000 cases hsted  as “non-dependent
merely naive enough) to inflate the num bers concerning illicit drug morbidity by- 
counting each code h it as a “drug-related encounter.”
■'® Edm und J . G raves and Brenda S. Gillum, Detailed Diagnoses and 
Procedures, N ational H ospital D ischarge Survev, 1994. U.S. D epartm ent of H ealth 
and H um an Services Publication PHS 97—1788. Vital and H ealth  Statistics, Series 
13, D ata From the N ational H ealth  Survey, No. 127, ( W ashington, DC, USDHHS, 
1994).
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drug abuse, tobacco,” and  tagged with the caveat “to be used w ith caution.” These 
cases are most likely those of adolescents unhappily regurg ita ting  the ir clandestine 
Marlboro adventures.) The damage caused by tobacco consum ption, however, will be 
found sprinkled across a host of other codes identifying costly and  severe maladies 
such as em physem a (dx 492), oral/ trachial/ esophageal/ lung cancers (numerous 
codes). COPD (dx 496, Chronic Obstructive Pulm onary Disease), and cardiovascular 
ailm ents (dozens of codes). Similarly, alcohol dam age will be evident in liver, renal, 
gastrointestinal, and  neurological ailments, to cite a few. Sim ple "principal dx” code 
counting, therefore, provides a misleading picture of the relative im pacts of various 
hfestyle-related m edical misfortunes.
Another im portan t point: the authors of th is report are  careful to point out th a t 
their ICD-9 code frequency breakdowns reflects encounters, not individual patients. 
Since a relatively high proportion of medical services are rendered  to chronic, repeat 
patients, it is easy to overestim ate the prevalence of a condition if the databases are 
stripped of pa tien t identifiers for confidentiality reasons, and  code “hits" are 
sum m arily tabu la ted  (recall tha t “prevalence” denotes the percentage of individual 
patients w ith a condition). The federal D.A.W.N. (Drug Abuse W arning Network) 
reports, which estim ate  “drug-related emergency encounters,” contain a similar 
disclaimer. The D.A.W.N. report also acknowledges th a t the medically indigent 
typically use em ergency rooms as prim ary care facilities. If, for example, a welfare 
client or homeless person is trea ted  a t the E.R. for the flu or some o ther relatively 
minor ailm ent and suffers an “ADR” (Adverse Drug Reaction), or is simply detoxed
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for alcohol abuse, his or her codes may readily end up in a sloppily designed and 
executed “drug-related emergency” tabulation.
But surely, one m ight object, researchers are com petent and vigilant against 
such naivete, right? Recall our earher assertion regarding estim ation of the nature, 
extent, and cost of drug abuse: "Upon close critical examination, serious questions 
emerge concerning the reliability o f the data, most o f which are gathered and  
dissem inated by “\Y'ar On D rugs”partisans intent on buttressing foregone 
conclusions." Consider the following recent news item:
Drug S tatistics Questioned
W hen any kind of a revelation about drug abuse trends are made 
public, so too are the statistics backing up the statem ent. But some 
critics charge these num bers are ju s t estim ates th a t in no way should 
have an im pact in making future drug poHcies, the New York Times 
reported April 20.
Drug statistics first became prom inent in 1978, w ith the creation of 
the N ational Narcotics Intelligence Consum er Committee. M ark A.R. 
Kleiman, a drug policy expert a t the U niversity of California a t Los 
Angeles and chairm an of the committee calls the process “estim ation 
by negotiation.” Kleiman says officials typically sit down and debate 
w hat the num bers should be.
Peter Reuter, a drug policy specialist a t the U niversity of 
M aryland, says the num bers are irrelevant “because they play 
virtually no role in shaping the nation’s drug policies ” And some 
contend the figures are merely a way to d istract a tten tion  from the 
root cause of the problem. Ju s t last year, an annual survey conducted 
by the U niversity of Michigan reported th a t half of high school seniors 
adm itted  they have used drugs, up 20 percent from 1992. The study 
showed th a t the m ajority of young people are not h ard  drug users 
since most s tuden ts said they experim ented w ith m arijuana. Of the 
studen ts surveyed, less than  2 percent of seniors said they had used 
cocaine in the previous month and 0.6 percent said they had used 
heroin.
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Eric D. Wish, director of the C enter for Substance Abuse Research 
a t the  U niversity  of M aryland, is also highly critical of the statistics. 
Recently he wrote. “W hat is not so obvious is th a t the federal agencies 
th a t produce these s ta tistics  are also agents of the adm in istra tion  in 
power, and  are not im m une from pressures to in te rp re t national drug 
s ta tis tic s  consistent w ith the ruling adm in istra tion ’s view.”®®
Need more? No problem; consider the most recent exam ination of the drug data 
dubietv issue from The W ashington Post:
N um ber Jum ble Clouds Judgm ent of Drug W ar 
Differing Surveys, Analyses Yield U nrehable D ata
W ashington Post Page: AOl. Je ff Leen, W ashington Post S taff W riter. Friday. 
2 J a n  1998
. . .  In spending a proposed S16 billion on the federal drug w ar in 
1998— a 400 percent increase since 1986— law m akers will rely on 
ream s of da ta  th a t often a ttem pt to impose sta tistica l order on a 
chaotic social problem th a t defies easy analysis. Extensive federally 
funded efforts to accurately assess the sub terranean  drug world have 
led to contradictory' findings and occasional s ta tistica l curiosities, 
such as a 79-year-old female respondent whose avowed heroin usage 
in one survey resu lted  in a projection of 142,000 heroin users, 20 
percent of the national total.
“I t’s clear th a t these things are badly m ism easured and nobody 
cares about it,” said Peter Reuter, the form er co-director of drug 
research  for the non-profit RAND th ink  tan k  and now a University of 
M aryland professor. “T h a t’s because drug pohcy isn’t a very 
analytically  serious business. ”
M easuring the drug w ar w ith any precision is a daun ting  task. 
H ard-core drug users are hard  to find, much less question, and people 
frequently  he on drug-use surveys—one study shows tw o-thirds of 
teenagers giving deceptive answ ers. Since surveys typicaUy receive 
only a smaU num ber of positive responses, analysts risk  m aking 
su b stan tia l erro rs in creating projections for the en tire  nation. Survey 
resu lts  som etim es include w arnings acknowledging these obstacles, 
such as “subject to large sam pling error ” or “great caution should be 
taken . ”
50 Jo in  Together Online, 4/25/97, [http://ww w .jointogether.org/], March, 1998.
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But the caveats often are downplayed or ignored, e ither by those 
issuing the data  or by journalists and others prom ulgating the 
inform ation. In reporting the apparen t 1991 jum p in hab itual cocaine 
use. for example, the WTiite House’s Office of D rug Control Policy 
noted th a t the s ta tistics were both “cause for concern” and “highly 
unreliable. ”
The difficulty in m easuring and evaluating the nation’s illegal drug 
problem made it harder to set policy, stoked partisan  rhetoric and 
confused the pubhc, drug analysts say. M any experts, for example, 
believe cocaine and crack use are in dechne, and the federal 
household survey indicates th a t overall d rug use is down 49 percent 
from its peak of 25 million monthly users in 1979; yet many 
Am ericans still perceive the drug w ar as perennially lost.
“You really can’t tell from the big debate th a t goes on in public 
w hat the big picture is, ” said David Musto, a Yale U niversity medical 
h istorian  who has studied drug trends for three decades. “W"hen I tell 
people about it, they’re completely surprised by the fact there has 
been a decline since 1980.”
T hat big picture can be obscured by drug sta tistics  th a t are “often 
incomplete, e rra tic  and contradictory,” in the words of two RAND 
researchers funded by the governm ent to m easure cocaine 
consumption. The first problem of drug w ar analysis is the sheer 
num ber of m easurem ents—there are more than  50 federal drug- 
related  “data  system s” with hundreds of “drug variables” produced by 
an a rray  of federal agencies . . .
W ith respect to drug testing specifically, the Post article notes problems w ith 
the Justice D epartm ent's DUF (Drug Use Forecasting) program , w herein 
“voluntary” urine sam ples are collected annually  from 30,000 inm ates from 23 cities 
around the nation. Politicians invariably rush to extrapolate from such data  to come 
up with highly suspect estim ates of the prevalence of various types of drug use 
nationally. A sim ilar flawed approach to workplace drug prevalence estim ation is 
noted by John  Gilliom in Surveillance, Privacv and the Law: Employee Drug Testing 
and the Politics of Social Control who observes that:
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. . .  it is the case th a t drug-testing program s have had the ironic 
effect of revealing far less illegal drug use among American w orkers 
than  advocates of testing had estim ated. Some reports have found 
positive ra tes of up to 8 or 9 percent in programs th a t prim arily  test 
workers who are suspected of drug use (meaning th a t roughly 8 or 9 
percent of suspected workers, not all workers, test positive. Large 
government program s of random  testing  have found less than  one 
percent of w orkers testing positive for illegal drug use.®*
As noted elsewhere in this thesis, the American M anagem ent Association 
recently reported the aggregate national employee positive drug te s t ra te  at 1.9 
percent (of all employees tested for w hatever reason. Given th a t certain  very low- 
p re vale nee employm ent s tra ta  have yet to enact indiscrim inate drug screening 
policies, the overall ra te  would have to be even lower than  that).
Clearly som ething is amiss: e ither the continuing official workplace drug abuse 
prevalence assertion of slightly more than  8 percent (10 million workers) is grossly 
exaggerated, or the testing  process is hem orrhaging false negatives. E ither way, we 
are w asting analytical resources.
‘H ealth  ’n’ Safety n’ Productivity" in the workplace: 
a quick pilgrim age to “Stonedhenge"
In in foregoing we exam ined some of the serious problems w ith the collection, 
analysis, and use of the policy data  th a t undergird suspicionless drug testing policy. 
In closing this section let us here briefly dwell on two item s which are  among the 
Rosetta Stones of the “H ealth  ’n’ Safety ’n’ Productivity” argum ent upon which
®' Gilliom, op cit., p.7.
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coerced employm ent drug screening policies are ostensibly based; The “Bensinger" 
and “Firestone" studies of the early  1980’s.
Peter Bensinger. former head of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and 
subsequently a “politically active supporter of testing and provider of industrial 
drug-testing consulting services,”®- was hired by Georgia Power to develop and 
adm inister an aggressive random  drug testing program at a GP nuclear power plant 
construction site. In his final report, he boasted of the program ’s dram atic 
effectiveness in reducing lost tim e accident rates. And who could argue w ith the 







Impressive, incontrovertible proof of the efficacy of drug testing, right? Decimation 
of the accident ra te  (i.e., a be tter than  90% decline). W hat more can one ask?
Indeed, Gilliom notes th a t the Bensinger study drew im m ediate accolades in the 
popular and  legal press of the day as u tte r proof of the efficacy of drug testing.
Well, critics pointed out (to no avail) th a t the random testing  program  was not 
even put in place until April of 1984, by which time the accident ra te  had essentially 
bottomed-out. Moreover, the proportion of accidents “caused” by illicit drug use was
®- Gilliom, op cit., p. 39.
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never established. N either was the  contribution of the  overall safety and  anti-drug 
aw areness program, for G P had also introduced intense job safety-related 
procedures and  tra in ing  program s early  on in the project. Finally, the  largest rate 
drop occurred in the first two years as workers became more fam iliar w ith their jobs 
and workplace environm ent.
No m atter: “proof’ of the  effectiveness of drug testing was a t hand.
Firestoned
The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. study is a granite em pirical rehquan.' beloved 
by drug poficy druids im pelled to recursively intone th a t “drug users are alm ost 4 
tim es as likely to be involved in p lan t accidents, 2.5 times as likely to be absent to 
for than  a week, and 5 tim es as Likely to file w orkers’ com pensation claims, and they 
receive 3 tim es the average level of such benefits, for these liturgical tabulations
originated a t Firestone.
Well, drug testing advocates now had drug abuse pohcy “proof of losses ’ firmly 
in the o ther hand. Never m ind ano ther sm all (and also ignored) factual 
inconvenience which Güliom illum inates:
While skeptical researchers have never been allowed to see the 
original data, it has been learned th a t the figures “refer only to 
alcohohcs th a t have been served by the Firestone EAP [Employee 
Assistance Program  - m ine].” (Morgan 1988, 685) This study  was 
therefore based on an  analysis of individuals who had been 
sufficiently im paired to e ith e r volunteer for or be ordered into the 
professional counseling program . The extrapolation to all working
Gilliom, op cit., p. 40.
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Americans who use illegal drugs—as The Partnersh ip  For a Drug- 
Free America and the U.S. Cham ber of Commerce did—is entirely  
inappropriate. “The statistics generated . . . have nothing to do with 
drug users, recreational or otherw ise.” (Morgan. 1988, 685) 
Nevertheless, these figures are widely and repeatedly cited, creating a 
pseudoscientific impression of firm knowledge about the im pact of 
drugs in the workplace.
Given th a t in the late 1990’s “no one seriously doubts” th a t ülicit drugs kül 
millions of Americans each year: tha t 10% of all newborns are drug-addicted on 
arrival: th a t 1 in 6 workers has a drug problem: th a t hospital emergency rooms 
across the land have drug traum a cases occupying every gurney and stacked Like 
cordwood out the doors and into the parking lots—well, the more things change in 
the drug war empirical strip  mines, the more they rem ain the same.
C hapter sum m ary:
In this chapter we have seen how partisans have “cooked the books” to 
exacerbate public anxiety and justify- coercive counterm easures, of which 
indiscrim inate drug testing is but one. Several principal methodological 
shortcomings of anti-drug researchers are glaringly apparent: [1] conflation of illicit 
drug use data  w ith statistics relevant to vastly more prevalent legal intoxicants: [2] 
inappropriate generahzations from “addict” cohorts to the general population, and: 
[3] inappropriate correlation of overall drug use w ith drug use health, safety, and 
productivity losses.
Gilliom, op cit., p. 40.
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In C hapter Four, we exam ine the m yriad complexities of the science and 
business of analytical chem istry. Can the labs m anage the curren t and proposed 
specimen workloads accurately and cost-effectively?
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CHAPTER FOUR
The “science ” and  business of suspicionless drug testing
The public generally  believes th a t laboratory  science is “accurate” w ithout ever 
giving much though to w hat the  term  tru ly  m eans. Vendors of com m ercial drug 
testing serrices benefit from such naivete, for a w ider appreciate of the  extent of the 
inherent indeterm inism  of laboratory science would not doubt increase venors' 
m arketing difficulties. In th is chap ter we exam ine the methodological complexities 
of analytical chem istry  and the ir impUcations w ith regard to two fundam ental 
questions: [1] can commercial labs perform  drug tests  en masse inexpensively 
w ithout falsely labeling people as “drug abusers” while otherw ise detecting all users 
of illicit substances, and  [2] is m ass suspicionless drug testing  an appropria te  use of 
finite bioassay resources? The answ er to the first question, as we shall see, is highly 
uncertain. The answ er to the second is an  em phatic no.
Private comm ercial laboratories perform ing the bulk of workplace drug testing 
hawk the ir services w ith  a vengeance, som etim es holding free “sem inars" in which 
drug abuse s ta tistic s  of dubious hneage and m erit are  pu t forth as incontrovertible 
fact to heighten the sense of urgency am ong prospective clients. And, w hen pressed 
on concerns regard ing  false positive ra tes, lab spokesm en usually respond with
67
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reassuringly vague s ta tem en ts  such as “our lab m ethods are quite precise, our 
screening resu lts  are 99.9% accurate.
Uncritical acceptance of such assertions is testim ony to a  widely-held naive faith 
in scientific exactitude;
. . . science has assum ed an  increasingly powerful role in  the 
execution of justice. Indeed, scientific testim ony is often the deciding 
factor for the  resolution of civil and  crim inal cases . . .  As one juror 
pu t it a f te r a recent trial in Queens, N.Y. “you can’t argue with 
science.” ®̂
Those who work in  analytical chemistry, however, know first-hand just how 
dem anding the never-ending quest for accuracy and  precision is, and how equivocal 
lab resu lts  can be in  the  absence of obsessive vigilance (and reasonable workloads). 
Mr. Neufeld w as one of the defense attorneys defending O.J. Simpson in his 
crim inal trial. The public has by now learned through the Sim pson criminal case 
and  the efforts of attorneys Peter Neufeld and B arry  Scheck therein  ju st how
The te rm s “accuracy” and “precision” are not synonyms (see Glossary for 
an extensive lis t of technical terms). The former refers to closeness of agreem ent 
w ith agreed-upon reference standards, while the la tte r  has to do with the ex ten t of 
variabiUty in repeated  m easurem ents. One can be quite precise, and  quite precisely 
wrong. Precision, in a sense, is a necessary but insufficient prerequisite for the 
dem onstration of “accuracy.” Do you h it the “buD’s eye” red center of the ta rg e t all 
the time, or are  your shots scattered  all over? Are they  tightly  clustered lower left 
(high precision, poor accuracy), or widely scattered lower left (poor precision, poor 
accuracy), in  an  analy tical laboratoiy, the “accuracy” of production results cannot be 
directly determ ined; it is necessarily inferred from the  resu lts of quality control 
(“QC”) data. If  the  lab does not keep ongoing, m eticulous (and expensive) QC records 
of the perform ance histories of aU instrum ents and  operators, determ ination of 
accuracy and precision is not possible.
P e te r Neufeld and John Colman, When Science Takes the Witness Stand, 
Scientific A m erican, M ay 1990.
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thoroughly one can indeed argue w ith science, particularly  the discipline of 
analytical chemistry, which is overwhelmingly “inductive” ra th e r than  “deductive."
A finding of a given concentration of an analyte^" in a specimen is an indirect 
statistical estimate, based on a long chain of interim  m easurem ents th a t are 
them selves estim ates, all of which can contribute to uncertainty  even as they 
attem pt to add clarification, and any one of which can be sufficiently in error as to 
weaken or invahdate the final result.
Anyone taking the trouble to avail them selves of the technical litera tu re  from 
NIDA—available free of charge— wül find much cautionary- language, caveats 
mostly falling on the deaf ears of W ar on Drugs zealots:
Accuracy is the absolutely essential ingredient of laboratory 
analysis. The pubhc perception of scientific m easurem ents is tha t 
they are indisputable. If a laboratory reports the presence of a 
quantity  of drug in a specimen, this ruling is judge to be correct, 
regardless of protestations to the contrary- by the subject.®*
NIDA scientific officials consequently advise against im plem enting 
indiscrim inate blanket or random®® drug testing  programs in the absence of 
evidence of true need:
The term  “analyte” simply m eans the chemical elem ent or compound of 
in terest in a laboratory analysis.
®* R.V. Blanke, Accuracy in Urinalysis, Urine Testing for Drugs of Abuse. 
NIDA Research Monograph No. 73, 1986.
In addition to blanket (100%) testing, there is a related, yet 
methodologically separate issue th a t should be addressed concerning the use of 
random  testing. Axiomatic to inferential s ta tistics is th a t random  sam pling assumes 
the random  distribution of true positives in a population. Ju s t as most diseases are 
unevenly- distributed throughout hum an s tra ta , drug users are by- no means
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U rinalysis for detection of drug use should be considered in the 
context of an overall plan to reduce or prevent the negative im pact of 
d rug  abuse on an  industry  or organization. It would be inadvisable, 
however, to proceed w ithout a careful assessm ent of the  group to be 
affected by testing  . . . The plan should be tailored to the extent of the 
problem. If no clear indication of significant drug use a t a worksite or 
in an  organization is apparent, a program beyond a preventive 
educational effort mav not be warranted.*®
There is good reason for such circumspection; The suspicionless drug test is part 
of a larger issue hotly debated in the medical community concerning the chnical and 
economic u tility  of m ass screening of asym ptom atic individuals for low-prevalence 
conditions. Should all men past the age of 40 have annual PSA screens perform ed 
(Prostate-Specific Antigen) for prostate  cancer? Should all women subm it to annual 
m am m ogram s or pap sm ears, irrespective of the ir ages or overall health  status? 
Should everyone have their serum  cholesterol analyzed routinely? W here the 
prevalence of an adverse condition is low, resources are inescapably w asted on the 
true negatives, and the probabilities of false positive resu lts  rise as the reliability of
randomly d istribu ted  throughout the workforce and the larger society. Drug use 
occurs predom inantly  in fairly well-known sociological clusters. The justification 
offered in defense of random  testing is th a t it is “non-discrim inatory” (m eaning 
“dem ocratic”) and, as such, allays speculative concerns th a t m anagers “out to get” 
certain  w orkers m ight otherwise target them  for testing. Such an assertion is, 
however, disingenuous in th a t all employers re ta in  the righ t to te st employees “for 
cause” in addition to any program s of blanket or random testing. Moreover, given 
the uneven distribution of workplace drug users, proper scientific statistica l 
procedure would require stratified  sam phng plans in which the s tra ta  with the 
lower prevalence ra tes would be subjected to com pensatory higher ra tes  of sam phng 
to elevate the probabihty of identifying true  positives, which would inevitably lead 
right back to cries of “discrim ination.” Such methodologically sound practice would 
never be to lera ted  by those in the (mostly white-collar professional) low prevalence 
s tra ta : such groups would clam or for increased sam phng in the aUegedly high 
prevalence clusters, theoretical statistical principles notw ithstanding.
*® ibid., Richard L Hawks, Ph.D., Establishing a Urinalysis Program-Prior 
Considerations.
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lab resu lts  degrades under the weight of the  workloads, as laboratory personnel are 
p ressured  to cut methodological corners to m eet the dehverables. Moreover, 
consider the following:
No diagnostic te st or screening device is perfect. E rrors of omission 
and commission occur . . . the definition of an accuracy rate can be 
done in a few different ways, and these are often confused in casual or 
uninformed communication . . .  It is an im portant fact tha t predictive 
values do depend on overall prevalence ra tes . . .  As the prevalence of 
a condition becomes rare. PPV [“Positive Predictive Value”] drops too, 
sometimes surprisingly so. For exam ple, a test with sensitivity and 
specificity each equal to 99% is generally considered quite precise, 
relative to most diagnostic procedures. Yet for a condition with a not- 
so-rare prevalence of one per hundred  . . . only 50% are truly affected! 
For a prevalence ra te  of one per thousand, the PPV is only about .10. 
These low num bers raise serious e th ical and legal questions 
concerning action to be taken  following positive test outcomes.**
The foregoing example is an apphcation of Bayesian statistical analysis. The 
Bayesian formula for dichotomous outcom es is given by:
p(+ I  A)p(A)
p(A I  + )  =
[ p{+ 1 A)p(A) - r  p(+ I  N)p(N) ]
Meaning, the probabihty of being tru ly  “Affected” (a true positive) given a positive 
test result, or p(A I  +), is equal to the probabihty of testing positive given th a t one is 
“Affected” p(+1 A) times the proportion of “Affecteds” (the “prevalence ra te”), or
** Michael O. F inkelstein  & Bruce Levin, S tatistics for Lawvers, (New York, 
Springer-Verlag, 1990), pp. 101-103. A nother exceUent explanation of such 
principles is to be found in Probabilistic reasoning in clinical medicine: Problems 
and opportunities, in Judgm ent under uncertain ty: Heuristics and Biases, 
K ahnem an, Slovic, and Tversky, ed. (Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press, 
1982), pp. 249-267.
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p(+ I A) p(A). divided by the combination of tha t factor plus p(+1 N) p(N). or the 
probabihty of testing  positive given tha t one is a true  Negative (a.k.a. an empirical 
“false positive”) tim es the proportion of true negatives, i.e., [1 - p(A)].
Plug in some num bers. Assume the lab has historicaUy had a false positive rate 
of 1/1000 (0.001: remember, the lab guy said their operation was 99.9% accurate), 
and th a t the proportion of true positives in your work stra tu m  is 1% (0.01). For the 
sake of simphcity, graciously stipulate th a t p(+1 A) = 1.0, meaning zero chance of a 
false negative. Given such assumptions, the predictive probabihty of being a true 
positive given a positive test result—that is, p(A I +)—is (.01))[.01 + (.001 x .99)] = 
0.909918, or alternatively, the predictive probabihty of not being a true  positive 
even though the test says “positive” is 1 - 0.909918, or rouglily 9%, not 1/10 of 1%. 
Were you a drug-free employee in such a cohort, your actual risk of incorrectly 
testing positive would be roughly 90 times w hat you m ight naively expect.
A significant concern with respect to ah of the foregoing is tha t neither the 
prevalence nor the false positive rates are generaUy known with any degree of 
certain ty  (see the S tandefer report la ter in this chapter), particularly the false 
positive rate, which, in contrast to the prevalence, is operationally specific to each 
lab and test param eter, and may indeed be unquantifiable in the absence of large 
and costly datase ts  of quahty control sample analyses. We might ask the lab 
spokesman: “99.9% accurate? W hat do you mean by th a t?  That you correctly 
identify 999 out of 1,000 drug abusers? That you can calculate a spiked*- sample
*- A “spike” is a sample containing a “known” concentration of an analyte 
derived from an “NIST-traceable” reference source of established and optim al purity
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
concentration w ithin 1/10 of 1% of the reference value? T hat you suffer only one 
false positive for every 999 true  positives? That you suffer only one false positive in 
every- 1.000 bhnd m atrix blanks? For each analytical param eter? What, indeed, does 
‘99.9% accurate’ mean? Can we have a look a t your data?”
SAMHSA/NIDA “certifies” drug testing labs for competence. Curiously, it is 
none other th an  the Research Triangle Institu te— our previously cited NIDA survey 
analysis organization (see C hapter 2)—th a t also holds the contract to adm inister
the NIDA Laboratory Certification Program. A call to the RTI num ber provided to 
me by NIDA was answ ered “N ational Laboratories Program, may 1 help you?” The 
N ational Laboratory Certification Program  Apphcation Form is a sHm document of 
16 typew ritten  pages containing mainly yes/no checkoff boxes (e.g., [F.5] “Is the 
director a full-time employee of the laboratory? ”). Section “C, ” pertaining to quality- 
control, consists solely of six yes/no questions covering two pages of the apphcation 
form. The accompanying instruction sheet advises th a t the certification program
(NIST is the N ational In stitu te  of S tandards and Technology, official source of all 
U.S. m easurem ent reference standards). A “m atrix  blank” is an actual sample 
specimen “known” to not contain any target analytes. Such quahty control sam ples 
should be run  through the lab  production process “bhnd,” i.e., posing as a normal 
client specimens. Bhnd testing  is the preferred method of quahty  control 
assessm ent, simple in principle but difficult to adm inister in  practice, as lab 
m anagers and technicians are  usually adept a t sniffing out inadequately concealed 
bhnds, which subsequently receive special scrutiny. This is particularly true at 
certification or contract aw ard  time; staffs are typically pu t on “red a lert” when 
Perform ance Evaluation sam ples are certain  to arrive in advance of hcense 
approvals or contract competitions. Such costly vigilance m ay be difficult to 
m aintain  once the hcense is on the waU and the contracts signed and filed away.
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consists of the application form, three rounds of “Perform ance T est” (PT) sam ple 
evaluations, two on site inspections, and fees totaling $17,300.00.
Performance requirem ents on the PT sam ples appear to be surprisingly lenient:
Acceptable perform ance for a PT sh ipm ent is no false positive 
resu lt and the identification of 90% of all required drugs and/or 
metabolites th a t are used to represent a drug or drug  class in the 
sam ples. In addition, the quantitative resu lts determ ined  for PT 
sam ples m ust be w ith in  "± 20% of the m ean calculated for the 
reference laboratories for 80% of all drug challenges, and w ithin "± 
50% of the calculated m ean for all sam ples.
No false positives, sounds reassuring: after all such is our overriding civil 
liberties concern, false accusation. But look closely: the “90%” identification 
requirem ent provides the apphcant with a safety valve allowing for up to 10% “false 
negatives," so when in doubt on the PT sam ples, sim ply declare the sam ple to be 
"negative.” Given th a t the NIDA specified spike concentrations of the PT m atrices 
are typically well above backgrounds (e.g., 180 ng/mL. for cocaine m etabolite where, 
for example, its Liquid Chrom atography MDC*® (M inimum Detectable
** MDC Note: Laboratory- technologies are incapable of detecting analyte 
concentrations all the w ay down to “zero” for a num ber of reasons, including 
chemical interferences in the various constituents of the sam ple m atrices and the 
“noise” inheren t in any electronic system (th ink about the “signal-to-noise ra tio” 
specifications accompanying your stereo system). The choice of “cut-off” levels th a t 
classify- resu lts  as e ither “positive or “negative” on the basis of th e ir quantification 
above or below adm inistratively  pre-determ ined concentration lim its is a principal 
factor in relative ra tes  of false positives and negatives. Low- cut-offs risk  excessive 
false positives, w hereas high cut-offs inevitably lead to a h igher false negative rate. 
The choices m ust be m ade w ith consideration for the consequences of being wrong 
either way, balanced against the benefits of being right. Assay “sensitiv ity” refers to 
the probability th a t a true  positive can be identified; “specificity” denotes the 
probability th a t a tru e  negative will be so determ ined. These two analy-tical 
a ttribu tes  are m utually  inverse, and sim ultaneous optim ization of drug  test 
sensitivity and specificity (or, equivalently, a t once m inim izing the  possibihty of
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Concentration) in biological fluids is on the order of 20 to 50 ng/mL.), and given th a t 
these PT sam ples are unlikely to be tru ly  “blind." (if even shipped as such) only the 
most glaringly incom petent of laboratories are likely to fail th is sort of licensing 
process. And, according to the  instructions accompanying the application, facilities 
so m aladroit as to “not perform  acceptably in the proficiency testing or any other 
stage of the certification process . . . may request re insta tem en t into the 
certification program." The only condition for re instatem ent is “the subsequent 
expense of repeat certification activities.”
So; perhaps “99.9% accurate” may actually m ean som ething like “we can analyze 
90% of spiked sam ples w ithin  ± 20% of a “known” value 80% of the time, and w ithin 
± 50% the rem aining 20% of the tim e.” If we know ahead of tim e w hat to expect and 
when to expect it.
Does “± 20%” imply laboratory ineptitude? Not necessarily. Consider the “power" 
formula below, which researchers use to determ ine sam ple size (“n”) required to 
discrim inate between an expected value (such as a “cut-off’) and an experim ental 
result;
false positives and  false negatives) is not economically feasible in inexpensive m ass 
production mode. Som ething has to give. The same principle appUes in crim inal 
jurisprudence, w herein “sensitiv ity” (the allegations) m ust be supported beyond a 
reasonable doubt by “specificity,” (the particular, logically undeniable proofs). 
Allegations (screens) are cheap; proof (confirmation) is expensive (and made 
prohibitively more so in the absence of probable cause).
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[(Za - (-Zb))s]=*
n = -------------------------------- '
(pi - po)-
The denom inator (pi - po) represents the difference pf the two means. The “Z 
values refer to the bell curve s tandard  score significance levels we can choose for 
false positives (a, or “alpha”) and false negatives (b, “beC& )' respectively. The 
“sigm a” (s) refers to the “standard  deviation,” i.e., the e/tpected variability based on 
prior m easurem ents. Once again, plug in some number?- Assume a m easurem ent 
cutoff (po) of 100 ng/mL.. w ith a sigma of 4%. or 4 ng/mJ-'- F"ix n at 1, the alpha 
level a t 3.72 (m eaning far less than a 0.001 chance of a false positive), and beta a t 
1.28 (for a 10% chance of a false negative). Set po a t lOO (the cutoff value), and solve 
for pi. You get pi = 120, a 20% difference, the best you (?ould be expected to do given 
a single run  a t specified probabihty and em pirical proce*®® variabüity  levels. And. in 
the trenches, a lab able to keep its process s tandard  deviations a t or below 5% 
under a heavy w orkload is doing very well indeed.*-* In fhis example we set n a t “1
*•* WTiy? Recall our earUer observation: A finding ® given concentration of 
an analyte in a specimen is an indirect sta tistica l estim ate, based on a long chain of 
interim  m easurem ents th a t are them selves estim ates, of which can contribute to 
uncertain ty  even as they attem pt to add clarification, a^^  °oe of which can be 
sufficiently in e rro r as to weaken or invalidate the final result.
In a m ulti-step process involving m any interim  iiieasurem ents, each w ith a 
variabüity  component, the overall uncertain ty  is a type sum of the individual 
fluctuations. In formal stat-speak, the to ta l process varl^"(*G is the sum of the 
individual variances. You then take the square root of to come up w ith the 
collective process s tandard  deviation. Another way of s tating  this is th a t error term s 
are additive, they cannot be assum ed to ju s t cancel eacP o ther out, because of a 
principle known as the “random walk” phenom enon in *vhich extended runs high or
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because production sam ple analysis is generally a one-run estim ate  of a “true” 
concentration. Were we to w ant finer discrim ination, we would have to analyze a 
sam ple m ultiple tim es (look at the mechanics of the formula). This is problematic, in 
th a t sam ples are typically consumed in analysis. We would have to split samples up 
into m ultiple “ahquots” for re-runs, and commercial labs do not routinely go to such 
effort and expense. The client gets a one-shot assessm ent. And, w ith the proposed 
increases in sam ple throughput, the quality of those one-shot analyses will be hard 
to m ain tain  or improve.
The im pact of cum ulative variance/error propagation is seen in a monograph 
en titled  G C /M S  Quantitation o f Benzoylecgonine Following Liquid-Liquid  
Extraction o f Urine. The salient paragraph  follows:
The precision of the method was evaluated by the analysis of 
quality  control sam ples independently spiked a t 150 ng/mL. Within- 
run  and betw een-run precision were determ ined by analyzing the 
control m ateria l seven times. W ithin-run the m ean concentration
low are shown to be more likely than  would be in tuitive. 1 recall the phrase “errors 
don’t cancel out, they ju s t get diluted.”
A nother point: assum e th a t a process contains 100 independent steps, each 
of which is perform ed “correctly” 99.9% of the time. W hat is the overall probability 
of the process executing w ithout a “failure”? The average? (99.9%?) G reater than 
tha t?  No. It would be .999 raised to the 100th power, or 90.5%, m eaning tha t almost 
once every ten  runs a t least one step wül “faü.” It gets even worse when the steps 
are not independent, and one m ust take into account the consequence of any single 
process m ishap. Consider now for a m om ent th a t a typical Gas Chromatography/ 
M ass Spectrom etry (GC/MS) test used to confirm drug screen positives has 30 
procedural steps, 27 of which involve taking m easurem ents. The point? Accuracy 
and  precision do not come easüy or cheaply. To those who m ake vague and broad 
assertions about th e ir operational inerrancy, we m ust reply “Show us the data!” 
(operational quahty  control data, th a t is.)
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found was. BE a t 142 ng/mL.(CV = 3.0%). B etw een-run the mean 
concentration was, BE a t 145 ng/mL. (CV = 2.7%).*®
The “CV,” recall, is the coefficient of variation, a lternatively  called the percent 
s tan d a rd  deviation. A bit of s ta tis tica l m ath: (0.03)(142) = 4.26 ng/mL. and 
(0.027)(145) = 3.92 ng/mL., the  “sigm as” (expected variabilities based on the 
experim ental distributions) for the respective experim ental results. Recall th a t the 
“spike” (the reference s tan d ard  concentration) was 150— not “151” or “149” (the 
“significant figures” issue). Are “142” and “145” statistically  equivalent to 150. i.e. 
close enough to affirm the u tility  of the method? S ta tistica l significance t-test and p- 
values for the foregoing work out to t = -4.97 (p < 0.01) and t = -3.37 (p <0.01) 
respectively a t 6 degrees of freedom (n-1). Equivalently, the 99% confidence 
in tervals for the experim ental m eans are  142 ± 6 and 145 ± 5.5 respectively. In 
form al s ta tis tica l term s, these resu lts are “significantly” off the mark, low. This 
researcher concluded the resu lts to be close enough, however, stating  th a t “[T]he 
present guidelines of the N ational In stitu te  on Drug Abuse call for a cutoff 
concentration of BE of 150 ng/mL. for GC/MS confirm ation in urine. The procedure 
was found to be an accurate, reliable m eans for the identification and quantita tion  
of BE a t these levels.”**
P erhaps so: but a couple of cautionary  observations are in order. F irst, putting 
aside any technical quibbles over t-tes t or confidence-interval statistical decision
*® John  Gerhtz, MS, G C /M S  Quantitation o f Benzoylecgonine Following 
Liquid-L iquid  Extraction o f Urine, Jou rna l of Forensic Sciences, Vol. 38, Sept. 1993, 
pp. 1210-13
** ibid., p. 1213.
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criteria, 5.3% (142/150) and 3.3% (145/150) differentials from a reference value do 
not qualify as—recall Justice Scalia—“99.94% accurate.” Second, this was a 
controlled methods development experim ent in which the researcher knew  w hat he 
was looking for (150 ng/mL.). These results are well w ithin the generous NIDA 
accreditation PE latitude, so in th a t sense the method is “accurate and reUable,” but 
it is orders of m agnitude more imprecise than  would be assum ed by a chnically 
untutored Suprem e Court Justice. Moreover, this is a GC/MS (Gas Chromatography 
/ Mass Spectrometry) quan tita tion  experiment, using w hat is ostensibly the 
“forensic” gold s tandard  of lab technology, the one used to confirm employment 
screen positives. We m ust ask: w hat kind of variability will be the norm in “bhnd” 
mass production commercial analytical settings? Are there any legitim ate false 
positive/negative error rate  concerns?
The S tandefer Performance Evaluation*® (1990) study cites fairly recent 
historical false positive and false negative PE rates for specimens containing 
metabolite concentrations “spiked” near the adm inistrative cut-off levels for 
am phetam ine, benzoylecgonine, morphine, codeine, THC, and phencyclidine (PCP):
*' cited in Forensic Urine Drug Testing, March, 1991, Robert B. Swotinsky, 
Ed., The Medical Review Officer’s Guide to Drug Testing, (New York, Van Nostrand 
Reinhold, 1992), pp. 7-8.
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D ru g
c la s s
F a lse  n e g a tiv e  r a te  
(%)
F a lse  p o s itiv e  r a te  (%)
Am phetam ine 4.9 1.6
Benzoylecgonine 3.3 2.9




These da ta  are by now a bit aged, and w hat counts—most im portantly  with 
respect to the in te rests  of those tested—are the tabulations for the current quarter, 
but can we safely conclude tha t such error rates have fallen off the rad ar by now? 
T hat all labs are  by now consistently “99.94% accurate”? Can we see your data?
Competence in the commercial lab
As alluded to above, critical to accurate laboratory specim en analysis is a solid 
understanding of the statistical nature of such work (review the foregoing)—most 
im portantly the degree to which probability estim ates (“is th is result truly a 
positive’?”) are im pacted by distributional abnorm alities, particu larly  in proximity 
to analytical cut-off hm its and “MDCs” (Minimum Detectable Concentrations). 
U nfortunately, m ost chem ists and lab technicians are exposed to only a cursory 
exam ination of applied m athem atical statistics—the ugly and disdained stepchild of
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quantita tive  disciplines. S tandard  academic texts on sta tistics  rarely venture 
deeply—if a t all—into issues of d istributional departu res from the “norm al” (i.e. 
“G aussian ,” depicted by the theoretical Bell Curve). Such is unfortunate: real-world 
operational requirem ents require a good bit more acuity w ith respect to the 
sta tistica l factors th a t shape and validate (or negate) lab results. As pointed out, for 
example, by Dr. Lloyd A .Currie of the N ational B ureau of S tandards (now NIST, the 
N ational In stitu te  of S tandards and Technology), an em inence in the field of 
quan tita tive  radiochem ical assessm ent:
Once we leave the domain of simple detection of signals, and face 
the  question of analy te or radioactivity concentration detection, we 
encounter num erous added problem s or difficulties w ith assum ption 
validity. T hat is, assum ptions concerning the calibration function or 
functions—i.e., the fuU analytic model—and the “propagation” of 
erro rs (and d istribu tional characteristics) become crucial.*®
Now, two conventional sta tistica l “significance thresholds” are those of the “95% 
or 99% confidence levels” w herein it is assum ed th a t 95% or 99% of the variation in 
a set of m easurem ents is confined w ithin ± two or ± three “s tandard  deviations” 
(a.k.a. “2-sigm a” or “3-sigm a”) of the mean, or average value (think of the standard  
deviation as more or less “the average variability  around the average”). A 
m easurem ent found outside such a ± 2- or 3-sigma ranges is frequently declared to 
be a “significant” difference from the overall population of values, with only 
approxim ately a “5% chance” or “1 % chance” of being wrong, respectively. But, real-
*® Lloyd A. Currie, Lower L im it o f Detection , . . , N ational Bureau of 
S tandards, NUREG/CR-4007, 1984, pp. 18-19.
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world m easurem ent datasets only approxim ate to a g rea ter or lesser degree the 
theoretical Bell Curve distribution.
“Chebychev’s Theorem,” on the o ther hand, provides us w ith a lower probability 
bound applicable when distributional characteristics are unknown or uncertain. 
P afnu tü  L. Chebychev (1821-94). a R ussian m athem atician, proved that, for any set 
of m easurem ents capable of yielding a m ean and standard  deviation, the proportion 
of da ta  w ith in  “K” sigma is always a t least ( 1 -  1/K-) irrespective of the "shape” of 
the  distribution. So, at 2-sigma, the w ithin-lim its distributional proportion could be 
as low as 1 — 1/2- or 75%, and would m ost often be somewhere between 75% and the 
95% of the pure G aussian distribution. Sim ilarly, at 3-sigma the inclusive range 
would be from 89% to better than  99%. So, for example, when we make a claim  of 
having only a 5% or 1% “chance of erro r,” we assum e a lot th a t m ight not s tan d  up 
to proper methodological scrutiny. And, if  one’s job and reputation are on the hne, 
scru tiny  is highly recommended.
S ta tis tica l “tests for norm ahty” exist, but are rarely taugh t to anyone except 
those studying advanced statistics. Most of those analyzing bioassay specim ens 
sim ply believe the ir results are accurate if they fall w ithin pre-set (though often 
unreahstic) standard  statistical boundaries. The following review of a random  
sam ple of coUege and professional analy tical chem istry books reveals ju s t why. To 
the  ex ten t th a t the  topic of “sta tistics” is included a t all, it is usually brief and basic, 
w ith  little  to nothing regarding probabilistic/distributional caution.
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Universitv-level analytical chem istry texts:
M odern M ethods of Chemical Analysis. (New York. Wiley & Sons. 1968). Pecsok. 
R.L. & Shields. L.D. Nothing on laboratory statistics.
Fundam entals of Analytical Chem istry. (New York, Holt, R inehart. & Winston. 
1962), Skoog & West. C hapter 3. pp. 33-68, basic univariate G aussian statistics. 
No m ention of non-normal d istribution probability considerations.
Instrum enta l Analysis. (Newton, MA, Allyn & Bacon, 1986), C hristian , G.D. & 
O’Reilly, J.E . Eds., C hapter 19.6 pp. 632-35. Four pages on “S tatistical 
Considerations in Radiochemical Analysis.” No mention of non-normal 
d istribution probability considerations.
Instrum en ta l M ethods of Analysis, 6th Edition. (Belmont, CA, Litton 
Educational Publishers, 1981), W illard, M erritt, Dean, & Settle. C hapter 29.7. 
pp. 861-67, “Evaluation of R esults.” Seven pages of basic statistics & lab 
"precision.” No m ention of non-normal distribution probability considerations.
Instrum en ta l Methods of A nalysis. 7th Edition, (Belmont, CA, W adsworth 
Publishing Co., 1988), W ülard, M erritt, Dean, & Settle, pp. 29-37. E ight pages of 
basic sta tistics  & lab “precision.” No mention of non-normal d istribution 
probability considerations.
Instrum enta l M ethods of Chemical Analysis. (New York, McGraw-Hül, 1985), 
Ewing, G.W. C hapter 26, pp. 480-487. Eight pages of “precision and accuracy ” 
issues and “error propagation.” Nothing on basic statistics, and no m ention of 
non-norm al distribution probability considerations.
Chemical In trum entation: a system atic approach. (New York, Wiley & Sons, 
1989), Strobel, W.R. C hapter 10, “Statistical Control of M easurem ent Quahty. ” 
pp 343-363. Basic univariate and  bivariate G aussian statistics, w ith discussion 
of precision, accuracy, and erro r propagation issues. No m ention of non-normal 
d istribution probability considerations.
Advanced Instrum enta l M ethods of Chemical Analysis, (New York, Elhs 
Horwood, 1993), Churacek, J . Ed. C hapter 16, pp. 406-415, “Chem ometrics in 
the Instrum enta l Laboratory. ” Short discussion of m easurem ent error 
propagation and  univariate G aussian distribution. No mention of non-norm al 
distribution probabihty considerations.
Introduction to M ass Spectrom etry, (Philadelphia, PA, Lippincott-Raven 
Pubhshers, 1997), Watson J . T. C hapter 18, “Sources of Error and Interference,” 
pp 414-19, focused on contam ination and m atrix interference issues. Section 7, 
pp 449-50, “Precision and Accuracy,” one and one-half pages on rephcabihty of 
resu lts  (e.g. “RSD” or Relative S tandard  Deviation). Nothing else on laboratory
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statistics, including no m ention of non-norm al d istribution probability 
considerations.
• Advanced Analytical Chem istry. (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1958), Meites, L., 
Thomas, H.C., & Baum ann, R.P. M ention of G aussian distribution on pp 354-55. 
No m ention of non-norm al d istribution  probability considerations.
Principles of Instrum en ta l Analysis. 4 th  Edition. (Ft. Worth, TX, Saunders College 
Pubhshing, 1992), Skoog & Leary. Appendix 1, pp, A1-A19. “Evaluation of 
Analytical D ata.” Basic G aussian statistics. No mention of non-norm al distribution 
probability considerations.
Analytical chem istry m ath /statistics texts:
Use of S tatistics to Develop and  Evaluate Analytical M ethods. ( Arlington. VA, 
Association of Official Analytical Chem ists, 1985). Basic apphed G aussian 
statistics. No m ention of non-norm al d istribution  probability considerations.
Chemometrics: Applications of M athem atics and  S tatistics to Laboratory 
Systems. (New York, Ellis Horwood, 1990), Brereton, R.G. Basic apphed 
G aussian statistics. No m ention of non-norm al d istribution probabihty 
considerations.
Practical Guide to Chem om etrics, (New York, M arcel Dekker, Inc., 1992), 
HasweU, S .J. C hapter 2, pp. 5-15, “S ta tistica l Evaluation of D ata.” Basic apphed 
G aussian statistics. No m ention of non-norm al distribution probabihty 
considerations.
S tatistics for Analytical Chem istry. ( New York, EUis HorwoodAViley & Sons, 
1984), Mfiler, J.C . & M iller J.N ., Basic apphed G aussian statistics. Three 
paragraphs (pp. 76-78, Section 3.13) on “Testing for N orm ahty.”
S tatistics for Analytical Chem ists. ( London, UK, Chapm an & Hah, 1983), 
C aulcutt R. & Boddy, R. Basic apphed G aussian  statistics, w ith three 
paragraphs addressing “O ther D istributions” (Section 2.5, pp 14-16), providing a 
brief discussion of the effect of d istributional skew on probabihty estim ation.
Use of Recovery Factors in Trace Analysis. (Cambridge, UK, The Royal Society 
of C hem istry Inform ation Service, 1996), Parkany, M. One paragraph  on 
“Propagation of E rror Considerations,” page 3.
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Analytical chem istry reference/continuing education texts:
• Sam ples and Standards: A nalytical Chem istry bv Open Learning. (New York, 
Wiley & Sons, 1987), Woodget. Ten pages of basic applied G aussian statistics 
(pp. 41-50). No m ention of non-norm al d istribution probability considerations.
• The Laboratory- Handbook of M aterials. Equipm ent, and Techniques. 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-H all, 1992), Coyne. O.S. Some references 
concerning accuracy, precision, and  “significant figures,” but otherwise nothing 
a t all regarding laboratory- m ath /statistics.
• Chem ical Technicians’ Readv- Reference Handbook. 2nd Edition. (New York. 
M cGraw-Hill, 1981), Shugar, G .J., Shugar. R.A.. Baum an, L., & Baum an, R.S. 
No references to laboratory- m ath /statistics.
Only one tex t in the foregoing h te ra tu re  review sample— S tatistics for Analytical 
C hem ists—had even the barest m ention of distribution asym m etry and its potential 
im pact on lab results. Most laboratory personnel are simply unaw are th a t the 
validity of sta tistica l inference is highly contingent upon d istributional assum ptions 
th a t m ay or may not be tenable in day-to-day operations.
O JT concerns
Regrettably, statistical naivete finds its way into both the peer-reviewed 
h te ra tu re  and  the continuing education texts used for on-the-job tra in ing  in the lab. 
A tra in ing  m anual from my own lab tenure— Radiochemical M ethods*®—iUustrates 
the phenom enon. In Section 5.1.2 (“Radioim m unoassay”) a m ethods development 
m onograph is presented from the jou rna l A nalyst’® en titled  Direct
*® W. Geary, Radiochemical M ethods, (New York, Wiley & Sons, 1986).
"® Mason, Law, Pocock, & Moffat, Direct Radioim m unoassay for the 
Detection o f Barbiturates in Blood and  Urine, A nalyst, June  1982, Vol. 107, pp. 629- 
33
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Radioim munoassay for the Detection o f Barbiturates in Blood and Urine. Among the 
sta tistica l curiosities in th is  paper is the  following:
The distribution of background levels of cross-reactivity in 50 
samples of urine from norm al subjects who were not receiving 
barb iturate  medication was positively skewed with a mean and 
standard  deviation of 15 ± 28 ng/mL. The positive/negative cut-off for 
urine sam ples was set a t 100 ng/mL.. thus ensuring a >99% 
probability of obtaining a true positive r e s u l t . . .
W hat this investigator obviously calculated was "mean + roughly 3-sigma." or 
■‘15 + (28)(3) = 99, round off a t 100.” Now, since 99.7% of data  in an exactly norm al 
d istribution are w ithin ± 3 s tandard  deviations around the mean, one would be 
justified in concluding th a t a result g rea ter than  100 ng/mL. was indeed a “positive” 
a t be tte r than  “99% probability.”
W hat is wrong with th is picture? Consider th a t these are ratio-level d a ta— 
m eaning one cannot have less than  zero nanogram s/m illiliter of an analyte in a 
specimen. For the distribution of these 50 sample assays to be approximately 
"norm al” with a m ean of 15. the s tan d ard  deviation could not be greater than  
approxim ately 5, as m ean -  (3)(5) = 0. W ith a sigma of 28—nearly twice the 
m agnitude of the m ean—the data  are highly skewed (the au thor even acknowledges 
this), making his bhthe assum ption of “>99% probability” m athem atically 
unsustainable. By Chebychev rule—in th is  instance 1 -  1/3- or 0.89—the worst-case 
confidence level v^ould be more on the order of 89%, roughly a one-in-ten chance of a 
>100 ng/mL. false positive.
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Since the raw da ta  (the 50 “m atrix blank” sample run  results) are not provided 
in the monograph, we have no way to assess ju st w hat the d a ta  distribution profile 
m ight be— besides obviously skewed, w ith some ra ther high values requisite to 
effect a sigma so large relative to such a sm all mean. But, assum e there were no 
blank resu lts >100 ng/mL.(for were there ju st one, the false positive rate  estim ate 
would then seem to necessarily be m inim ally 1 out of 50, or 2%, irrespective of any 
conventional statistical param eter estim ates). Another Httle known statistical 
principle comes into play tha t gives a confidence estim ate close to th a t of the 
m inim alist Chebychev: the “Rule of 4.6/n.”
As set forth in I f  Nothing Goes Wrong, Is Everything A ll Right? Interpreting Zero 
N um erators,'' the confidence in terval estim ate appropriate for circum stances where 
"positives” are rare— and, in seemingly problematic fashion, fail to tu rn  up during 
an investigation—is given by the simple formula [ 0 <= p <= -ln(C)/n ], where p = 
the true proportion of positives, C = the acceptance level for the probability of a 
false positive, and ln( ) is the natural, or "naperian” logarithm . So, assum e a “99% 
confidence level,” meaning C= 0.01, a 1% chance or less of a  false positive. Do the 
m ath: -ln(0.01)/50 = 9.2%, m eaning th a t we can be 99% confident th a t the possible 
proportion of positives is from zero to 9.2%, given th a t we sam pled 50, found none, 
and are bereft of defensible param etric  distribution indices th a t augur anything 
better. Note how close this is to the Chebychev boundary in  the foregoing example. 
Both Chebychev and the “-ln(C)/n” principle provide us w ith  worst-case bounds for
®‘ Hanley & Lippman-Hand, Ph.D.s, I f  Nothing Goes Wrong, is Everything  
All Right? Interpreting Zero Numerators, JAMA, Vol, 249, No 13, pp. 1743-45.
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probabilistic estim ation under conditions of uncertain ty—neither of which appeared 
on the em pirical radar of the experim enter ju st cited, one— like so many—content 
with a sim plistic notion of “mean + 3-sigma.” for setting  cut-off limits.
The point of aU this stochastic techno-babble? Several, actually. F irst, w hen we 
observe less than  100 events and claim to have estim ated some “percentage.” we are 
extrapolating. (If I go to bat 8 tim es and get 3 hits, th a t my “batting  average” is at 
th a t mom ent “.375” is m ere long-division arithm etical artifact. We will have to 
aw ait my 1,000th trip to the plate to see w hether the “7” and the “5”—or the “3.” for 
th a t m atte r—are still around) Second, given th a t the entire business of inferential 
statistics concerns extrapolating wisely from ostensibly representative random  
sam ples to the ir parent populations, a good deal of circumspection is in order should 
certain  fundam ental d istributional assum ptions not be met. Finally, we are not 
dealing w ith mere academic sta tistica l nit-picking here; employees’ jobs, careers, 
and repu tations are a t stake.
Moving along: it get worse. Radiochemical M ethods also contains an exercise 
wherein s tuden ts are to construct a curvilinear “calibration function” for com puting 
RIA (radioim m unoassay) production specimen analysis of insuhn—on the basis of 
four da ta  points from “reference s tan d a rd ” analyses. Basically, the studen t plots the 
four results, connects the dots w ith a smooth curve, and then subsequently 
“com putes” the “unknown” (production) sam ple resu lts by visual reference: up from 
the “x” axis (the radiation counts/m inute) to the curve, then right, horizontally over 
to the “y” axis (for the estim ated  insuhn  concentration). Nowhere in th is exercise is
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there  any discussion of “erro r bounds” i.e., the likely varia tion  for each of the four 
reference d a ta  points and w hat such implies for “cahbration function” 
indeterm inacy. Nor—in related  fashion—is there any ap p aren t aw areness th a t no 
com petent s tatistic ian  would ever agree to derivation of a “higher-order” 
(curvilinear) calibration function on the basis of ju s t four in te rn a l tracer results. 
Forty perhaps (per concentration level, across the full analytical range), but not 
four.
One concern we ought have w ith respect to the foregoing; Economic pressures 
are p u tting  more and more of the in-the-trenches lab work in the hands of 
technicians of perhaps even lesser tra in ing  and  competence. T hat which used to be 
the dom ain of chem ists w ith at least a 4-year degree (with questionable statistical 
acum en) is now expected of community coUege graduates w ith AA degrees (and 
likely even more deficient in statistical skills).
Moreover, the gradual shift toward expensive, high-tech autom ated lab 
equipm ent and away from traditional “bench chem istry”—which tu rn s  m any lab 
"analysts” into m ere m ass-production m achine operators—is not w ithout problems, 
either: accuracy and precision concerns merely shift to the equipm ent 
m anufacturers and  those who m aintain the instrum ents— not to mention those who 
in te rp re t and  sign off on the results of such autom ated processes, m any of them  also 
woefully undereducated w ith respect to the statistical underpinnings of their 
findings. M any of them  eager to ju s t believe th a t the technologies and procedures 
are inerran t.
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But, it cannot ju s t be assum ed th a t the num bers coming out of any analytical 
process, w hatever its apparen t sophistication, are acceptably “exact” ju s t because 
the instrum ents and processes are assertedly error-proof.
May we have a look at your data?
Conventional Drug Testing Methodology
The cu rren t NIDA protocol for drug urinalysis specifies the use of the Enzyme- 
M ultiplied Im m unoassay (EMIT®) test to screen samples, followed by the 
sophisticated GC/^IS technology for confirmation of screen “positives.” GC/MS. or 
Gas Chrom atography/M ass Spectrom etry is the most accurate, precise, and specific 
technology generally available to the chnical chemist, the only analytical method 
universally s tipu la ted  to conform to the federal Frye S tandard  for adm issibility as 
forensic evidence. It is expensive, requiring sophisticated equipm ent and advanced 
tra in ing  and skill. Immunological drug abuse screens such as the  EMIT on the other 
hand, are inexpensive, but they are m arkedly non-specific, m eaning they yield a 
relatively high proportion of false positives owing to their sensitiv ity  to “cross- 
re active” compounds w ith molecular structu res sim ilar to those of the target 
analystes. EMIT screens are known to re tu rn  false positives for literally  hundreds of 
legal substances.'- It is the GC/MS method th a t “disconfirms” or weeds out such 
errors.
see B arbara  A. Sm ith  & Jean  C. Joseph, E M IT  Assays for Drugs o f Abuse, 
in Analvtical Aspects of D rug Testing. Dale G. Deutsch, Ed., (New York, John Wiley 
& Sons, 1989), pp. 35 - 58. The EMIT® is actually a “panel” or ba ttery  of 
im m unoassay screens for detecting am phetam ine, cocaine, THC (m arijuana).
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In light of the foregoing, we m ust now have a look a t a serious ethical issue 
arising from m ass production indiscrim inate drug testing. Quoting once more from 
the 1994 N ational Academy of Sciences findings:
Preem ploym ent drug testing  m ay have serious consequences for job 
applicants. Applicants, unlike most employees, often do not enjoy 
safeguards com m ensurate w ith these consequences. A particu lar 
danger of unfairness arises because screening test da ta  are reported 
to companies despite the known possibility of false positive 
classification errors. Recommendation: No positive te st resu lt should 
be reported for a job applicant until a positive screening test has been 
confirmed by GC/MS technology.”̂
The im portance of th is last point cannot be overstated, especially since there are 
increasing economic pressures to do away w ith GC/MS confirm ations of p re­
employment tests. It is argued th a t a “m edical” a.k.a. “chnical” s tan d ard  will suffice 
(i.e., unconfirmed by GC/MS). The real reason for this a ttitude  is th a t employers 
w ant to pay as fittle as possible for drug testing, and lab owners are hard-pressed to 
finance sufficient equipm ent and to recru it and  retain  enough GC/MS-competent 
chem ists to perform the volume of confirm ations required of a m ass screening 
workload. Consider a few rough estim ates: assum e quarterly  screening of merely 
10% of the U.S. civihan work force of 120 milhon; 48 miUion screens would be
barb iturate , opiate, and Phencyclidine (PCP) metabohtes, which are biochemical 
derivatives of compounds in the originally ingested drugs. The monograph lists 211 
false-positive reactive substances for the EM IT am phetam ine assay alone! (e.g., 
A lka-Seltzer Plus, Contac, Sudafed, Dim etapp, Tavist-D, Robitussin NR, Actifed 
and so forth). Think of a chnical screen as rad ar picking up an  unscheduled flight, 
highly sensitive, but inherently  non-specific: Well, it m ust be a plane, com ing this 
way pretty fast; m ust be a jet; beyond that can’t tell you much. D on’t know  whose it 
is, how m any engines, what color, w ho’s on board, where i t ’s precisely headed  . . .
Norm and et al, op cit., pg. 9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
92
required annually. Assum e fu rth e r a  prevalence of “true positives,” i.e., those w ith 
sufficient m etabolite concentrations in the ir sam ples to be a t all detectable, to be 
roughly the 8.3% th a t NIDA has claimed, or 10 miUion in the  work force, implying 
roughly one m i l l i o n  am ong those sam pled each quarter. If the  screens can pick up 
90% of the true  positives while yielding a false positive ra te  of perhaps 2%. (a 
conservative estim ate) the resu lting  3.6 million annually detected true  positives 
detected plus the  880.000 false positives (2% of the 44 million yearly true  negatives) 
implies a need for nearly  4.48 m ülion GC/MS tests per year, or equivalently, more 
th an  245 GC/MS runs per N lDA-certified lab per day, seven days a week. 365 days 
per year. The equipm ent and  tra in ed  labor capacity to perform anyw here near such 
a quan tity  of GC/MS solely for drug  screening confirm ation do not exist (ignoring for 
the moment the even g rea ter issue of the resources required to m anage such an 
enormous volume of screens). The laboratory infirastructure m ust also deal w ith the 
rem aining analytical needs of governm ent, industry, and health  care. The volume of 
environm ental testing  required under Superfund and related  EPA laws and 
regulations is staggering. USDA. FDA. and OSHA m ust continually te s t the food 
supply, pharm aceuticals, and  all m anner of m aterials for a host of health  and safety 
criteria. H ospitals and  physicians require tim ely and accurate clinical lab resu lts for 
effective trea tm en t of the sick and  in jured (Think about th a t the next tim e you are 
ill and  your health  care provider’s lab vendor is operating a t  chronic overload owing 
to the ir employm ent drug screening “easy-money” infatuation). The crim inal justice 
system  has no shortage of forensic-quality analytical work to be done on an ongoing 
basis. Such capacity lim itations alone call into serious question the general wisdom
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of mass drug testing, and raise serious ethical concerns w ith respect to non­
confirmed “chnical s tan d ard ” false positive rates given the cost-minimization 
im peratives felt by employers and commercial laboratories alike.
Is any of th is tru ly  w arranted? The NAS report asks the same question:
The use of illegal drugs in recent years is thought to pose problems 
so severe as to justify  a w ar on drugs.’ The current w ar on drugs 
overlooks, however, the abuse of alcohol and tobacco, which cause 
more deaths in the United S tates than  all illegal drugs combined 
(Newcomb, 1992). W hereas illegal drugs are estim ated  to be 
responsible for approxim ately 30,000 prem ature deaths in the United 
S tates per year (Reuter, 1992), tobacco is responsible for nearly
400.000 prem ature  deaths per year and alcohol accounts for nearly
100.000 fatah ties per year (Jufien. 1992)."•*
In our zeal to combat a relatively minor fraction of the overall U.S. substance 
abuse problem, we bhthely ignore the counsel of esteem ed institu tions hke NAS, as 
well as the expertise of NIDA scientists. We propose to pu t miUions of job apphcants 
a t undue risk of false accusation in the name of a W ar on Drugs and in the service 
of commercial laboratories under continuing pressure to cut methodological corners 
in pursu it of profit. Dr. R ichard Hawks of NIDA, further commenting on the special 
situation of testing  of preem ploym ent apphcants:
Most of the urine sam ples being analyzed in industry  today are 
associated w ith preem ploym ent appUcations. While many of the 
rights usually accorded an applicant are not necessarily those of an
N orm and e t al, op cit., p. 15. The point was driven home again in 
Congressional testim ony on May 1, 1995 by then-FDA Commissioner Dr. David 
Kessler: “Smoking kills more people each year in the U nited S tates than  AIDS, car 
accidents, alcohol, homicides, illegal drugs, suicides and fires combined. And the 
real tragedy is th a t these deaths from smoking are preventable.”
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employee, the sam e rights of privacy and accuracy of analysis should 
be accorded these individuals.'®
C ontrast such a sensible and  fair-minded observation—one entirely  consonant 
with the NAS report recom m endation—with those of Psychemedics Corporation 
executives and associates:
In general, private sector employers tend to the opinion th a t it is 
excessive to apply forensic-standard testing to job apphcants, since 
job-seekers are frequently rejected on the basis of very subjective 
criteria such as unsatisfactory appearance or demeanor. This opinion 
is shared by a num ber of analysts of pending drug testing legislation 
for the private sector. In place of forensic standards, medical 
standards have been effectively apphed in pre-employment 
situations.'^
No competent H um an Resources m anager would share such a view. P rudent 
hiring practices include fastidious documentation of objective rejection criteria. 
Psychiatrist Dr. Robert L. DuPont, however, former Director of NIDA, Presidential 
"Drug Czar.” and now a "consultant” to Psychemedics, has an even more curious 
take on the subject:
In some settings hair testing  can be done w ithout GC/MS 
confirmation . . . Preem ploym ent is another setting where 
confirmation may not be needed. The best confirmation of all is not 
GC/R'IS, but adm ission of drug use by the person te s ted .''
'® Richard L. Hawks, Ph.D., Establishing a Urine Testing Program: Prior 
Considerations, in Urine Testing for Drugs o f Abuse, (Rockville, MD, NIDA Research 
M onograph Series. M onograph #73. 1986)
TG W erner A. B aum gartner & Virginia A. Hill, Hair Analysis for Drugs of 
Abuse: Some Forensic and Policy Issues, NIDA 1990 Conference Proceedings.
'■ Robert L. DuPont. M.D., Hair Testing for Abused Drugs: A  Practical 
Guide, Institu te  for Behavior and  H ealth, Inc., Rockville, MD., 1990.
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On the contrary, the term  “confirm ation” in th is context properly m eans 
independent verification, not affirm ation under duress, given the le tte r 's  long and 
Ignoble history.
Dr. D uPont was once aw arded a D epartm ent of Energy g ran t for “a study 
described as an  a ttem p t to dem onstrate th a t opponents of nuclear power are 
m entally ill.' D uPont [says] th a t he will study unhealthy fear, a phobia tha t is a 
denial of reality .”'® Psychiatrists are frequently big on Denial. Dr. DuPont seems to 
imply th a t since “the card inal symptom of drug abuse is denial,”'^ if you use illegal 
drugs and  claim to do so w ithout adverse consequences, you are by definition in 
Denial; your very dissent proves you to be an addict. And, before we can help you 
(given th a t you m anage so well to not evince any overt symptoms), we m ust identify 
you through inexpensive m ass drug screening.
You m ight as well ju s t confess on the basis of the “chnical” screen result; after 
ah, where th e re ’s smoke, there’s usually fire, correct?
’® K.S. Schrader-Frechette. Risk and Rationahtv: Philosophical Foundations 
for Popuhst Reforms. (Berkeley, CA. University of C ahfornia Press, 1991). p. 14.
DuPont, op cit. In 1995 the U.S. Suprem e C ourt handed down a major drug 
testing  decision in the case of Vernonia School District 47-J  v. Acton et ux., (Docket 
94-590, suspicionless drug testing  of Vernonia, Oregon high school athletes), ruhng 
th a t the in stitu tio n ’s in te rest in combating drug abuse outw eighed any right to 
privacy on the  p a rt of student-ath letes. The “scientific expert” for the school district, 
noted in the ACLU’s Amicus Brief, is none other than  Dr. Robert L. DuPont. Dr. 
D uPont first came to my a tten tion  when his paper cited above came in a two-inch 
thick bound volume of “scientific” papers I received from Psychemedics Corporation. 
In his paper Dr. D uPont waxes rhapsodic w ith respect to the  v irtues of the RIAH® 
drug test, and enthusiastically  supports its expanded utilization. Is th is man a 
d isin terested and  principled scientist or a partisan  advocate of m ass drug testing 
with a financial stake in its  spread to all sectors of society?
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A nalytical chem istry  can indeed be performed to a very high degree of accuracy 
and precision. B ut to asse rt th a t it can be done so on the cheap in m ass production 
mode w ithout p u tting  innocent people a t unacceptable risk is open to serious 
question. On Jan u a ry  16, 1991, Dr. Donald Cathlin, Director of the Olympic 
Analvtical Laboratory on the UCLA cam pus was interview ed on N ational Pubhc 
Radio's “M orning Edition” by reporter Ina Jaffe (10:21 EST). She began by narra ting  
th a t the lab was “am ong the most sophisticated drug-testing labs in the countrv'. if 
not the world. Begun in 1982 to prepare for the Olympics in Los Angeles, the lab 
still perform s more th an  15,000 tests  per year for the U nited S tates Olympic 
Com m ittee, the N ational Football League, the N ational Collegiate Athletic 
Association, and the  Defense D epartm ent.” Dr. Cathlin, in describing the analytical 
process a t his facility, reported th a t GC/MS was used as a prehm inary  screening 
tool! Sam ples found to be GC/MS-positives were subjected to “ano ther three or four 
days of additional chem ist-chem ical work . . .  to make a final determ ination . . . ”
The reason for such tender care should be obvious: no one w ants to risk falsely 
accusing a S5 million per year ballplayer on the basis of a S20 EMIT screen. But Joe 
& Jan e  Lunchbucket e t al are expected to subm it en masse to a largely symbolic, 
w asteful process th a t poses serious question as to its  propriety, efficacy, and 
poten tial to pu t drug-free individuals a t risk of being falsely accused of crim inal 
activity. Beyond the  purely ethical, there are compelling scientific reasons for 
adhering  to the “probable cause” selection standard  in chemical testing  for illicit 
drug use. H ard-core users will not be deterred by such non-cause m easures (Charles 
M anson certain ly  w as not), and the overwhelming m ajority th a t are in fact drug-
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processing their sam ples are both figuratively and literally  poured down the drain. 
Indeed, most of the tru ly  “hard-core” drug users are not even in the work force, and 
those th a t are typically dwell in the transien t semi- and unskilled employment 
sectors, not in the technical and professional domains so aggressively targeted by 
commercial drug testing  m arketers. The truly high prevalence s tra ta  were long ago 
identified and subjected to testing.
The campaign to extend non-cause testing to all employment sectors has 
everv'thing to do w ith political symbolism and laboratory profitability, and nothing 
w hatever to do w ith effective social policy. Such token m easures are not, however, 
w ithout significant costs; a 1991 GAO investigation of federal employm ent non­
cause testing program s revealed a confirmed positive rate  of 0.5% (th a t’s a mere 
0.005), and pegged the adm inistrative cost at $77,000 per confirmed positive. 
Conservatively assigned cut-off lim its cannot but indicate th a t the analyses are in 
fact being performed at “probable-cause” sensitivity levels anyway (with the hope 
th a t no one wül notice, and be cowed into compliance), resulting in a significant 
proportion of “false negatives” among casual drug users tested.®"
®° How are we otherw ise to account for the large gap between the purported 
unacceptably high overall work force prevalence ra tes and low confirmed positive 
findings such as those detailed in the GAO findings? Opting for the probable-cause 
strategy' yields be tter science, in th a t the prevalence ra te  among those tested  would 
by definition be g rea ter than  50% [ p(A) > 0.5 ], thus significantly lowering the 
Bayesian probability of false positive findings while enabling the labs to perform 
more accurate analyses on a much sm aller workload (for which they could charge 
com mensurably more to cover the costs of perform ing forensic quality  analyses), a 
circum stance which would also dim inish the proportion of false negatives, because 
cut-off levels could be lowered, yielding better sensitivity.
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The net resu lt of mass suspicionless drug testing, its ethical poverty aside, is an 
egregious waste of scientific resources, to the detrim ent of all who have need of 
high-caliber analytical laboratory services.®*
Moreover, the drug m etabolite concentration levels in the probable-cause 
specimens would undoubtedly be significantly higher on average, m aking true 
positive determ inations far less susceptible to challenge. The rationale for the 
ethical and legal concept of “probable cause” is not purely “political” and 
"philosophical.” It is implicitly rooted in sound science.
®‘ Food for thought: You are  an adm in istra to r perusing your organization’s 
employee drug test reports routinely sen t to you by your laboratory vendor. You 
assum e the samples were indeed processed, and th a t the resu lts are  “accurate. ”
How can you know this with certainty? The question of competence usually focuses 
on methodological reHabüity, but there  is also the possibility of ou trigh t firaud to 
consider, w ith disquieting precedent. In the late 1980’s a scandal came to fight 
w ithin the EPA’s Contractor Laboratory Program  (CLP), w herein a num ber of CLP- 
certified labs performing environm ental analyses for the governm ent and Superfund 
liability clients were found to have doctored or sim ply fabricated m any of their lab 
results, in one instance for more than  a year. Eventually, d isbarm ents and  criminal 
convictions resulted, but such fraudulent practices had gone on undetected for quite 
some time, in a highly regulated environm ent w ith predom inantly savvy clients 
requiring forensic quality analyses for use in contam ination and/or exposure 
litigation.
In the case of mass workplace drug screening, how can technologically 
unsophisticated clients know w hether all sam ples are in fact processed—th a t some 
percentage are not simply discarded to ease backlogs? After all, everyone seems 
content w ith low positive findings. If the custom ers are not subm itting  the ir own 
QC blinds—problematic in any event, given th a t laboratory personnel usually 
collect the w orkers’ specimens—how can there  be verification th a t  all sam ples are 
fully processed? Do the labs stabilize and  archive reserve aliquots of all sam ples for 
subsequent audit re-testing? For how long? Is such even possible, given curren t and 
proposed specimen volumes? Will SAMHSA/NIDA accreditation and  oversight 
suffice, given its conflicting m ultiple roles in the “W ar On Drugs”? Such questions 
are unlikely to even come to m ind for most drug testing  clients. But they should.
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O ther m atrices: H air testing
H air assays are based on the principle th a t, in addition to urine, feces, saliva, 
and  sweat, a routine exit pathw ay of m etabolic biochemicals is th a t of the ha ir and 
nails. The process is known as “k era tin iza tion ,” w herein trace am ounts of a breadth 
of chem icals become en trapped and  preserved  w ithin the hair shafts and nails. 
These chem icals are recoverable, identifiable, and  quantifiable using sophisticated 
analytical methods, of which the ha ir drug  te s t purports to be one. Psychemedics' 
RIAH®, or Radiolm m unoAssay of H air, is a pa ten ted  process employing a 
proprietary  chemical separation m ethod in which specimens are processed through 
a num ber of chemical separation steps and  adu lte ra ted  with a radioactive “internal 
tracer.” The tracer competes w ith im m unoassay antibodies for chemical “binding” 
w ith the analy tes of in terest. Analyte (e.g., illicit drug) concentration levels are 
inferred by com paring the rem nan t rad ioanaly te tracer “count ra te ” in the 
production sam ple against the “know n” d isin tegration  count ra te  of the radionuclide 
reference s tandard . A “calibration curve” is established and production sam ple drug 
concentrations estim ated  from the end-process count rate (recall the foregoing 
discussion of methodologically sim ilar serum  RIA methods).
While RIAH® is in fact a ra th e r sophisticated  analytical process, valid 
methodological concerns rem ain:
N agging generafizability questions persist. Most of the “scientific” lite ra tu re  
cited by the patent-holder is of th e ir  own patern ity  and consists of anim al 
studies and  investigations w ith in  clinical drug abuse rehab cohorts. Analytical 
accuracy extrapolations to the general population (and m ass-production 
com m ercial analysis) should be viewed skeptically.
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• Quality control realism  issues: The vendor asserts  th a t the drug user cannot 
w ash the illicit m etabolites out of the hair w ith any type of solvent/antidotes, 
but tha t the lab can “adsorb” QC spike concentrations “in” during analysis. True 
quality control realism  would en tail ha ir sam ples taken  from a large cohort of 
volunteers who had  ingested controlled am ounts of the various illicit drug 
m etabohtes. Such cannot be done, for a host of w hat should be obvious reasons.
• Cross-reactivity concerns: Are we to believe th a t only ülicit drug metabolites 
excrete into the hair? The potential cross-reactivity, false positive concerns th a t 
a ttend  conventional urine and serum  analyses (see above) also apply to hair 
testing. For the vendor to suggest th a t GC/MS confirm ation assays may not need 
be run in certain  settings is outrageous.
• There are a couple of overlooked sam pling bias problems. F irst, the hair 
“sam phng” protocol calls for snipping approxim ately 50 s trands of hair from a 
location atop the head two inches posterior to a scalp midline figuratively 
“draw n” from ear to ear. Psychemedics' own technical lite ra tu re  adm its tha t 
hairs taken from other areas of the body yield significantly less reliable results. 
Well, this sam pling location is precisely where m any m ales experience a t least 
p artia l baldness. Consistent resu lts require consistent sampling, recall.
On a related note, one of the ostensible “virtues” of the ha ir test is its ability to 
“see back in tim e” to reveal a chronology of drug use. H um an head air grows at 
roughly 0.5 inches per month. The RIAH specimen collection protocol calls for a 
1.5" hair sample which will purportedly reveal a 90-day prior history of any 
illicit drug use, w hereas urine tests  only reveal very recent drug use—so drug 
users need only abstain  for a short while to pass th e ir urine tests. Well, the hair 
assay then discrim inates in favor of bald men and against women. Balding or 
not, if John apphes for a job or comes to work w earing a close-cropped “buzz 
cut,” can there be any autom atic adverse inference? But, can Jane  show up just 
as unrem arkably with, well, a “G.l. Jan e ” coiffure?
More on the 90-day analytical “look-back.” It is telling th a t the RIAH technical 
lite ra tu re  touts the virtue of its lengthy “S W —"surveillance window”—rather than  
referring to such in conventional drug bioassay terminology as the “DW,” or 
“detection window.” “Detection window” refers to the tim e during  which metabolites 
are detectable prior to excretion to below analytically quantifiable concentration 
levels. The detection window for cocaine m etabolites in urine, for example, is on the 
order of 1-3 days, and the urine DW for the fat-soluble, slower-to-purge THC
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(m arijuana metabolite) is 7-30 days (depending, of course, on consumption 
patterns).
For Psychemedics, quarterly  hair testing would ensure ongoing “surveillance" of 
employees adequate to effect a “drug-free workforce” (semantically distinct from the 
mere “drug-free workplace”). A handy little m arketing hook, for “surveillance" is 
tru ly  the prim ary function of aU suspicionless drug testing.
A recent published update on concerns regarding hair testing follows:
H air Tests Tangled in Problems: 1/7/98
N early 80 percent of all U.S. firms rely on standardized urine tests 
for drug abuse. And while there is another type of test—the 
exam ination of hair strands, which is said to identify far more users 
th an  urine tests—federal authorities say there are some shortcomings 
to the process, The Philadelphia Inquirer reported Jan . 5.
“The scope of drug testing  is expanding dram atically, and with 
expanding hair testing, the likelihood of bias wül increase, too. It’s a 
major problem,” w arned J. Michael Walsh, executive director of the 
P resident’s Drug Advisory Council under President Ronald Reagan 
and George Bush, and now a consultant to the urinalysis industry. 
One cause for concern, the experts say, is when hair tests are used on 
non-Caucasians. This group may test positive more often because 
researchers have found th a t traces of drugs last longer in thick, dark 
h a ir than  thin, light-colored hair. Hair tests also can’t catch recent 
drug use, the way urine tests  can.
The experts add th a t there is another problem with hair tests. To 
date, “ha ir analysis for the presence of drugs is unproven, 
unsupported by scientific lite ra tu re  or controlled trials,” said Food 
and Drug A dm inistration spokeswoman Sharon Snider.
W hüe urine tests can easUy detect m arijuana use, the experts say 
th a t ha ir tests  are better a t detecting cocaine and heroin use. With 
th a t in mind, there is a belief th a t th a t hair tests may someday be 
used in conjunction w ith urine analysis. “H air testing may tu rn  out to 
have a com plem entary role in workplace testing,” said Robert 
Stevenson, deputy director of the Workplace Program s Division of the
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federal Center for Substance Abuse Prevention, “bu t we have yet to 
resolve rem aining questions about its fairness and the ability to 
in terp re t resu lts consistently.”®-
‘Backwash,” or, wag the dog and baste the “turkey ': 
Surveillance backlash
As argued previously, for drug testing  to tru ly  serve a maximally deterren t 
function, im plem entation would have to be not only highly visible, but also 
unpredictable. Not only ought selection be random, but also the testing intervals 
them selves, so th a t those under surveillance could know neither w hether nor when 
they m ight be selected to provide a specimen. Moreover, specimen collection 
procedures should also be m axim ally vigilant to preclude the possibüity of 
adu lteration  or switching.
VVTiUe some program s (e.g.. Defense D epartm ent testing  protocols) explicitly call 
for close direct visual monitoring of urination  during specimen collection, our social 
squeam ishness in th is regard has resulted  in a good bit of laxity, and there is even 
much approving discussion of procedures th a t “allow for reasonable privacy and 
personal dignity concerns” in the Suprem e Court opinions which have ruled thus far 
on testing  program s. In Chandler, for example, the C ourt noted th a t the Georgia 
law perm itted  those to be tested to have the ir specimens collected by their own 
physicians a t a tim e of the ir own choosing. No ostensible “privacy” issue there. In 
Treasury, the Court s ta ted  th a t specimen “donors” were subjected to neither 
proxim ate visual nor au ra l monitoring, also obviating privacy concerns. In Railway.
®- Join Together Online, 1-8-98, [http://www.jointogether.org], March, 1998.
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it was noted by the Court th a t security procedures only extended to auditory 
m onitoring by a sam e-sex overseer outside the secured stall—a negligible intrusion. 
Only in Vernonia were privacy considerations dism issed out of hand, for Opinion 
au thor Scalia concluded th a t (1) studen t-ath letes are not otherwise fussy about 
locker-room physical exposure—including the use of communal urinals, and (2) even 
were they, s tuden ts do not have full constitutional rights in any event.
H ard-liners insist th a t  visual m onitoring is an essential part of a complete 
"chain-of-custody” regim en essential to obviate evasion. The hard-hners have a 
point. But—never underestim ate the resourcefulness of the evader. As recounted by 
John Coombs in D rug-im naired Professionals (see C hapter 2):
Although testing  procedures are carefully monitored to prevent 
cheating, addicts devise ingenious methods to escape detection 
(Coombs and  W est 1991). For example, a female clinician ran  a feeder 
tube down through her buttocks. By leaning back against a urine- 
filled bag, she got the expected urine stream . A young anesthesiologist 
filled a sm all polyethylene bag w ith clean urine, palmed it, and, by 
squeezing the sides together, dehvered the appropriate specimen in 
the appropriate  arc when observed by testing  personnel. A first his 
wife provided the specimen, but when she la ter refused, he 
substitu ted  his dog’s urine. “We didn’t know we were analyzing the 
dog’s urine until la te r when he told us” the testing  director 
remarked.®®
Rex! Here, boy; lift your leg; hold it right there . . . W'ell. we can put a stop to all 
evasive m easures by requiring a full nudity strip  search, right?
Wrong. Coombs continues:
®® Coombs, op cit., pp. 184-5.
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A urologist catheterized his own bladder, removed his urine, 
substitu ted  clean urine, and urina ted  clean urine under close 
supervision a t the testing site.®®
Wow. Form er NFL linem an and au tho r Tim Green recounts sim ilar tactics in 
his recent book about life in the N ational Football League, The Dark Side of the 
Game, w herein Green describes how football players would sometimes use an 
ordinary kitchen turkey baster and ca the te r tube to inject clean urine back into 
their bladders prior to subm itting to a drug test.
Wag the Dog: Baste the m etabolite Turkey: D arth  Evader strikes back.
O ther m atrices, continued: saliva and sweat
Saliva has been proposed as a viable a lternative assay m atrix for drug testing. 
Vendors of sahva testing  services base its  ostensible preferability on on-site 
convenience, m eaning th a t screening can be perform ed on the spot by technicians 
requiring only m inim al training. All the costly elem ents of laboratory assays 
(including chain-of-custody expenses) are obviated. Two recent items concerning 
sahva tests foUow:
Thursday Jan u a ry  15, 1998, 3:06 pm E astern  Time Company Press 
Release, SOURCE: Epitope. Inc.
Epitope Announces FDA Clearance of O ral Fluid Assay for Cocaine
BEAVERTON, Ore., Jan . 15 /PRNewswire/—Epitope, Inc. (Nasdaq: 
EPTO news) today announced th a t  its  research partner, STC 
Technologies, Inc., located in Bethlehem , Pennsylvania, has received 
FDA clearance for the STC Cocaine M etabohte Micro-Plate EIA
®® Coombs, op cit., p. 185.
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(enzyme im m unoassay) Kit for use in detecting cocaine and cocaine 
m etabolites in oral fluid collected w ith  the OraSure(R)/EpiScreen(R) 
Oral Specimen Collection Device m anufactured  by Epitope. “This is 
the first oral fluid-based im m unoassay for drugs of abuse cleared by 
the U.S. Food and Drug A dm inistration.” said Sam Niedbala, Ph.D.. 
executive vice president, research and  developm ent of STC . . . Drugs- 
of-abuse testing  generally occurs in one of four basic testing segments: 
1) Clinical testing including hospital emergency rooms, laboratories, 
and drug rehabüitation  centers. 2) governm ent m andated testing, 
such as testing  of transportation w orkers (D.O.T.), defense 
contractors (D.O.D.). and other governm ental contractors, 3) forensic 
testing, including apphcations in the  crim inal justice system, law 
enforcement, the courts, and probation/parole programs, and 4) 
industria l testing  for employment evaluation and  drug-firee workplace 
program s. In each of these segm ents O raSur testing  wül provide an 
alternative for sample coUection th a t can be perform ed in any setting, 
is non-invasive, is less em barrassing, and  improves the chain of 
custody.
SALIVA AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL IN TOXICOLOGY
Karin M. Hold, B.S.; Douwe de Boer, Ph.D.; Jan  Zuidema, Ph.D.; 
Robert A.A. Maes, Ph.D.
{from ABSTRACT)
“Due to our present incomplete knowledge of saliva as a biological 
specimen, sahva drug levels should be used concomitantly with 
recorded drug concentrations in o ther fluids, e.g. plasm a, to 
contribute to a more ideal in terp re ta tion  of drug concentrations in 
chnical and forensic case studies.”®®
Whüe the sahva test wül be m arketed initiaUy as an alternative drug abuse assay, 
it wül invariably end up being an addition to conventional lab methods, resulting 
not in savings but in additional employer expense.
®® In ternational Journal of Drug Testing. Fall 1996, 
[http://big.stpt.usf.edu/~journaI/hold.htm l], March, 1998.
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The “Patch”
Pharm C hem . a drug  testing  m ark e te r based in Menlo Park, California, recently 
received FDA clearance for sales of its  drug abuse sweat patch. This adhesive device 
is actually  a replacem ent for the urine sam ple vial ra th e r th an  a method of 
detecting the presence of drugs directly. The patch, apphed to the body for a week or 
two. absorbs sw eat and  re ta in s  it un til the strip  is analyzed via GC/MS in the lab. 
NIDA, while in te rested  in the potentia l of th is  m atrix (as an ongoing surveiUance 
device), cautions th a t it p resen tly  encum bered by high false positive potential.
While the FDA authorization  p erta in s  to crim inal justice apphcations, Pharm C hem  
is reported to be seeking approval to m arke t th is technology to the em ploym ent 
sector.®"
“C haracter” testing; H andw riting  analysis and the “MMPl Lite” 
(Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory)
Can we uncover actual or po ten tia l “drug  abusers” by subjecting them  to 
“character” tests  ra th e r  th an  the invasive bioassay methods th a t are so contentious? 
Use of he detectors is largely proscribed by law, and hiring private detectives to 
shadow people to surveill and  assess th e ir "moral habits” is im practical, so some 
com panies have tried  adm in istering  psychological assessm ent instrum ents  to 
discern “m oral character defects” such as drug-seeking propensities or, more 
generally, “dishonesty” and “laxity” tra its . Some employers have tried  handw riting
®" Sweat Testing M ay Prove Useful in Drug-Use Surveillance, N ational 
In s titu te  on D rug Abuse,
[http://www.nida.nih.gOv/NIDA_Notes/NNVoll0N5/Sweat.htmI], M arch, 1998.
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analysis, for example (see below), while others adm inister “personality te sts” to 
weed out undesirables.
An acquaintance of mine w as turned  down recently for a job. The 
hiring firm told her th a t she was rejected because the ir handw riting 
analysis had shown th a t she was not “open to learning.” Use of 
handw riting analysis (“graphology”) to screen prospective employees 
is w idespread in France and  is becoming more common in both the 
U nited Kingdom and America. While job interviews, apphcations and 
recommendations rem ain the preferred screening techniques, more 
than  5% of American com panies used graphology when hiring as of 
1990. T hat num ber has alm ost certainly increased during the last few 
years with weU-known firm s hke C itibank and Bristol-Myers 
experim enting w ith the technique.
Consultants who advocate graphological screening claim th a t such 
analysis is able to reveal im portan t character tra its  of job apphcants. 
While analysis cannot disclose a person's age or sex, it allegedly can 
discern (at relatively low cost) character tra its  of a potential hire— 
e.g., a candidate’s stabüity , vivacity, creativity, inteUigence, 
imagination, reasoning abüity, speed of thinking, and force of 
character. In addition, graphologists m aintain th a t the ir skül is 
extremely useful in identifying pedophiles, sociopaths, persons w ith 
cancer, schizophrenics, and  epileptics. Some go so far as to m aintain  
th a t the individual's en tire  personahty  structure appears in his or her 
handwriting. The individual is said to have no secrets before the 
graphologist who supposedly can teU one's private sexual likes and 
dishkes from a handw riting specimen.®'
Like suspicionless drug testing, “character ” evaluation in the workplace is also a 
very controversial area, for em ploym ent evaluations are by law supposed to be 
lim ited to job-skills suitability  (with the limited exception of inquiry into prior 
crim inal convictions). The Target discount store chain, for example, was successfully 
sued several years ago over its use of the MMPI (M innesota M ultiphasic Personality
®' Daryl Koehn, Ph.D., H andw riting  Analysis in Pre-Employment Screening, 
The Online Journal of E thics. D ePaul University, Chicago, IL, 
[http://condor.depaul.edu/ethics/hand.htm l], March, 1998.
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Inventory) in assessing employment candidates’ “character.” The MMPl is a chnical 
diagnostic in strum ent appropriate only for the evaluation of psychopathology' in 
clinical settings.*®
A Florida firm. CERA. Inc.. now touts to businesses a paper-and-pencü 88- 
question "chemical dependency ” test known as SASSI-2. the "Substance Abuse 
Subtle Screening Inventory, ” purporting to identify actual or potential drug abusers, 
w ith a claimed “overall 94% accuracy level.” Essentially a pared-down and more 
narrowly-focused MMPI knock-off, this in strum ent is m arketed as a cost-effective 
alternative to traditional employment urine screening. The job apphcant or 
employee completes the test—said to be w ritten  a t a 6th-grade comprehension 
level—in 10-15 m inutes. It is then faxed to the vendor, where it is “scored” and 
in terpreted . The results are then faxed back to the chent w ithin the hour. The 
SASSl instrum ent is said to be unaffected by age, gender, and educational level 
factors—i.e., th a t is “generahzable” and suitable for broad employment apphcation. 
Is th is so?
A brief look into the SASSl validation methodology documentation follows:
This is to sum m arize the reliability and validity of the Substance 
Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory (SASSl 2). The SASSI-2 is a 
psychological assessm ent tool designed to identity those who have a 
substance-related disorder. This instrum ent is currently used by 
hundreds of organizations including addictions treatm ent centers, 
hospitals, o ther health  care organizations, and employee assistance 
program s in corporate settings.
Sample:
®® See Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., No. A052157, 10-25-91. See also 
Getting Personal, ABA Journal. Vol. 78, Jan . 1992, pp. 66-67.
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These findings are based on the  resu lts  of 2.954 respondents. 
N inety percent of th is sam ple consisted of clients firom a varie ty  of 
trea tm en t programs th roughout the  country, including psychiatric 
hospitals, addictions tre a tm e n t centers, a dual diagnosis hospital 
(substance abuse and psychiatric), a sex offender trea tm en t program , 
a vocational rehabilitation program  and a county detention center. 
The rem aining ten  percent consisted of college studen ts and  a  group 
who responded to a new spaper ad requesting subjects w ith a family 
history of alcohol use. Sixty-six percent of the to tal sam ple w as male. 
Sixty percent of the sam ple w as Caucasian. 22% was African- 
American, and 11% was N ative American. Forty-one percent reported 
never being married, w hereas 30% were m arried and 25% were 
divorced. The average age of th is  group of respondents was 32, and 
the average educational level was ten th  grade. Thirty-six percent of 
the sam ple (n =1,053) had been interview ed and diagnosed by a 
tra ined  clinician. Of those interview ed, 75% were diagnosed as being 
dependent on alcohol and/or some other substance.
Accuracy In Identifying Substance Use Disorders . . . Combined 
Sam ple (n=839)






. . . resu lts indicate th a t the  SASSI-2 is a rehable and vafid 
m easurem ent tool and support its  use for clinical assessm ent. The 
overall rehabihty coefficient for the SASSI-2 (coefficient alpha) was 
found to be .93. and supplem entary  analyses support the reliability  of 
the SASSl-2 subscales. The SASSI-2 was found to correspond highly 
w ith independent chnical diagnoses. The SASSl-2 was also associated 
w ith theoretically related  c rite ria  (e.g., substance-related a rre s ts  and 
the num ber of ühcit drugs used) bu t unassociated w ith theoretically  
unrela ted  criteria (e.g., intelligence, reading and arithm etic  tests).
This is a ra th e r glaring exam ple of selection bias in a putative “validation” 
sam ple. These vendors cannot su sta in  generalizabüity claims given the  homogeneity 
of th is  research group. This type of methodological myopia is som ething of a 
syndrom e in drug abuse research generally. Clinicians working w ith  drug rehab
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clientele routinely probe th e  psyches of th e ir “patien ts” and  sometimes “publish” 
the ir findings—“m arket” would be the more apt term —as characteristic of the 
general population w ithout any serious effort to evaluate the salient a ttribu tes of 
non-problem “control group” cohorts. Indeed, our ostensible clinical understanding 
of the true nature  of “addiction” is burdened by th is type of Hmitation. for, we 
cannot ju st random ly select subjects representative of the general population for 
continued controlled dosing w ith  psychoactive chemicals with the intent of
t
analyzing the proxim ate and  long-term outcomes. Such would be a t once illegal and 
unethical.
The SASSl validation report contains a couple of oddities. First, it jum ps from a 
discussion of the dem ographic a ttrib u te s  of the 2,954 validation pool respondents 
s tra igh t to prevalence and  “accuracy” tabulations based on a "Combined Sample 
(n=839)” of a “SASSI-3,” w ith  no explanation of the difference in the cohort sizes or 
w hether SASSI-2 and SASSI-3 are the sam e instrum ents. Second, there is no 
information presented anyw here in the report on the derivation of the “specificity” 
percentage of “94%.” Recall th a t specificity refers to the power on a measure to 
correctly identify and exclude “true  negatives.” Given the small “n” and obvious 
sam pling bias in gathering  of th is cohort, it  is far from clear th a t the num ber “94%” 
has any precise (and independently  replicable) meaning. A homogeneous, mostly 
captive clinical cohort of undereducated, intoxicant-prone subjects purporting to 
represent a validation anchor certifying the general employment assessm ent 
propriety of th is in s tru m en t is dubious a t best.
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Also in teresting  is th a t this vendor also touts its  method as a cost-effective 
alternative to trad itional lab drug testing, but then goes on to embellish the asserted 
accuracy of SASSl w ith the following:
The utility of the SASSl has been dem onstrated in clinical research 
w ith thousands of individuals. When used sequentially w ith urine 
drug testing  the published accuracy ra te  is 99%.®"
Well, is SASSl a cost-effective replacement for the urine screen, or one more 
methodologically suspect auxiliary expense?
Employer expense questions aside, any drug-free individual consenting to 
subm it to this “te s t” should perhaps be IQ tested as well.
Commercial drug testing: m arket considerations
Vendors of drug testing  services operate in an intensely competitive, low-bid 
m arket. True forensic “cost-plus” pricing is impractical, for employers and 
adm inistrators w ant to keep screening costs as low as possible (hence quiet 
proposals to do away w ith the relatively expensive GC/MS confirm ations for pre­
employment screens). Recent stock m arket performance histories of m ajor publicly 
traded testing firms are, in the aggregate, less than  exhilarating. Several examples 
below illustra te  the circum stances:
®® SASSl Validation document [http://www.cerainc.com /htm l/sassi.htm l], 
March, 1998.
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Figure 2: Psychemedics Corporation recent stock history
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Figure 3: Epitope. Inc. recent stock performance history
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Figure 5: Pharmchem. Inc. recent stock performance history
Psychemedics (NASDAQ ticker symbol: PMD), heretofore an  aggressive 
m arketer of em ploym ent h a ir  testing, recently began haw king a hom e-test kit (the
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PDT-90) sold through discount drug store chains and  pitched to w orried parents. 
Epitope (NASDAQ ticker symbol: EPTO) is likely banking on its  recently FDA- 
approved sahva test O raSure®  (developed in  partnersliip  w ith STC Technologies. 
Inc) to help reverse the negative slope of its  stock perform ance. OraSure® is aimed 
a t the em ploym ent screening m arket, and is portrayed as a convenient and cost- 
effective “onsite” alternative  to traditional lab services. Chem trak. Inc. (NASDAQ 
ticker symbol: CMTR). a vendor of a variety of hom e-test and  physicians' in ternal 
office lab assays, has struggled with dechning share prices for years. They are 
hopeful th a t the ir new “P aren t’s Alert” home drug-testing k it will improve their 
fortunes. Pharm C hem  (NASDAQ ticker symbol: PCHM) is the vendor of a variety of 
drug testing  products and services, among them  the recently FDA-approved drug- 
detecting skin “sw eat patch.”
Q uite a cohort of stock performance downhill skiers. For context, a graphic 
illu stra ting  aggregate m arket performance during the sam e period is provided 
below.
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It is indeed a tough m arke t for vendors of drug screening products and services 
(as the foregoing graphs indicate). In 1997 a major vendor of trad itional 
employment-sector urine screening, U.S. Drug Testing Corporation, succumbed and 
was liquidated in C hapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings.
In such a difficult arena, two im peratives obtain. F irst, expanded m arket share 
is critical to eventual profitability, hence the enlistm ent of legislative collaborators 
through “educational” organizations whose activities focus on enactm ent of 
m andatory drug-testing laws, such as The Alhance for Model S tate  D rug Laws and 
kindred lobbying groups such as The Institu te  for a Drug-Free Workplace. Second, 
there is ceaseless pressure to cut costs in the labs. Employee a ttitude  surveys in 
laboratory journals reflect these circum stances, reveahng a  litany of discontent 
caused by excessive workloads, inadequate resources and pay, lack of training, 
understaffing, low morale, and  high turnover.
Those who opted for laboratory careers with TV' ad images of Glaxo Glory and 
"Dow-Lets-Ya-Do-Great-Things" cfinical whitecoat glamour in mind come to be 
considerably less than  ecstatic working in high-stress, mass-production, 
methodologically banal environm ents having more in common with poultry 
processing p lan ts than  in tellectually  stim ulating scientific enclaves. Yet we propose 
to exacerbate the in frastructu re  burden by proposing more unjustified suspicionless 
drug screening a t every tu rn .
These minds, machines, and methods can be put to much better uses.
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Sum m ary thus far:
Drug pohcy historical and  political contexts are anything but rational (Chapter 
Two). Likewise for the  epidemiological and social science empirical foundations 
(C hapter Three). The presen t chapter exam ines some of the  core issues th a t call into 
serious question popular assum ptions regarding the “accuracy” of commercial 
laboratory science and  the wisdom of com m itting so much of the bioassay 
in frastructure  to these dubious ends. Next: Is any of th is tru ly  legal? In Chapter 
Five we see how historical ignorance, political dissem bhng, and scientific naivete 
combine w ith ju risp ruden tia l am nesia to tu rn  the F ourth  Am endm ent on its head.
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CHAPTER FIVE
D rug testing and C onstitu tional law: 
clamorem et uthesium
Does suspicionless drug testing violate the  U nited  S ta tes  C onstitution, more 
specifically the Bill of Rights—in particular the Fourth  A m endm ent— irrespective 
of w hether the  pohcy is directly prom ulgated by the  governm ent or enacted in the 
private sector? Yes. We will prove this assertion in  th is  chapter, beginning with a 
look into the  p a tern ity  of our Constitutional righ t against unreasonable search and 
seizure, continuing w ith an exam ination of the relevan t Fourth  A m endm ent 
jurisprudence th a t followed the founding of our nation, and concluding w ith a 
consideration of the m oral underpinnings of our A m erican C onstitu tional rights 
heritage.
Cuddihy: evolution of the F ourth  A m endm ent
We have all heard  the phrase “hue and cry," which for most is sim ply taken to 
m ean social clam or or indignant uproar over some pubhc controversy. And, if ever 
there were a w idespread, sustained, and vociferous modern “hue and  cry,” the 
concern over and cam paign against drug abuse ran k s a t the top, w ith  m any polls 
reporting sen tim en t rank ing  “drug abuse” as our num ber one social problem and 
“domestic th re a t.” A core question examined by th is  thesis is w hether the “th rea ts”
117
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posed by recreational intoxication and “addiction” are sufficiently grave as to 
overwhelm our law enforcem ent infrastructure and consequently justify  abrogation 
of the privacy provisions of the Constitution through suspicionless drug testing 
programs. W hat of this contem poran- “hue and cry” from a historico-jurisprudential 
perspective?
According to William J . Cuddihy’s exhaustive 1990 Clarem ont G raduate 
University Ph.D. D issertation Origins and Original M eaning of the Fourth 
Am endm ent (cited by Justice  O’Conner in Vernonia c. Acton et ux) “hue and cry,” 
was much more than  a mere colloquial expression in the European middle ages from 
which we trace our American jurispruden tia l heritage—it was a  legal term  of art. 
one we today would equate w ith vigilante mob “justice” and/or deputization of the 
private sector for the suppression and/or punishm ent of wrongdoing. The 1950’s “b- 
movie” image of angry villagers—pitchforks, clubs, axes, and torches held high— 
m arching en masse on Baron F rankenstein’s castle to mete out a bit of harsh 
sum m ary justice comes readily to mind. Such is indeed historically accurate: 
formally announcing a “Hue and Cry” obhgated one’s fellow citizens to participate in 
the ensuing unbridled pu rsu it and searches of suspects. Cuddihy finds the earliest 
official references to Hue and Cry— clamorem et uthesium —in 13th century 
European legal documents.
Cuddihy’s work traces the development of social norms and codified legal 
res tra in ts  against excessive search and seizure doctrines firom ancient times 
through the period of the American Revolution. He recounts in m inute detail the
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evolution of practices involving civilian-led or assisted Hue and Cry episodes into 
general w arrantless searches conducted by formal authority, codifications of 
unencum bered “general w arran ts ,” and, finally, the English and colonial 
apphcations of “G eneral W rits of A ssistance”—which were in effect Hue and Cry 
gussied up in Parham entary  s ta tu te , the in tent of which was the augm entation of 
the relatively meager resources of officialdom with the enforced assistance of the 
private sector.
A sm all sample of Cuddihy illu stra tes the 15th to 17 century developments;
Between 1485 and 1642, the Enghsh law of search and seizure 
underw ent a radical transform ation. With other factors, th a t 
transform ation caused the equally far-reaching changes th a t began to 
occur in Enghsh thought on search and seizure a century later, after 
1580.
The Tudor m onarchs had not only the capacity but mighty 
incentives to enlarge the general search into a powerful weapon of 
social, pohtical, economic, and  intellectual control. D uring the Tudor 
and early S tu art periods, the apphcations of the search process 
prohferated from three to fifteen categories: (1) vagrancy. (2) 
recreation. (3) the apparel th a t the lower classes wore, (4) the hue and 
cry. (5) the Crown's p u rsu it of accused persons, (6) the recovery of 
stolen possessions, (7) game poaching, (8) economic regulation. (9) 
sum ptuary  behavior. (10) bankruptcy, (11) weapons, (12) the customs 
and importation. (13) the guilds. (14) censorship, and (15) the 
suppression of pohtical and  rehgious unrest.
In ah fifteen categories, the law authorized general searches during 
all or part of the period from 1485 to 1642. Everything from the food 
th a t an Enghshm an pu t in his m outh and the cap th a t he wore on his 
head to the thoughts circulating in his mind came to furnish legal 
pretexts for the governm ent to inspect his home. Enghsh law defined 
a m an’s house as his castle in 1485 and as his governm ent’s castle a 
century later.
Parliam ent, the S tu a rt kings of 1603-49. and local governm ents ah 
participated vigorously in th is expansion, but the Tudors were the 
m aster architects, for the m ethods of general search th a t they
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pioneered changed but h ttle  over the next th ree  centuries despite the 
m ultitude of uses to which they were put. This growth in  the  types of 
searches, in turn , was a major im pulse to the p ro tests th a t in itiated 
the movem ent for a right against unreasonable search and  seizure.
Cuddihy cites num erous instances detailing  the evolution of Hue and Cry and 
its investigative progeny through the next hundred-odd pages of his dissertation. 
P articu larly  notew orthy are his recitations of the use of Hue and Cry to suppress 
the “debaucherous recreation by workers and  servan ts. ” (p. 315) He also makes 
w hat is for our purposes a most telling observation;
Incorporation of the general search into the hue and  cry was 
especially significant. A cornerstone of crim inal procedure for a 
m illennium , the hue and cry applied w hatever m ethods it absorbed 
against the growing list of problems th a t it addressed a fte r 1580: 
theft, poaching, vagrancy, and dissent. One effect was to insure tha t 
num erous houses could be searched not only w hen plots against the 
governm ent were afoot but every tim e someone’s sh irt w as stolen or a 
deer was poached to feed some hungry m ouths. While the  rehgious 
controversies of the 1580s and 1590s generated  a s tream  of routine 
general searches, the sim ultaneous incorporation of the sam e kind of 
searches into the hue and cry tu rned  the  s tream  into a continuous 
flow.
Once entrenched as an essential elem ent of the hue and  cry, 
general w arran ts  and promiscuous searches w ere all bu t guaranteed 
an  extended longevity, for the hue and  cry was an indispensable 
component of Tudor-Stuart law enforcem ent. The coun terpart to the 
m odern police force in Tudor-Stuart E ngland consisted of little  more 
th an  a n ight w atch of citizens in each town to discourage nocturnal 
brigandage and several dozen unpaid justices of the peace 
superin tend ing  several times th a t num ber of sheriffs, unsalaried  
constables, and lesser officials.
P etty  constables and their power to requisition assistance were the 
hnchpin  of the  system. A constable or two was usually  selected in 
each parish , manor, or village on the expectation th a t he would
90 W üliam J . Cuddihy, Ph.D., O rigins and  O riginal M eaning of the Fourth 
A m endm ent. Volume 1, Clarem ont G raduate U niversity doctoral d issertation, 1990,
pp. 80-82.
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suppress m ost crim es and catch wrong-doers on a part-tim e basis 
while still w orking full-time a t his accustomed profession. W henever 
the m agnitude of the crime exceeded the individual resources of local 
officials, they commandeered the ir neighbors into helping them . In 
effect, the overburdened constable forcibly deputized every adult male 
in the vicinity whose assistance he thought m ight be appropria te  to 
accomplish his assigned task. G eneral search w arran ts  were a 
frequent device for expediting th is process, for nearly  a ll of them  
authorized the bearer not only to search all suspicious places but also 
to requisition such assistance as he needed to do so. The general 
w arran t and its power to com m andeer assistance were interwoven 
elem ents in a system  of penurious law enforcement.
Furnished with such a w arrant, a constable could call out his 
neighbors and oversee a prolonged, far-reaching search. To 
accomplish lesser resu lts today, however, would require a m ultitude 
of specific search w arran ts, each obtained fi-om a m agistra te  after due 
cause shown, and num erous full-time policemen to serve those 
warrants.9>
Except where the present-day W ar on Drugs is concerned, for which our puny 
federal constabulary  feels compelled to resurrect the Hue and  Cry-, Fourth 
Am endm ent heritage notw ithstanding. Recall Ronald R eagan's Executive Order 
12564 (“Drug-Free Federal Workplace Order") and its most revealing passage:
The use of illegal drugs, on or off duty, by Federal employees is 
inconsistent not only w ith the law-abiding behavior expected of all 
citizens, but also w ith the special tru s t placed in such employees as 
servan ts of the public.
The “law-abiding behavior expected of aU citizens . . . ” Such compHance was to be 
enforced extrajudiciaUy through the use of the employee drug test. Steven L. Nock 
observes:
Indeed, the testing  component is the only significant p a rt of this 
executive order. Illegal drugs, by definition, are illegal, so there was
9‘ Cuddihy, op cit., pp. 194-96
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Little an  Executive O rder could do about enforcem ent of existing laws. 
Clearly, existing judicial practices were perceived by the P resident to 
be ineffective. Executive O rder 12564 m ust be seen as a sta tem en t 
th a t norm al judicial procedures were inadequate: only extrem e 
m easures, in this case drug tests, would do.^-
In o ther words. General W rits revisited. According to Cuddihy and other historians, 
it was the reviled General W rits and the abuses they perm itted  in the colonies th a t 
were among the prim ary causes of the American Revolution. For example, as 
recounted by O.M. Dickerson in W rits of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution. 
“[Wlrits of A ssistance were legalized by a series of acts of ParU am ent giving the 
custom s officers authority  to search for and seize uncustom ed goods.” Dickerson 
cites pertinen t provisions of the 1664 Act. (13 and 14 Car. II, c. 11, cl. 5):
And it shall be lawful to or for any person or persons, authorized by 
w rits of assistance under the Seal of His M ajesty’s court of exchequer, 
to take a constable, headborough, or other public officer inhabiting 
near the place, and in the daytim e to enter, and go into any house, 
shop, cellar, warehouse, room, or other place and in case of resistance 
break open doors, chests, trunks, and other packages, there to seize, 
and from thence to bring, any kind of goods or merchandize, 
w hatever, prohibited, and uncustom ed . . .  9’
General enhstm en t of the private sector in the unfettered search for w hatever 
prohibited goods the government thought it exigent to suppress. G reenhalgh and 
Yost note tha t, bv the 1750’s
9- Steven L. Nock. The Costs of Privacv: Surveillance and Reputation in 
America. (New York. Aldine De Gruyter, 1993), p. 100.
9-̂  O.M. Dickerson, Writs o f Assistance as a Cause o f the Revolution, The Era 
of the Am erican Revolution. Morris, R., Ed., (New York, Columbia U niversity Press, 
1939), pp. 43-44.
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. . . the Enghsh beheved th a t common law search w arran ts  were 
insufficient to curb smuggling. The requirem ent of a rticu la ting  the 
specific location of the contraband before a justice of the peace or 
m agistrate  made it difficult for the governm ent to obtain a common 
law search w arran t. The W rit of Assistance, however, had  proved 
itself to be a more effective enforcem ent tool. By 1760, its  use in the 
colonies had become commonplace. The W rit of Assistance 
commanded “all” persons to assist an official, when requested, in 
conducting a search and  seizing persons and/or property . . . The writs 
were issued w ithout prior judicial screening. Their use was not 
Umited to searching places for particu lar persons or objects. The writs 
granted boundless discretion to the officer.9-*
As Cuddihy m akes incontrovertibly clear in the more than  1.200 pages of his 
d issertation devoted to the 18th century  colonial political and legal conditions, 
revolution, and codification of the Bül of Rights, it was the explicit in ten t of the 
victorious American revolutionists who firamed our Constitution to enshrine in our 
BÜ1 of Rights a clear condem nation and prohibition of a rb itra ry  and excessive 
searches th a t had for centuries taken  place under color of the Hue and Cry.
The im phcations for indiscrim inate drug testing
As discussed elsewhere in th is thesis, the four U.S. Suprem e Court drug testing  
rulings to date (Skinner. Von Raab. Vernonia, and Chandler) all include the full text 
of the Fourth  Am endm ent and acknowledge its centrality  to th e ir holdings, 
stipu lating  th a t drug tests  in fact constitu te “searches” w ithin the purview of the 
Amendment. The threshold questions, as enum erated by the Court, are thus far;
9̂  W dham  J. G reenhalgh & M ark J. Yost, In  Defense o f the “Per Se" Rule: 
Justice S tew art’s struggle to preserve the Fourth A m endm ent’s warrant clause, 
American C rim inal Law Review. Vol. 31. No. 4, Sum m er 1994, pp. 1031 - 1040.
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[1] WTiether those seeking to te st are “s ta te  agents.” This question owes to the 
distinction m ade betw een C onstitu tional protections afforded citizens against 
governm ental activities and  the  to rt rem edies apphed to privacy violations 
com m itted by private  parties. This distinction is crucial to the legality of all m anner 
of indiscrim inate surveillance of employees and others in the private sector. It is in 
m any ways a spurious distinction. Recall my citation of Griggs v. Duke Power. In 
Griggs, the C ourt upheld the constitu tionahty  of Title \T I of the Civil Rights Act. 
specifically w ith  respect to illegal em ploym ent discrim ination. Em ployers may not 
discrim inate on the  basis of non job-related criteria. The nom inal issue in Griggs 
was race—the exclusion of blacks from em ploym ent w ith or promotion w ithin Duke 
Power on the basis on irre levan t paper-and-pencil tests  and  diploma requirem ents. 
The language of T itle \T I refers to “race,” “gender,” “rehgion,” and “national origin." 
Griggs m akes no m ention of “pohtical affihation” (or age, ha ir color, preferred TV 
shows, favorite sports team s, and so on). No one seriously doubts, however, tha t an 
employer inquiring  into. say. the political convictions and/or affiliations of 
employees or job apphcan ts would be in violation of a constitutionally protected 
privacy right. The right to pohtical and otherwise “associational” privacy is by now a 
C onstitutional commonplace. The only logical and moral in terp re ta tion  of Griggs is 
th a t if it’s not dem onstrably  job-related, it’s ConstitutionaUy im perm issible, and is 
fundam entally  m uch more th an  a to rt issue.
A second issue arises out of the “sta te  agent” pubhc/private distinction. Courts 
hold th a t w here the governm ent m andates or is otherwise significantly involved in 
the enactm ent of drug testin g  policy, Fourth  A m endm ent restrictions are more
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closely im plicated. Officials invariably a sse rt th a t p rivate  firm s and  institutions 
im plem ent suspicionless drug testing  for health , safety, and productivity reasons 
having no connection to government requirem ents or exhortations. A quick in ternet 
visit to the federal C enter for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP) online catalog, 
however, belies the claim. Among the num erous pro-testing m aterials available—  
courtesy of your tax dollars—two item s are particu larly  vivid:
We’re Putting  Drugs Out of Business
Organization: P artnersh ip  For a D rug Free America Year: 1987 
Form at: Ad shck Topic: Alcohol and O ther D rug Intervention/
T reatm ent. Workplace Target Audience: Employees Setting:
Governm ent and Workplace Readabüity: Easy Availability:
P artnersh ip  For a Drug Free America. 405 Lexington Avenue. 16th 
Floor, New York, NY 10174
This is a black and white ad shck of a closed door. The door reads 
“Corporate Drug Testing.” The top of the shck reads “At This Point 
Your Alma M ater Doesn’t M atter.” The bottom of the shck says,
“We re Pu tting  Drugs Out of B usiness.” Also included are facts about 
drugs in the workplace and how much money is lost because of drug 
use.
We're Putting  Drugs Out of Business
Organization: Partnersh ip  For a Drug-Free America Year: 1987 
Form at: Ad shck Target Audience: CoUege S tuden ts and Employees 
Setting: Governm ent and W orkplace Readabihty: Easy Availabihty: 
P artnersh ip  For a Drug-Free America, 405 Lexington Avenue, 16th 
Floor. New York. NY 10174. This shck pictures seven te s t tubes. Six 
te st tubes have a clear substance in them  and one test tube has a 
black hquid in it. The test tube th a t has a black hquid in it reads 
“Positive.” The top of the shck reads “Four Y ears of CoUege Down the 
Tube.” The bottom of the shck says “We’re Pu tting  Drugs Out of 
Business.” Also included are facts about drugs in the workplace and 
how much money is lost due to drug use.^®
95 We’re Putting Drugs Out o f Business. Partnersh ip  for a Drug-Free 
America. [http://w w w .health.0rg/pubs/resguide/pw place.htm #Secl], March, 1998.
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The first item  clearly im phes tha t, indeed, your C.V. counts for nothing, th a t the 
drug test shall have “controlling force”—Title \T I and Griggs notw ithstanding. The 
second item additionally imphes, in ra th e r creative fashion, a workplace drug abuse 
prevalence of 14.3% (1 out of 7 positive). N either address the fact th a t the bulk of 
health, safety, and  productivity losses in industry  owe to factors other than  dlicit 
drug use. Both prove “state  agency” w ith respect to private sector drug testing, as 
does the easily obtained Federal Register announcem ent below:
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUNLAN SERM CES Substance 
Abuse and M ental H ealth Services A dm inistration Center for 
Substance Abuse Prevention; Notice of Meeting
P u rsu an t to Pubhc Law 92-463. notice is hereby given of the 
meeting of the Drug Testing Advisory Board of the C enter for 
Substance Abuse Prevention in April 1997. The Drug Testing 
Advisory Board (DTAB) is having a 3-day scientific m eeting to discuss 
drug testing  alternative specimens and technologies as they apply to 
workplace drug testing programs. The entire  m eeting is open to the 
pubhc; however, attendance by the pubhc wiU be hm ited to space 
available. The first two days wiU consist of presentations on the 
principles and criteria of workplace drug testing  program 
requirem ents and industry representatives discussing alternative 
specimens/technologies (urine, hair, sahva, sweat, and non­
instrum ent based on-site tests). The presentations wih be focused on 
the foUowing areas for each alternative specimen/technology: 
specimen collection and chain of custody, initial test reagents and 
procedures, confirmatory test procedures, in ternal quahty control 
program, reporting te s t results, in terpreting  test results, and an 
external quahty  assurance program. On the th ird  day, the DTAB will 
review the presentations, identify areas of concern, and make 
recommendations concerning those specimens/technologies for 
workplace drug testing. In terested  persons may present information 
or views, oraUy or in writing, on these issues pending before the 
Board. Those desiring to make formal presentations should notify the 
contact person before March 7. A coordinator for each alternative 
specimen/technology wih select the presenters. The presenters who 
WÜ1 discuss the underlying principles and criteria  for each major topic 
are required to subm it their presentations in w riting a t least four 
weeks before the meeting. These will be shared w ith ah  presenters at 
least 3 weeks before the meeting. The presenters describing how each
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type of specimen and/or technology satisfies, or does not satisfy, the 
requirem ents (each presentation is Limited to 15 m inutes) are 
required to subm it the ir presentations in w ritten  form at least two 
weeks before the meeting. These will be shared  w ith  all presenters. 
An agenda for this m eeting and a roster of board m em bers may be 
obtained from: Ms. Giselle Hersh. Division of W orkplace Program s. 
Room 13A-54. 5600 F ishers Lane, Rockville, MD 20857, Telephone: 
(301) 443- 6014. Substantive program  inform ation m ay be obtained 
from the contact whose name and telephone num ber is h sted  below.
Committee Name: Drug Testing Advisory Board. M eeting Date: Aprü 
28-30. 1997. Place: DoubleTree Hotel. 1750 Rockville Pike. Rockville. 
M aryland 20852. Open: April 28-30. 1997, 8:30 a .m .-5:00 p.m.
Contact: Donna M. Bush, Ph.D.: Executive Secretary, Telephone:
(301) 443-6014 and FAX: (301) 443-3031.
Dated: February 12, 1997. Je ri Lipov, Committee M anagem ent 
Officer. SAMHSA. [FR Doc. 97-3956 Füed 2-18-97: 8:45 am] BILLING 
CODE 4162-20-P.96
Or. review the drug testing  program  im plem entation advice provided to 
employers by the U.S. D epartm ent of Labor website:
Drug and alcohol testing  by itself is not a substance abuse program. 
M any companies, however. beUeve tha t, when combined w ith the 
o ther components of a comprehensive substance abuse program, 
testing  can be an effective deterren t to substance abuse and an 
im portan t tool to help employers identify w orkers who need help.
Though setting  up a testing program  is not a sim ple process, every 
year more and  more companies of all sizes are doing so. Some 
establish  program s because they are required to by sta te  or federal 
laws or regulations. O thers test to take advantage of incentive 
program s m ade available through the s ta te  or an  insurance provider. 
StiU, o thers do so because it is the right business decision for the 
company . . .
Drug testing  has been gaining in popularity in the private sector for 
the past decade. D uring th a t time, m any safeguards and 
confidentiality m easures have been developed to ensure  the quality
9G Federal R egister: February 19, 1997 (Volume 62, N um ber 33) [Notices] 
[Page 7468-7469] From  the Federal Register Online via GPO Access 
[wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:frl9fe97-85]
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and accuracy of drug testing. In addition. laws and regulations have 
been passed th a t govern how program s m ust be set up and  run. 
Before im plem enting a testing program , you would be well advised to 
contact an individual or organization w ith expertise in  drug and 
alcohol testing  issues to help you estabhsh  your program.^"
U nfortunately, partisan , self-interested, pro-surveülance individuals and 
organizations sm iled upon and  promoted by the governm ent are  thought to be the 
only ones "with expertise" in drug testing  policy.
It is simply beyond dispute th a t our governm ent is deeply involved in the 
m arketing  of drug  testing  in all workplace domains, public an d  private-sector. 
Anyone in need of more evidence need only exam ine the activities of The National 
Alliance for Model S ta te  D rug Laws (see Appendix A), a federally-funded non-profit 
tax-exem pt § 501(c)(3) “charitable organization” whose overt m ission is to help sta te  
legislatures enact com prehensive anti-drug laws th a t include indiscrim inate drug 
testing  of private sector employees. The supposedly public/private distinction 
dehneating  the boundary of the reach of the Fourth A m endm ent has been 
ham m ered into obhvdon.
[2] W hether the s ta te  or its designee has a compelling in te rest sufficient to trum p 
individuals’ privacy rights. This question tu rns on em pirical assertions of exigency: 
are the nature, extent, and cost of drug abuse in fact sufficiently adverse to w arran t 
extrem e m easures? As we have seen elsewhere in th is work (e.g.. C hapters I and 2), 
the pertinen t characteristics and aggregate severity of the d rug  problem—and the
9" U.S. D epartm ent of Labor, [http://www.dol.gov:8001/said.nsfi 
W orkplace/Step+Five?OpenDocument], March, 1998.
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likelihood tha t indiscrim inate drug testing  can serve as a significant de terren t 
(Chapter 3)—are hotly disputed by a host of com petent researchers. Moreover, laws 
exist to deal with the “problem.” Tw entieth century American law enforcem ent 
agencies bear no resem blance w hatever to their feeble 16th century constabulary 
antecedents. Enforce the law w ithin  the law; extrajudicial m easures are beyond the 
pale of Constitutional legitimacy.
[3] W hether the privacy intrusions are m inimal relative to legitim ate sta te  
interests. C onstitutional validity should not be regarded as a function of the 
proximal “severity” of the intrusion. Yes; collection of a urine sam ple is less invasive 
than th a t of an IV blood sample, and far less invasive than , say, forced stomach 
pum ping or body cavity exam inations in search of contraband. B ut “loss of privacy” 
need not even entail physical contact and/or bioassay. If an unm arked pofice van 
outfitted with the la te s t surveillance technology monitors your house w ithout cause, 
its operatives capable of hsten ing  to your most in tim ate conversations and 
monitoring your m ovem ents via ultrasonic, infrared, or o ther im aging equipm ent, 
your privacy has been violated as surely as had your blood been draw n or stom ach 
forcibly evacuated—and arguably all the more reprehensibly for the s tea lth  
employed.
[4] The purpose of the testing—prosecutorial or “adm inistrative?” Following a trend 
developed in the lower courts over the last generation, the Suprem e Court has 
allowed “adm inistrative” or “special needs” exceptions to the “probable cause” and 
“w arran t” requirem ents of the Fourth  Amendment, In short, since positive drug test
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
130
resu lts are  supposedly “confidential” and not referred for prosecution—despite the 
fact th a t they  constitu te “scientific evidence” of recent crim inal conduct—the Court 
majority finds them  acceptable as mere non-discretionary and “evenhanded” 
adm inistrative functions for which the probable-cause evaluating function of the 
m agistra te  is rendered unnecessary'. In Skinner v. Railu ay, Justice  Kennedy sings 
the p raises of th is curious nuance of evenhandedness, arguing th a t “a rb itra ry ” 
would be his (hallucinatory) specter of m agistrates abusing the ir power by opting to 
“arb itra rily” issue w arran ts  w ithout cause against targeted individuals. B etter to 
trade in th is  type of speculative (and preposterous) arb itrariness for the operational 
evenhandedness of indiscrim inate investigation. Consider for a moment, however. 
Justice  O’C onner’s d issenting rejoinder in the Vernonia high school drug testing
case:
P erhaps most telling of aU, as reflected in the text of the W arran t 
Clause, the particu lar way the F ram ers chose to curb the abuses of 
general w arran ts—and by implication, all general searches—was not 
to impose a novel evenhandedness’ requirem ent; it was to re ta in  the 
individuahzed suspicion requirem ent contained in the typical general 
w arran t, but to make th a t requirem ent meaningful and enforceable, 
for instance, by raising the required level of individualized suspicion 
to objective probable cause . . . WTiile the plain language of the 
A m endm ent does not m andate individuahzed suspicion as a necessary 
component of all searches and seizures, the historical record 
dem onstrates th a t  the F ram ers beheved th a t individuahzed suspicion 
w as an inheren t quahty  of reasonable searches and seizures . . . 
Protection of privacy, not evenhandedness, was then and is now the 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.
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Lest anyone th ink  th a t such F ourth  A m endm ent fastidiousness is the exclusive 
preserve of the more “liberal” drug-w ar-softie m inority on the  Court, conservative 
Justice Scalia’s Von Raab  d issent is illum inating:
1 dechne to join the C ourt’s opinion in the p resen t case because 
neither the frequency of use nor connection to harm  is dem onstrated 
or even likely. In  my view the Custom s Service ru les are a kind of 
immolation of privacy and hum an dignity in symbohc opposition to 
drug use . . . W hat be tte r way to show th a t the G overnm ent is serious 
about its w ar on drugs’ th an  to subject its employees on the front line 
of th a t w ar to th is invasion of the ir privacy and  affront to their 
dignity? To be sure, there is only a slight chance th a t it will prevent 
some serious pubhc harm  resu lting  from Service employee drug use, 
but it wül show to the world th a t the  Service is clean,’ and—most 
im portant of all—will dem onstrate  the  determ ination  of the 
G overnm ent to ehm inate  th is  scourge of our society. I th ink  th a t this 
justification is unacceptable: th a t the  im pairm ent of ind iridual 
hberties cannot be the m eans of m aking a point; th a t symbohsm, even 
symbohsm for so w orthy a cause as the abohtion of unlaw ful drugs, 
cannot vahdate  an  otherw ise unreasonable search . . . Those who lose 
because of the  lack of understand ing  th a t begot the  p resen t exercise 
in symbohsm are  not ju s t the Custom s Service employees, whose 
dignity is th u s  offended, bu t all of us—who suffer a coarsening of our 
national m anners th a t u ltim ately  give the Fourth  A m endm ent its 
content, and who become subject to the adm in istra tion  of federal 
officials whose respect for our privacy can hardly be g rea ter than  the 
sm all respect they have been tau g h t to have for th e ir own.^s
“There is no C onstitu tion a t D isneyland; we have our own laws here. ”
We seem to be in some ways reverting  to a feudal society. Well-heeled gated 
communities som etim es sue for property  tax  exem ption on the grounds th a t they 
provide the ir own “m unicipal services,” including arm ed security patrols. Similarly, 
large corporations frequently  field th e ir own in ternal security  operations and deal
98 U. s . Suprem e Court, Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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with suspected transgresso rs w ith methods th a t m any feel tram ple on 
constitutional rights.®®
99 An excerpt from a recent article on corporate neo-feudaUsm:
Was Democracy Ju st a Moment'? by Robert D. K aplan
Of the world’s hundred  largest economies, fifty-one are not countries but 
corporations. While the 200 largest corporations employ less than  th ree  fourths of 
one percent of the world’s work force, they account for 28 percent of world economic 
activity. The 500 largest corporations account for 70 percent of world trade. 
Corporations are like the feudal dom ains th a t evolved into nation-states; they are 
nothing less than  the vanguard  of a new D arw inian organization of pohtics . . .
. . . The num ber of residen tial communities w ith defended perim eters tha t 
have been built by corporations went from 1,000 in the early  1960s to more than  
80,000 by the mid-1980s, w ith  continued dram atic increases in the 1990s. (“Gated 
com m unities” are not an  A m erican invention. They are an im port from Latin 
America, where deep social divisions in places like Rio de Janeiro  and Mexico City 
m ake them  necessary for the middle class.) Then there are malls, w ith th e ir own 
rules and security forces, as opposed to public streets; private health  clubs as 
opposed to pubhc playgrounds; incorporated suburbs w ith stric t zoning; and other 
m undane aspects of daily existence in which—perhaps w ithout reahzing it, because 
the changes have been so g radual—we opt out of the pubhc sphere and the  “social 
contract” for the sake of a protected setting. Dennis Judd, an urban-affairs expert at 
the University of M issouri a t St. Louis, told me recently, “It’s nonsense to think that 
Americans are in d iriduahsts . Deep down we are a nation of herd anim als: micelike 
conformists who wül lay a t  our doorstep many of our rights if someone te Us us tha t 
we won’t have to worry about crime and our property values are secure. We have 
always pu t up w ith restrictions inside a corporation which we would never put up 
with in the pubhc sphere. B ut w hat m any do not reahze is th a t hfe w ith in  some sort 
of corporation is w hat the fu tu re  wih increasingly be about.” . . .
. . . “The governm ent of man will be replaced by the adm inistra tion  of 
th ings,” the E nhghtenm ent French phUosopher H enri de Saint-Sim on prophesied. 
We should worry th a t experts wül channel our very instincts and thereby control 
them  to some extent. For example, whUe the governm ent fights drug abuse, often 
w ith pathetic results, pharm aceutical corporations have worked through the 
governm ent and pohtical p a rtie s  to receive sanction for drugs such as stim ulan ts 
and anti-depressants, whose consciousness-altering effects, it could be argued, are 
as g reat as those of outlaw ed drugs . . . .
. . . Even J. P. M organ was hm ited by the borders of the nation-state. But in 
the fu ture who, or w hat, w ih hm it the hkes of Disney chairm an Michael Eisner?
The UN? Eisner and those like him are not ju s t representatives of the “free” m arket. 
N either the Founders nor any of the early  modern philosophers ever envisioned tha t
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The above-cited Disney quote appeared in the press on November 4. 1996 in a 
story concerning allegedly excessive security practices a t Disneyland.'®® The rem ark 
was reportedly made by a Disney security supervisor to the m other of a young 
Disneyland employee who had been detained by Security and held incommunicado 
for several hours after she neglected to tu rn  in her uniform after leaving her job at 
an ice cream  shop on the premises. The news item also recounted additional 
episodes w herein guests suspected of shoplifting were sim ilarly detained and 
subjected to prolonged interrogation and intense pressure to confess, sign releases, 
and pay sum m ary “civil dam ages” on the spot as a condition of release from 
“custody.” Ear her last faU, sim ilar stories appeared in central Florida papers 
regarding the sam e types of security practices a t Disney World in Orlando. Critics 
complained th a t Disney, owing to its enormous economic clout in the area.
the free m arket would lead to the concentration of power and resources th a t many 
corporate executives already embody. W hereas the hberal m istake is to think th a t 
there is a program or pohcy to alleviate every problem in the world, the conservative 
flaw is to be vigilant against concentrations of power in government only—not in the 
private sector, where power can be wielded more secretly and sometimes more 
dangerously.
Umpire Regimes
This rise of corporate power occurs more readily as the m asses become more 
indifferent and the ehte less accountable. M aterial possessions not only focus people 
tow ard private and away from communal life but also encourage docihty. The more 
possessions one has, the more compromises one wih make to protect them. The 
ancient G reeks said th a t the slave is someone who is in ten t on filhng his beUy, 
which can also m ean someone who is in ten t on safeguarding his possessions. 
A ristophanes and Euripides, the late-eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Adam 
Ferguson, and Tocqueville in the n ineteenth  century all w arned th a t m aterial 
prosperity would breed servility and w ithdraw al, tu rn ing  people into, in 
Tocqueville’s words, “industrious sheep,” Robert D. Kaplan, A tlantic Monthlv, 
December 1997, pp. 55-80.
100 e.g.. Associated Press wire story. Las Vegas Re view-Journal, p. 4B.
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effectively operated  a private extrajudicial fiefdom, w ith the off-the-record assent of 
a local law enforcem ent establishm ent quite content to let D isney adm in ister its 
own brand  of “justice” for the mostly petty offenses the park  encountered, thereby 
hghtening the load on the overburdened police.
Are we to understand  th a t we leave our C onstitutional righ ts a t the entrance to 
the m all and the factory gate? T hat once we pass through the tu rn stile  a t the theme 
park or the door of the corporate office, we leave our citizenship and our Bill of 
Rights behind and  are accorded in re tu rn  m ere v irtual green cards or visas 
revocable a t the whim of the proprietors? T hat w hat we need is an Am bassador to 
Disney? The construction of consulates w ithin our corporate enclaves. Gallerias, and 
gated com m unities?
T hat to get and  keep a job (obtain a driver’s hcense? ren t an apartm ent?) we 
m ust partake  of the drug w ar Holy Communion—its chahce the Pyrex beaker; its 
confessional the secured bathroom stall; its Keeper of the Sacred W rit William J. 
Bennett; its papal G rand Inquisitor G erald B.H. Solomon?
Obsta principiis
W riting for the 8-1 m ajority in the recent Chandler u. M iller decision (Docket 
96-126), Justice  Ginsberg once again reinforces the notion th a t p rivate sector 
privacy violations are outside the scope of the Fourth A m endm ent, opining tha t “we 
do not speak to drug testing  in the private sector, a domain unguarded by Fourth 
A m endm ent constrain ts. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). ”
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In the m ost general and  m undane sense, it is indeed the case th a t private sector 
privacy violations are to rt issues, not constitutional ones. If. for example. Penthouse 
M agazine surreptitiously  acquires and pubhshes, say, in flagrante delicto 
photographs of a celebrity and his or her consort, Mr. Guccione’s attorneys will not 
find them selves defending a t O rals before the Suprem e Court. This t\-pe of violation 
and  sim ilar invasion of privacy and  “m isappropriation of likeness” offenses are in 
fact civil to rt issues.
But, such in trusions are far removed in character and in ten t from those posed 
by suspicionless private sector drug screens. And, if we follow closely the chain of 
precedents back in tim e firom Chandler, we are perplexed to learn  th a t there isn’t 
much “th e re” there, in term s of argum ents and principles th a t validate 
indiscrim inate commercial workplace drug testing. Moreover, the  em phatic and 
repeated Court apology th a t drug test resu lts are purely “adm in istra tive” and not 
“prosecutorial” is shown by these precedents to be unnecessary—private employers 
could indeed forward positive drug test resu lts to the au thorities for prosecution, for 
such could be construed from several of these cases as also tan tam oun t to the 
ostensibly narrow  and long-recognized “plain view” exception to the probable cause 
and search w arran t requirem ents of the Fourth  Amendment.
The Chandler “stare  decisis” chronology is as follows:
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• United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). FedEx employees encounter 
w hat tu rn s  out to be cocaine spewing from a dam aged package and alert the 
authorities. Suppression of the evidence denied: “Plain View” equivalence.
• Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). Oops! 8mm porno films sent to the 
wrong address. Inadvertent recipients alert the au thorities. Suppression of the 
evidence denied: “Plain View” equivalence.
• Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). Private party  theft of documents 
subsequently used as evidence in a m ad fraud case. Suppression of the evidence 
denied: “Plain View” equivalence. This case cites seven prior decisions in 
sum m ary justification of the pubhc/private distinction:
We do not question the authority  of the court to control the 
disposition of the papers, and come directly to the contention th a t the 
constitu tional rights of the petitioner were violated by th e ir seizure, 
and  th a t havdng subsequently come into the possession of the 
prosecuting officers of the government, he was en titled  to their 
re tu rn . The am endm ents involved are the Fourth and  Fifth, 
protecting a citizen against unreasonable searches and  seizures and 
compulsory testim ony against himself. An extended consideration of 
the origin and purposes of these am endm ents would be superfluous in 
view of the fact th a t this court has had occasion to deal w ith those 
subjects in a series of cases. Boyd c. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 
Sup. Ct. 524; Adam s v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372; 
Weeks c. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, L. R. A. 1915B, 
834, Ann. Cas, 1915C, 1177; Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 
33 Sup. Ct. 572, 47 L. R. A, (N. S.) 263; Perlman u. United States. 247 
U.S. 7, 38 Sup. Ct. 417; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States. 251 
U.S. 385, 40 Sup. C t.l82; Gouled v. United States, decided February 
28th, 255 U.S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, this term.
The F ourth  Am endm ent gives protection against unlaw ful searches 
and  seizures, and as shown in the previous cases, its  protection 
apphes to governm ental action. Its  origin and history  clearly show 
th a t it was in tended as a res tra in t upon the activities of sovereign 
authority , and  was not intended to be a Umitation upon other than
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governm ental agencies; as against such authority  it was the purpose 
of the Fourth  A m endm ent to secure the citizen in the  right of 
unm olested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his 
property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly issued.
In the p resen t case the record clearly shows th a t no official of the 
federal governm ent had anything to do with the wrongful seizure of 
the petitioner’s property, or any knowledge thereof until several 
months a fter th e  property had been taken from him  and was in the 
possession of the  Cities Service Company. It is m anifest th a t there 
was no invasion of the security afforded by the F ourth  Amendment 
against unreasonable search and  seizure, as w hatever wrong was 
done was the act of individuals in taking the property of another. A 
portion of the property so taken  and held was tu rned  over to the 
prosecuting officers of the federal government. We assum e that 
petitioner has an  unquestionable right of redress against those who 
ülegally and wrongfully took his private property under the 
circum stances herein  disclosed, but w ith such rem edies we are not 
now concerned.”
In other words, you can sue a private transgressor for civil damages, but it’s not 
a constitutional issue— even if the private intrusion effects your prosecution by the 
government. Moving along to the cases cited in Burdeau:
• Gouled V.  United States. 255 U.S. 298 (1921). Evidence of crim inal fraud 
obtained by ruse. An Army Intelligence D epartm ent operative made an 
ostensible ‘‘social call” on the defendant, whereupon the  operative gained access 
to and removed certa in  incrim inating papers. The Court ruled tha t the evidence 
was obtained illegally.
• Silverthorne Lum ber Co. Inc, et al. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
Evidence obtained w ithout a w arran t subsequent to corporate defendant’s 
refusal to obey a subpoena. Lower court conviction overturned.
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Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918). Documents originally in tended  for 
use in a civil pa ten t infringem ent su it subsequently  used in a g rand  jur>- 
proceeding. The Court ruled here th a t the governm ent could indeed use the 
evidence.
Weeks V.  United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). W arrantless search for evidence of 
illegal gam bling activity, in the course of which au thorities gained en try  to the 
suspect’s home through the aid of a neighbor who inform ed them  of the location 
of a house key. The Court ru led  the search unconstitutional. Im portantly , this 
case is the first of the C handler precedents to expHcitly point out the  original 
in ten t of the Fourth A m endm ent, citing the history of G eneral W arran ts  and 
W rits of Assistance:
The history of this A m endm ent is given w ith particu larity  in the  
opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for [232 U.S. 383, 390] the 
court in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. 
Rep. 524. As was there shown, it took its origin in the determ ination  
of the fram ers of the A m endm ents to the Federal C onstitution to 
provide for th a t in strum ent a BiU of Rights, securing to the A m erican 
people, among other things, those safeguards which had grown up in 
England to protect the people from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, such as were perm itted  under the general w arran ts  issued 
under au thority  of the governm ent, by which there  had  been invasions 
of the home and privacy of the citizens, and the seizure of the ir 
private papers in support of charges, real or im aginary, m ake against 
them . Such practices had also received sanction under w arran ts  and 
seizures under the so-called w rits of assistance, issued in the 
A m erican colonies. See 2 Watson, Const. 1414 e t seq. R esistance to 
these practices had estab lished  the principle which was enacted  into 
the fundam ental law in the  4th  Am endm ent, th a t a m an’s house was 
his castle, and not to be invaded by any general au thority  to search 
and  seize his goods and papers. Judge Cooley, in his C onstitutional 
Lim itations, pp. 425, 426, in trea ting  of th is feature of our 
C onstitu tion said: ‘The maxim th a t every m an’s house is his castle’ is 
m ade a p a rt of our constitu tional law in the clauses prohibiting 
unreasonable searches and  seizures, and has always been looked upon
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as of high value to the citizen.’ ‘Accordingly,’ says Lieber in his work 
on Civil Liberty and Self-Government. 62, in speaking of the Enghsh 
law in th is respect, no m an’s house can be forcibly opened, or he or 
his goods be carried away after it has thus been forced, except in cases 
of felony: and then the sheriff m ust be furnished w ith a w arran t, and 
take great care lest he commit a trespass. This principle is jealously 
insisted  upon.’ In E x parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733, 24 S. L. ed. 877, 
879, th is court recognized the principle of protection as appUcable to 
le tte rs and sealed packages in the mail, and  held tha t, consistently 
[232 U.S. 383. 391] w ith th is guaran ty  of the right of the people to be 
secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
such m atte r could only be opened and exam ined upon w arran ts  issued 
on oath or affirmation, particu larly  describing the th ing to be seized, 
as is required when papers are subjected to search in one’s own 
household.’
Johnson v. United States. 228 U.S. 457 (1913). Can evidence gleaned from a ci\âl 
bankruptcy proceeding subsequently be used in a fraud case? Yes, said the 
Court. Such does not constitu te “unreasonable search and seizure’’ and 
“compelled testim ony” in violation of the Fourth  and Fifth Am endm ents.
A dam s  v. \ e w  York. 192 U.S. 585 (1904). W arrantless acquisition of illegal 
gam bling “policy shps.” The Court ru led  here th a t evidence obtained by a 
“trespasser ” could indeed be used against the defendant, th a t the defendant had 
to rt rem edies available w ith respect to the “trespass ” but th a t the in truder’s 
“testim ony is not thereby rendered incom petent.” Interestingly, th is decision 
contradicts Weeks.
Boyd V.  United States. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The w atershed  decision in Ginsberg’s 
s tare  decisis “4th-does-not-apply” genealogy. Boyd  was about allegations of 
Custom s Revenue Law fraud against a glass products im porter. Does the 
subpoenaed production of invoices constitu te unconstitu tional “compelled self-
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incrim ination”? The Court ruled in th is case tha t, yes it does. Lower court 
reversed.
U nhappily for those claiming “4th-does-not-apply-to-the-private-sector,” these 
precedents are not uniformly instructive, supportive, or relevant to the 
public/private issues surrounding m ass drug screening. Moreover, the antecedent 
Boyd  case in particu lar seem s to throw cold w ater on the idea of legitim ated 
extrajudicial expediency of the sort typified by suspicionless private sector drug 
testing:
Though the proceeding in question is devested (sic) of many of the 
aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet, as before said, 
it contains the ir substance and essence, and effects their substan tia l 
purpose. It may be th a t it is the  obnoxious th ing in its m ildest and 
least repulsive form; but illegitim ate and unconstitutional practices 
get th e ir first footing in th a t way, namely: by silent approaches and 
slight deviations firom legal modes of procedure. This can only be 
obviated by adhering to the rule th a t constitutional provisions for the 
security of person and property should be hberally construed. A close 
and h te ra l construction deprives them of h a lf their efficacy and leads 
to gradual depreciation of the  right, as if it consisted more in sound 
than  in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the 
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy 
encroachm ents thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis.
And obsta principiis  is directly re levant to the argum ent of th is thesis, for 
suspicionless drug testing  policy is nothing less than  a C onstitutionally-repudiated 
resurrection of claniorem et uthesium  th a t  tram ples on legitim ate privacy rights 
forged in a noble and costly revolt against tyranny. It is a poficy th a t “stric t 
constructionists” ought rush  to repudiate, one undeniably repugnant to 
C onstitu tional and eth ical principle. Political “conservatives” vowing to enact
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policies th a t a t once "work" and hew to “original in ten t” ought give the m atte r more 
serious thought th an  they have to date.
The devolution of constitutional privacy
In a 1991 American Business Law Journal article, legal scholar Don M ayer 
argues th a t the m ajor drug testing  cases have served a cen tra l role in the 
devaluation the original m eaning of “privacy” under the Fourth  A m endm ent. Mayer 
notes th a t in Fourth  A m endm ent crim inal cases generally, “the Court has generally 
found individual expectations unreasonable, and in civil cases has generally 
discarded both probable cause and w arran t requirem ents” and th a t “ the Court’s 
contractarian  th inking  encourages the notion th a t not only s ta tu to ry  but 
constitutional rights can be explicitly or implicitly waived by the dem ands of 
employers or the "operational realities of the workplace .”
Mayer observes th a t w hat w as once a constitutional “righ t” has been 
downgraded to a m ere “in te re s t” in competition w ith other, more powerful interests: 
an individual in terest whose worth m ust be calculated on the basis of “reasonable 
expectations.” WTiat are “reasonable expectations”? Well, w hatever society is 
prepared to accept as “reasonable, ” a notion w ith a charm ingly bootstrap quahty 
where drug testing  cases are  concerned. For example, M ayer cites Willner r. 
Thornburgh (928 F.2d 1185, D.C. Cir. 1991). wherein the m ajority wrote th a t
Don Mayer, Workplace Privacy and  the Fourth Am endm ent: A n End to 
Reasonable Expectations? American Business Law Jo u rn a l. Vol. 29, 1991, p.631.
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[m]ore th an  85 percent of employers w ith d rug-testing  program s 
tested  job applicants . . . Some of the nation’s la rgest employers, 
including A m erican Telephone & Telegraph, DuPont, Exxon, Federal 
Express, T rans World Airlines, and U nited A irlines . . . W hat is 
occurring generally outside government is some indication of w hat 
expectations of privacy “society is prepared to accept as reasonable ” 
when the governm ent engages in the h iring  process.
So. the very fact th a t private sector corporations, “unguarded” by the Fourth 
Am endm ent (recall G insberg earher in Chandler), screen for illegal drugs willy-nilly 
w ithout cause becomes itse lf the reference s tan d ard  for “reasonable expectations ” 
under the Fourth A m endm ent. How conveniently circular.
In essence, on th is  line of reasoning, the scope of the  F ourth  Am endm ent is 
determ ined by Disney and its corporate brethren, not by the courts. W hatever is 
required to m eet the “operational realities of the workplace” trum ps, by virtue of its 
mere declaration and  enactm ent, an employee’s puny privacy “in te rest.”
M ayer’s article is thorough and thoughtful, a highly recommended resource, but 
on one significant point he errs;
The fourth am endm ent was not w ritten  w ith m odern conditions in 
mind. Electronic searching methods through w iretapping, computers, 
parabohc microphones, or laser and com puter assisted  microphones 
th a t can literally  listen  through walls w ere unknow n and unim agined 
in 1789. Also unknow n were biochemical analyses of hum an ha ir or 
w aste products, genetic and personality testing, voice-stress 
analyzers, infra-red  and starligh t telescopes, and  telephoto lenses. 
Any fourth am endm ent jurisprudence based on the fram ers’ in ten t is 
therefore likely to look backwards and th u s  lim it the am endm ent’s 
relevance to m odern conditions.
Mayer, op cit., p. 650. 
103 Mayer, op cit.. p. 633.
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I counter th a t increasing technological sophistication in no way lim its the 
relevance of the original in ten t and m eaning of the Fourth A m endm ent. If anything, 
the history so exhaustively recounted by Cuddihy is more relevant th an  ever. 
claniorem et uthesium. be it operationalized through the w arran tless breaking down 
of doors, through m ass-production bioassay, or through the indiscrim inate use of a 
breadth of high-tech surveillance devices by employers in pu rsu it of contraband, 
clearly rem ains nothing more than  Constitutionally-repudiated tactical expediency. 
Recall from Burdeau:
The Fourth  Am endm ent gives protection against unlaw ful searches 
and  seizures, and  as shown in the previous cases, its  protection 
applies to governm ental action. Its origin and history clearly show 
th a t it was intended as a restra in t upon the activities of sovereign 
authority , and was not intended to be a Umitation upon o ther than  
governm ental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose 
of the Fourth  A m endm ent to secure the citizen in the  right of 
unm olested occupation of his dweUing and the possession of his 
property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly issued.
In Ught of Cuddihy (which, of course, the 1921 Court did not have available), one 
has to conclude th a t Burdeau  was simply in error on this point. Yes the Fourth 
Am endm ent is a brake on the activities of the sovereign. It was also, remember, 
originally intended to res tra in  those acting as the agents of the sovereign, and the 
suspicionless private sector drug test is indisputably an enforcem ent tool of 
commercial and institu tional agents of the contemporary sovereign.
The observations of John  S tu a rt Mill (On Liber tv. C hapter 1) come to mind;
Like o ther tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was a t first, and 
is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of 
the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived th a t when
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society is itse lf the ty ran t—society collectively, over the separate 
individuals who compose it—its m eans of tyrannizing are not 
restricted  to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political 
functionaries. Society can and does execute its own m andates: and if 
it issues wrong m andates instead of right, or any m andates at all in 
things w ith which i t  ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny 
more formidable th an  m any kinds of poUtical oppression, since, 
though not usually upheld by such extrem e penalties, it leaves fewer 
m eans of escape, penetrating  much more deeply into the details of 
hfe, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the 
tyranny of the m agistra te  is not enough: there needs protection also 
against the ty ranny  of the prevailing opinion and feehng; against the 
tendency of society to impose, by other means than  civil penalties, its 
own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from 
them; to fe tter the development, and, if possible, prevent the 
formation, of any individuahty not in harm ony with its ways, and 
compel all characters to fashion them selves upon the model of its  own. 
There is a lim it to the  legitim ate interference of collective opinion 
w ith individual independence; and to find th a t fimit. and m aintain  it 
against encroachm ent, is as indispensable to a good condition of 
hum an affairs, as protection against pohtical despotism.
Indeed. Jam es M adison and his co-founders of the new American nation quickly 
learned th a t continued exercise of the rights and freedoms they risked the ir fives for 
would require a vigilance codified into constitutional constraints focused on far 
more th an  any anticipated  excesses of a neo-monarchical executive. As recounted by 
Stanford U niversitv constitutional historian Jack  Rakove;
Americans en tered  the Revolutionary' crisis confident th a t they 
knew w hat the ir rights were; after independence, they modified these 
ideas only modestly. W hat did evolve, far more dram atically and 
creatively, were th e ir ideas of where the dangers to rights lay and of 
how rights were to be protected. At the outset Americans believed 
th a t a rb itra ry  acts of the Crown and its colonial officials, including 
judges of the higher courts, posed the greatest th reat, and they 
accordingly trea ted  the rights of representation and trial by jury  as 
the ir chief securities against a rb itra ry  rule. It took a decade of
John S tu a rt Mill, On Libertv and other w ritings. Stefan Colli ni. Ed., 
(Cambridge, UK, Cam bridge University Press, 1989), pp. 7-8.
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experience under the s ta te  constitu tions to expose the triple danger 
th a t so alarm ed Madison in 1787: first, th a t the abuse of legislative 
power was more ominous than  arbitrary ' acts of the executive: second, 
th a t the true  problem of rights was less to protect the ru led  firom their 
ru lers th an  to defend m inorities against factitious popular m ajorities 
acting through government: and  th ird , th a t agencies of cen tral 
governm ent were less dangerous th an  sta te  and local despotism s.
The drive to require m ass suspicionless drug testing is nothing less than  the 
w'ork of “factitious popular m ajorities” acting through and at the behest of abusers 
of legislative power, justifying them selves through opinion polls purporting  to 
dem onstrate w idespread pubhc support for a policy th a t is plainly unconstitutional 
(as if C onstitutional rights were subject to abrogation subsequent to the USA 
Today/CNN/CASA plebiscite du jour), a false public/private ju risp ruden tia l 
dichotomy clearly contradicted by the historical record, a dichotomy long-ago 
obhterated  by politically cross-poUinated, self-interested parties. M adison and 
Jefferson would not be am used a t the suUv'ing of the ir m oral enterprise.
The moral underpinnings of constitutional rights
The F ram ers’ “moral en terprise”? Can we document th a t the founding of the 
new Am erican nation w as fueled by more th an  expedient, u tilitarian  
considerations? T hat our C onstitution is more th an  an inadequately detailed 
insurance contract or chess rulebook?
Jack  N. Rakove, O riginal M eanings: politics and ideas in the m aking of 
the C onstitution. (Alfred A. Knopf, NY. 1996) pp. 289-290.
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Recall the assertion  proffered in the introduction of th is thesis: “Those who 
fram ed our Bül of Rights were far more noble than  a cynical conspiracy of tariff- 
averse fur trad ers  and rum -runners m otivated by nothing more th an  a  desire to 
hog-tie au thority .” Support for th is view is seen in G raham  W alker's Moral 
foundations of constitutional thought:
Indeed, w hen the founding generation was fram ing an d  ratifying 
the Constitution, they did not seem to regard their u ndertak ing  as 
simply an  assertion of th e ir wills. If we take seriously th e ir  overtly 
moral argum ents—and there  is no compelling reason not to— we find 
th a t they did not im agine them selves to be arbitrarily  privileging the 
conventional wants, and fears of the ir particu lar m om ent in history. 
Nor, conversely, did they' seem to th ink  they were providing a 
malleable rationale for the indeterm inately  evolving values of la te r 
generations. Rather, they defended th e ir constitutional project as 
reaching to tim eless principles of hum an nature and political order: 
for th a t reason they' spoke of its universal significance.
While M adison and his colleagues were indeed a practical, em pirical, and 
politically-saw y lot, their erudition w ith respect to a norm ative heritage spanning 
the m illennia fi*om A thens through the Enlightenm ent arm ed them  w ith the 
in tellectual tools and ethical inclination for moral statecraft. P ittin g  “faction against 
faction. ' while no doubt tactically deft, had a higher norm ative basis and moral 
purpose:
The separation  between judicial, legislative, and executive power 
figures as p a rt of a broader constitu tional strategy to achieve both 
“responsibüity” and “energy” in governm ent by, among o ther things, 
firagmenting political power. The federal separation am ong s ta tes  and 
between s ta te  and national au thority  also embodies th is  
fragm entation. M adison noted th a t th is fragm entation would not be
G raham  W alker, Moral foundations of constitutional thought: curren t 
problems. Auerustinian prospects. (Princeton, NJ, Princeton U niversity  Press, 1990),
pp. 10-11.
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necessary “if men were angels.” But his “reflections on hum an n a tu re” 
led him to argue th a t constitu tional fragm entation of power would 
foster justice by checking am bition w ith ambition. His argum ent thus 
suggests the  norm ative underpinnings of a t least a portion of those 
s truc tu ra l provisions of the Constitution . . .  as im phcitly ra th e r than  
exphcitly moral in character.
Augustine exposes the fundam ental ontological term s on which we 
can make sense of M adison s argum ent. He thus equips us to reaffirm 
it.'o :
W alker’s in ten t is to dem onstrate how “the normative im passes of contemporary- 
constitutional theory invite an  A ugustinian scrut iny” that  m ight provide a proper 
understanding of the moral heritage of procedural, positivist law. He finds fault 
w ith those who would deny the relationship:
Every influential scheme of constitutional theory stands, w hether 
openly or not, on some prem ises of normative morality. Yet most 
contem porary constitutional scholars—on both the pohtical Left and 
Right—are unwilling to shoulder the normative burdens of the ir own 
enterprise. Instead they profess to believe th a t m orality is a rb itrary  
and relative a t its  foundations . . .
Some constitutional theorists contend, for example, th a t the 
constitutional prerogatives of democratic m ajorities ought to be 
recognized as param ount and ought to be largely exem pt from judicial 
scrutiny. O ther devote them selves to arguing th a t certain  
fundam ental constitutional rights ought to be protected from those 
same majorities.
Indeed, the  record is clear th a t we can count Jefferson and Madison—the 
principal architects of the U.S. Constitution—in the la tte r camp. Contem porary
107 W alker, op cit., p. 160.
108 W alker, op cit., p 23.
109 W alker, op cit., pp. 10-11.
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history' m akes it clear also th a t we can count Chief Justice  R ehnquist—who has yet 
to encounter a drug testing program  he ought strike down—and Judge Bork—who 
has yet to come upon a C onstitutional privacy claim he m ight affirm —in the former:
Chief Justice Rehnquist and former federal judge Robert Bork 
share  a  common constitutional philosophy'. As expressed in the ir most 
theoretically  self-conscious essays, this philosophy rests  on two basic 
pülars: a moral nihilism  th a t reduces m orality to convention, and a 
political theory th a t reduces legitimacy to the will of democratic 
m ajorities. Bork has asserted  unequivocally th a t m orality is never 
anyth ing  more than  a “form of gratification” th a t people indulge, 
while R ehnquist has insisted th a t distinctions between right and 
wrong are radically' subjective preferences, beyond the reach of 
reason. Hence there exists nothing beyond m ajority will itself, they' 
argue, th a t can rightfully bar the m ajority from establishing, w ith 
public force, whichever gratifications or preferences it wills to 
estabhsh . In other words, Rehnquist and Bork connect the two pillars 
of the ir theory by m aking majority' will the ir conventional surrogate 
for a real morality. They seek to erect on th is foundation a norm ative 
theory of in terpreta tion  (fram ers’ intent) and of adjudication (judicial 
restra in t).
We know, however, from the ample historical record w hat the  F ram ers’ in ten t 
was w ith respect to suspicionless searches—an in ten t made clear by both the plain 
text and the developm ental context of the Fourth Am endm ent. A proper hewing to 
“judicial re s tra in t” in such m atters, consequently, ought oblige the Court to eschew 
the ungainly spectacle of expedient “adm inistrative exceptions” departu res from 
constitu tional privacy principle codified therein. In C hapter 5 we exam ine a breadth 
of evidence speaking to the im portance of privacy as a hum an necessity and  a moral 
good. Suffice it to observe here th a t a ju risp ruden tia l and political respect for
W alker, op cit., p. 14.
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privacy can be viewed in  the context of an A ugustinian hum ility necessary for the 
effective long-term functioning of a democracy. W alker argues th a t
[T]he A ugustinian a ttitude  th u s  has doubts not about the  existence of 
an ultim ate, supralegal m oral goodness but about the possibilities of 
its em bodim ent in hum an law. It has doubts not about the  basic and 
prim ary content of the good but about the hum an ability to discover 
and respect its political and legal en taüm ents.
The im perative of A ugustinian caution thus applies w ith special 
force to anyone wielding the instrum en ts  of pohtical order. Indeed, it 
supphes a compeUing justification for an American constitutional 
system  th a t fragm ents both the power to define good and  the power to 
do i t ." '
Examples of “A ugustin ian  caution” abound in St. A ugustine’s Citv of God:
W hat shall I say of these judgm ents which men pronounce on men, 
and which are necessary in communities, w hatever outw ard peace 
they enjoy? M elancholy and lam entable judgm ents they are, since the 
judges are men who cannot discern the consciences of those a t their 
bar, and are therefore frequently compelled to put innocent w itnesses 
to the to rtu re  to ascertain  the tru th  regarding the crim es of other 
men. W hat shall I say of to rtu re  applied to the accused himself? He is 
tortured  to discover w hether he is guilty, so tha t, though innocent, he 
suffers most undoubted punishm ent for crime th a t is s till doubtful, 
not because it is proved th a t he com m itted it, but because it is not 
ascertained th a t he did not commit it. Thus the ignorance of the judge 
frequently involves an innocent person in suffering.
. . . But, as m an has a ra tional soul, he subordinates all th is which he 
has in common w ith  the beasts to the  peace of his ra tional soul, tha t 
his intellect m ay have free play and may regulate his actions, and 
th a t he may th u s  enjoy the well-ordered harm ony of knowledge and 
action which constitu tes, as we have said, the peace of the rational 
soul. And for th is  purpose he m ust desire to be neither m olested by 
pain, nor d istu rbed  by desire, nor extinguished by death , th a t he may
Walker, op cit., p. 150.
St. A ugustine, O f the error o f hum an judgm ents when the truth is hidden, 
Book XIX. Ch. 6, Citv of God, [http://www.bluffton.edu/~schlabachg/docs/city.htm ). 
March, 1998.
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arrive a t some useful knowledge by which he may regulate his life 
and m anners. But, owing to the habUity of the hum an mind to fall 
into m istakes, this very pursuit of knowledge may be a snare to him 
unless he has a divine M aster, whom he may obey w ithout misgiving, 
and who may a t the same time give him such help as to preserve his 
own freedom. And because, so long as he is in this m ortal body, he is a 
s tran g er to God, he walks by faith . . .
. . . But in the family of the ju s t man who hves by faith  and is as yet a 
pilgrim  journeying on to the celestial city, even those who rule serve 
those whom they seem to command; for they rule not from a love of 
power, but from a sense of the duty they owe to others—not because 
they are proud of authority, but because they love m ercy .'"
There is little  th a t can be characterized as circumspect or “merciful” in the 
espoused views and pohcy proposals of our leading anti-drug partisans such as 
Congressm an Solomon and Dr. William Bennett, however. Recall th a t for Dr. 
B ennett and his supporters (Chapter 1) the power of “authority” over the individual 
is beyond dispute or diminution, and those who choose to disobey authority  by 
indulging in illicit drug use are fair game for the harshest of sanctions.
Peter H uber’s call for more claniorem et uthesium: 
Back to the future
In his colum ns for Forbes Magazine. Peter H uber inexplicably sings the praises 
of a re tu rn  to the Hue and Cry, this time in the form of private commercial digital 
p u rsu it of malefactors, deadbeats, and all m anner of m iscreants. Some excerpts:
St. Augustine, op cit.. Of the order and  law which obtain in heaven and  
earth, whereby it comes to pass that hum an society is served by those who rule it, 
Ch. 14.
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Crime and Punishm ent
bv Peter Huber. Forbes. Nove*®^®'  ̂ 1995 a t Pg. 210.
Copyright 1995 by Peter Hub^r- Electronic copies of this document 
may be distributed freely, pro^hded th a t th is notice accompanies all 
copies.
. . .  The private system  of law' and order is gaining power as fast as 
. our desktop com puters and communications networks. W herever you 
deal w ith people today, you leave a tra il of economic evidence. With 
every new modem and Web site, m erchants, employers, landlords and 
custom ers pool the ir experience about whom to tru s t and whom not 
to. In the economic world, we've privatized both the tria l and the 
punishm ent. No preening tria l lawyers, m uddle-headed judges, or 
sociopathic juries, nothing but private databases and telephone hnes.
Catching the crim inal in the first place used to depend on private 
initiative, too. U nder the ancient Enghsh law of “hue and cry.” all who 
heard the ir neighbor shouting th a t a felon was at large were bound to 
join in the pursu it un til the malefactor was taken. Faüure to take 
p a rt in the pursu it was itself a crime. Today the hue and cry is 
electronic, and not ju s t the village but the whole nation can be alerted 
to the chase. Except th a t honest burghers don’t chase any more, they 
w alk away.
It isn’t just a m atte r of selfiinterest; shunning crooks and 
psychopaths is a civic duty, as? im portant as paying taxes to m aintain 
prisons. Most honest people know that, and willingly add to the flow 
of accurate inform ation about how their feUow citizens behave in 
public dealings. I t’s like chatting  with your neighbor about a prowler; 
we don’t do it for profit, we do i^ har m utual protection.
No new list of rights m inted in W ashington can possibly stop or 
change this. There is nothing illegal about hounding known 
psychopaths off the golf greenS and onto the roughs of civilization. To 
the contrary; Hounding of thiP sort is an obligation we owe each other. 
Civü society has always depeiihed on its ability to build tru s t and 
punish treachery. The private instrum ents th a t analyze, record and 
describe th a t tra il to others afen t subject to the constitutional 
dem ands of due process th a t gome judges push to dysfunctional 
extrem es. The BiU of Rights doesn’t apply to strictly private conduct. 
Yes, Congress has passed one or two fair credit reporting laws, but 
the ir dem ands are modest and easily bypassed.
Nor should we w ant to limi^ ^he information economy s 
privatization of law and order- As Frank Fukayam a describes in his
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
152
splendid new book, T rust, societies th a t develop cultures of 
cooperation prosper and flourish: o thers don’t. The challenge is to 
extend tru s t beyond the trad itional family un it or sm all tribe; the 
building of microchips, skyscrapers and je t planes requires 
cooperation on a larger scale. T rust used to depend on family, 
ethnicity, common nationality  and physical proximity. It no longer 
does. Today tru s t is forged through electronic networks . . ."■*
The Com puter T hat Doesn’t Forget
By P eter Huber, Forbes. August 12, 1996, a t Pg. 144.
. . .  As Oliver N orth discovered to his sorrow, electronic files are quite 
different. He thought th a t erasing E-m ail from his com puter erased  it 
from the face of the earth . It didn’t. Com puter networks log files in 
and out, catalog, track, back up and archive w ith meticulous 
precision. Electronic file m anagers faithfully record where records go, 
on whose instruction. They create records of records, layer upon layer. 
This isn’t optional. If the m achines don’t do this, the network soon 
dies.
T hat simple engineering fact has profound consequences for good 
m anagem ent, and for privacy, too. M anagem ent by wire creates 
alm ost perfect accountability. How m any scribbled notes did you w rite 
in the la st year, and w hat did they say? How many orders did you 
bark out on the phone, and to whom? You could hardly begin to guess. 
Mrs. Clinton probably can’t, either.
But if your office uses com puters a t all seriously, your E-mail 
records are im m aculate, even if you wish they w eren’t. Wiping 
inform ation off a corporate network completely is very difficult.
Wiping it off the In ternet is impossible. Once the file goes out, you 
never get all the dow nstream  copies back. I t’s Like trying to take back 
the tune to “Happy B irthday.” . . .
One hesitates to take on such an august ju rispruden tia l and in tellectual 
eminence as P eter Huber, but w ith respect to these propositions he is simply wrong.
P eter Huber, Crime and Punishm ent, Forbes. November 20, 1995, 
[http;//www.phuber.com/huber/forbes/112G95.html], March, 1998.
P eter Huber, The Computer That D oesn’t Forget, Forbes. A ugust 12, 1996, 
[http://www.phuber.com /huber/forbes/081296.htm l], March, 1998.
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for the “privacy/confidentiality” issue is far more complex th an  a mere m atte r of 
unfettered  contributions “to the flow of accurate inform ation about each o ther.” Try 
selling that ideal to the innum erable fru stra ted  citizens dealing w ith unresponsive 
credit reporting  agencies th a t continue to m ake egregious m istakes which 
frequently w reak  exasperating havoc. O r to those caught up in the error-ridden 
labyrinths of dealings w ith the 1RS, which, of its own adm ission makes millions of 
m istakes each year, some trivial, some dow nright catastrophic. Try selling the 
notion of “alm ost perfect accountability” to the innocent victims of appan tional 
m ass child abuse w itch-hunts th a t resu lt in moral travesties hke W enatchee and 
M cM artin Pre-School. Or to the hapless citizen in Florida th a t was last year 
targeted  w ith an anonymous in ternet h a te  mail cam paign falsely accusing him of 
being a pedophile, complete w ith the publishing of his home address.
H uber should know better. His two best-known books, Galileo's Revenge (of his 
authorship) and Phantom  Risk (which he edited), are erudite  and compelling 
exposes of a long and dism al h tany  of the  recurren t pubhc m ass psychoses th a t so 
often end up in ludicrous htigation and counter-productive pohcies. While perhaps 
some m uddle-headed “judges push to dysfunctional extrem es” a variety of rights 
claims (although no one can argue th a t the right to privacy has faired particularly  
weU a t the bench in recent decades), had  we access to accurate historical da ta  on 
the cost/benefit ratios of Hue and Cry pursu its, we m ight well take pause and give 
our hard-won system  of justice (through pubhcly adm inistered due process and 
pubhcly defended rights) the moral respect it deserves.
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Next (Chapter Six): beyond the “constitutional.” can we make a more general 
moral case in defense of privacy? Yes.
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CHAPTER SIX
On the value of privacy: a short historical and philosophical rum ination
As alluded to elsewhere in this thesis, one of the most durably contentious of 
American C onstitutional claims involves the right to privacy. If we are to estabhsh  a 
case for privacy as a fundam ental e th ical principle th a t the law ought reflect and 
adm inister w ith vigor, we ought exam ine a bit of its legal, sociological, and 
philosophical evolution. In C hapter Five we began by exam ining the historical 
evolution of search-and-seizure re s tra in ts  th a t ultim ately found their way into our 
Fourth Amendment, and we ended w ith a review of the convoluted, often 
contradictory U.S. Suprem e Court case law history and constitutional in terp re ta tion  
theory th a t undergirds our current legal and pohtical confusion over the role of 
privacy as it perta ins to drug pohcy. We begin here with some general sociopohtical 
and legal theory reflections tha t serve as foundation for and  transition  into the 
larger philosophical concepts bearing on privacy discussed in the la tte r  part of th is  
chapter.
Some regard privacy as an inseparable aspect of personal autonom y requisite for 
the very notion of hberty we ostensibly revere as a cardinal elem ent our social and 
legal order. Critics, on the other hand, e ith e r dism iss the notion of a general right to 
privacy out of hand, or assert th a t it is a relatively recent, weak, and “derivative”
155
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
156
declaration, one inherently  inimical to and necessarily deferential to society’s “right- 
to-know” in the in te rest of commercial efficiency, pubhc safety, and criminal 
prosecution. Those holding th is la tte r position view the quest for privacy as a 
reaction to increasing urbanization and advances in inform ation processing 
technologies, th a t the inhab itan ts  of earh er e ras  and  non-industrial cultures had 
and have h ttle  concern w ith our notions of “privacy.” Critics of the former 
persuasion who disavow the very notion of a general righ t to privacy under federal 
law find the concept adequately accounted for principally in term s of property 
rights. L ibertarian  advocate M urray N. Rothbard, for exam ple, argues in The Ethics 
of Libertv th a t “there is no such thing as a righ t to privacy except the right to 
protect one’s property from invasion. ” R othbard holds th a t w hat some regard as an 
invasion of privacy is more correctly seen as a m isappropriation of property, “not 
some vague and  woolly invasion of a “right to privacy.’””"®
“The word privacy’ appears now here in the  C onstitution”
This is a recurren t apology one sees sprinkled throughout the legal policy 
lite ra tu re , an  unhelpful rhetorical tic em blem atic of our ju risp ruden tia l and 
philosophical confusion w ith respect to “privacy.” The Oxford Companion to the 
Suprem e C ourt of the U nited S tates notes th a t
[A]lthough there may be w idespread agreem ent th a t a decent society 
is one in which individuals possess significant control over the release 
of inform ation about themselves, it is difficult to find much protection 
for such a right in the Constitution, a t  least as it has been in terpreted
"6 M urray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Libertv. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 
H um anities Press, 1982), p. 122.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
157
by the Suprem e Court. As Lucas Powe has w ritten , “privacy has never 
done as well in the courts as in the legal journals.”""
A discouraging observation, th a t one—for privacy’s stand ing  in the legal journals is 
mixed a t best. A few representative exam ples from the voluminous privacy legal 
theorv archives suffice to illustrate:
Privacy, Autonomy, and Consent, D aniel R. Ortiz, H arvard Journal of Law & 
Public Pohcv. Vol 12., No. 1, pp. 91-97: “Privacy is a  funny notion—not in the 
sense of being odd or unusual, bu t in the sense of being hilarious. The 
constitutional value itself derives from an oxymoron: substantive due process.”
Everym aji’"s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or M utual Trust Between Government 
and Citizen?, Scott E. Sundby. Columbia Law Review. Vol. 94, No. 6, Oct. 1994, 
pp. 1751-1812: “The fact th a t it has become increasingly difficult to find a 
W alden Pond or “bee-loud glade” in today’s world does not mean th a t privacy no 
longer has a role w ithin the Fourth  Amendment; indeed, it may support all the 
more an argum ent for a stronger Am endm ent to protect w hat enclaves of privacy 
are left. But th is requires th inking  of privacy in general, abstract term s, such 
th a t everyone, including the Court, would agree th a t “privacy” is a cherished 
principle. However, under the C ourt’s current Fourth  Amendm ent formulaic 
approach, privacy is not invoked as an overarching value but ra ther is used as a 
specific fact to assess w hether and how the Fourth  Amendment should apply to 
a given in trusion .”
Constitutional Law: Fourth Am endm ent and the Right to Privacy. John A. 
Wasowicz, T rial. November 1990, pp. 60-64: “But ju st w hat is the right of 
privacy? WTiere did it come from? The answer, of course, is the fourth 
am endm ent. But th a t am endm ent does not even contain the word privacy.' 
Furtherm ore, it is debatable w hether the am endm ent was ever intended to 
reach so broadly as it does into so m any parts  of our lives.”
The R ight o f Privacy, Jed  Rubenfeld, H arvard  Law Review, Vol. 102. No. 4, Feb. 
1989, pp. 737-807: “This article is about the constitutional right to privacy, a 
right th a t  m any beheve has h ttle  to do w ith privacy and  nothing to do w ith the 
C onstitution . . . The effect of these developm ents has been to compel a new 
articu lation—in the form of a right to privacy— . . .  a right ot be let alone, if by
Sanford Levinson, Privacy, The Oxford Companion to the Suprem e Court 
of the U nited S tates. (New York, Oxford U niversity Press, Kerm it L. HaU, Ed., 
1992), p. 676.
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‘let alone’ we understand  the right not to have the course of one’s life dictated by 
the s ta te .”
What Privacy Is Not, Lilian R. BeVier, H arvard  Jou rna l of Law & Pubhc Pohcv. 
Vol. 12, No. 1, pp.99-103: Lawyers and judges custom arily use words to convey 
m eanings th a t are wholly unexpected to laymen . . . Lawyers are accustomed to 
using “privacy” as a term  of a r t also. We know th a t th is word, used in the 
context of a legal or constitu tional dispute, does not always m ean w hat we 
thought it m e a n t . . . ”
Sunlight, Secrets, and  Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and  
Disclosure in Constitutional Law. Seth F. Kreimer, Universitv of Pennsylvania 
Law Review. Vol. 140, No. 1. Nov. 1991. pp. 1-143: “The tension between the 
a ttraction  of sunhght and the fear of the scarlet le tte r reflects deep-seated 
conflicts in our in tuitions. We know th a t the scarlet le tte r is a punishm ent not to 
be trifled with, and like Justice  Brandeis, we consider “the right to be let alone ” 
to be one of the prizes of chnlization. Yet we also beheve, as did Brandeis, th a t 
“[s]unhght is . . . the best of disinfectants.” . . . [T]here is fuzziness regarding 
subjects (or environs) th a t caU forth constitutional protection. It is easy enough 
to say th a t certain  types of bodily functions, certain  personal communications, 
and certain  aspects of personal psyche, physiology, and physique are not, 
w ithout the consent of the subject, topics of pubhc conversation in pohte society 
. . . Fourth A m endm ent doctrine has a t tim es adopted the proposition th a t there 
are particu lar ‘in tim ate activities th a t the A m endm ent is intended to shelter 
from government in terference or survehlance.” These in tim ations have been 
freely mixed with historical inquiries about ‘expectations of privacy tha t society 
has long recognized as reasonable’ and quasi-sociological analysis regarding the 
‘expectation of privacy . . . th a t society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. ”
C onstitutional privacy disputes: a brief survey
WTiatever the extrem ity  of positions taken pro or con, it is generally agreed th a t 
privacy is difficult to define, a t least for ju risprudentia l purposes. Conservative legal 
theorist and former Suprem e Court nominee Robert Bork is rem em bered for, among 
o ther things, his exasperated  re to rt “Privacy to do w hat. Senator?” in arguing his 
proposition tha t he could “find no generalized right to privacy in the Constitution” 
during his Senate confirm ation hearings. In his essay N eutral Principles and Some 
First Am endm ent Problems, Judge Bork derides the landm ark  Suprem e Court
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
159
“privacy” decision in Griswold vs. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479, 1965) as 
“unprincipled,” specifically w ith respect to w hat he views as Justice  D ouglas’ 
spurious creation of a new general righ t of privacy out of th in  air;
He called the F irst A m endm ent’s penum bra a protection of 
“privacy” and then  asserted  th a t the  other am endm ents create “zones 
of privacy” . . . [and] th a t these various “zones of privacy ” created  an 
independent right of privacy, a righ t not lying w ithin the penum bra of 
any specific am endm ent. He did not disclose, however, how a series of 
specified rights combined to create a new and unspecified right."®
Justice Douglas had concluded th a t the am algam  of 1st, 3rd, 4th. 5th, and  9 th  
A m endm ent proscriptions conferred a broad presum ptive privacy right. For Judge 
Bork and ju ris ts  of sim ilar views, however, each assertion of C onstitutionally  
protected activity m ust be evaluated as to its particu lars and w hether they mesh 
with explicit textual provisions of the Bill of Rights. For Bork, the burden  of proof is 
on each privacy claim ant. And, such is indeed to some degree evident in the history 
of U.S. Suprem e Court adjudication of m ajor federal “privacy” cases;
• Meyer v. Nebraska  (262 U.S. 390. 1923) —Teaching of the G erm an language in 
p rivate schools in N ebraska in contravention of s ta te  law. The s ta tu te  was 
struck  down.
• O lm stead v. United States  (277 U.S. 438, 1928) —Use of w arran tless  w iretaps 
upheld.
• Griswold v. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479, 1965) —Invahdation of s ta te  laws 
forbidding the use of contraceptives.
• Stanley v. Georgia (394 U.S. 557, 1969) —Private possession of “obscene” 
m ateria ls  held to be constitu tionally  protected.
"® Robert H. Bork, N eutral Principles and Some First A m endm ent Problems, 
The N orm ative C onstitution. Sherlock et al. Ed., (Lanham, MD, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1995), p. 21.
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Roe V.  Wade (410 U.S. 113, 1973) —The landm ark decision declaring abortion 
decisions to be a wom an’s private prerogative. Probably the m ost controversial 
privacy ru ling  in U.S. history.
Akron V.  Akron Center for Reproductive Health (462 U.S. 416, 1983) —Upheld 
Ohio restrictions on abortion services despite the precedent of Roe vs. Wade.
Thornburgh v. Am erican College o f Obstetricians & Gynecologists (476 U.S. 747, 
1986) —Upheld the "central holding” (i.e., a woman’s right to reproductive 
autonom y) of Roe in s trik ing  down Pennsylvania abortion regulations.
Bower v. H ardwick  (478 U.S. 186, 1986) —Held in favor of a Georgia law 
forbidding private consensual homosexual “sodomy.”
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association ( 489 U.S. 602. 1989) — 
V ahdated m andatory post-accident w arran tless drug testing of railroad 
employees.
N ational Treasury employees Union v. Von Raab (489 U.S. 656, 1989) —Upheld 
suspicionless pre-em ploym ent drug testing  of T reasury D epartm ent applicants 
for “sensitive” positions.
Vernonia School District 47J  v. Acton et u r  (Docket 94-590, 1995) —Ruled th a t 
Oregon schools have the righ t to random ly test studen t ath le tes for drug use.
The foregoing comprise a mixed bag of particu lars providing the grist for privacy 
affirm ations and denials: w iretaps, private school curricula, heterosexual relations, 
homosexual relations, abortion, possession of “obscenity,” and w arran tless drug 
testing of various classes of citizens. While it is apparen t th a t litigated privacy 
issues have prim arily  been and wül likely continue to be decided fairly narrowly 
w ith a focus on the ir case-specific a ttrib u te s—particularly  during the conservative 
R ehnquist Court era—it is difficult to see the textual bases for much of the 
foregoing. W hile the word “privacy” adm ittedly appears nowhere in the text of the 
BUI of R ights, neither do the term s “obscenity," “sodomy,” “pregnancy,” “sacred 
m arita l bedroom,” or “drug abuse.” Those who espouse a view of the Constitution as
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a docum ent of broad moral principles find such lack of specificity compelling in their 
a rgum ent against sim plistically lim ited tex tual “strict construction.”"^ Indeed, the 
9th A m endm ent—“The enum eration in the Constitution of certain  rights shaU not 
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”—is universally 
cited by “broad construction” advocates to counter the observation th a t the specific 
term  “privacy” is absent from the C onstitutional language. To the “Constitution-of- 
Principle” advocate, the very brevity and generality of the C onstitutional text is 
dispositive evidence that, far from being a document essentially no different than  a 
comm ercial insurance contract, the “large-C” Constitution provides the general 
vision of justice and procedural guidelines for those who m ust adm inister ongoing 
the “sm all-c” constitution comprised of the ver\- breadth of our social fabric.
A final word on “tex tuahsm ”: In recent speeches and writings. Justice  Antonin 
Scalia has taken  pains to expound on the difference between “originalism ” and 
“tex tualism ,” planting him self squarely in the la tte r camp. Considered by many the 
in tellectual leader of the Rehnquist Court, Scalia has grown weary of the 
insurm ountable problems associated w ith searching for the original in ten t behind 
constitu tional clauses asserted  to apply to issues brought before the judiciary. Such
A different take on C onstitutional “text”: In a forceful d issen t in Skinner  
vs. Railway, Justices M arshall and B rennan chide the majority for “jettisoning” the 
4th A m endm ent in favor of drug w ar pohcy expediency, observing th a t “|T]he 
m ajority’s concern w ith the railroad safety problems caused by drug and  alcohol 
abuse is laudable; its cavafier disregard for the text of the C onstitution is not. There 
is no drug exception to the Constitution, any more than  there is a communism 
exception or an exception for other real or im agined sources of domestic unrest.” To 
these ju ris ts  the plain Enghsh of the 4th Am endm ent requires probable cause and 
the issuance of a w arran t to authorize the invasion of privacy in p u rsu it of crim inal 
conduct. W hat could be more “tex tual”?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
162
is illu stra ted  by his rem arks before The Catholic U niversity of America in 
W ashington. D.C. on October 18, 1996, w herein he observes tha t
I belong to a school, a  sm all but hardy school, called “tex tuahsts’’ or 
“originahsts.” T hat used to be “constitu tional orthodoxy” in the United 
States. The theory of originalism  trea ts  a constitution hke a statu te , 
and gives it the m eaning th a t its  words were understood to bear at 
the tim e they were prom ulgated. You wiU sometimes hear it described 
as the theory of original in ten t. You wiU never hear me refer to 
original in ten t, because as 1 say I am first of ah  a tex tuahst, and 
secondly an  orig inahst. If you are a tex tuahst, you don’t care about 
the in ten t, and  I don't care if the firamers of the Constitution had 
some secret m eaning in m ind when they adopted its words. 1 take the 
words as they were prom ulgated to the people of the U nited States, 
and w hat is the fairly understood m eaning of those words.
I do the sam e w ith s ta tu tes , by the way, which is why I don’t use 
legislative history. The words are the law. I th ink th a t’s w hat is 
m eant by a governm ent of laws, not of men. We are bound not by the 
in ten t of our legislators, but by the laws which they enacted, which 
are set forth in words, of course. As 1 say, until recently th is was 
constitu tional orthodoxy. Everyone a t least said  that: That the 
C onstitution was th a t anchor, th a t rock, th a t unchanging institu tion 
th a t forms the Am erican poHty. Im m utability  was regarded as its 
characteristic. W hat it m eant w hen it was adopted it m eans today, 
and its m eaning doesn’t change ju s t because we th ink  th a t meaning is 
no longer adequate to our tim es.
Fine. The exact words of the Fourth A m endm ent germ ane to the argum ent of this 
thesis declare th a t “[T]he right o f the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and  seizures shall not be violated  
. . . " The A m endm ent does not add a  qualifier advising th a t “these strictures apply 
only to officials of the governm ent,” though such is indeed the popular (and 
m istaken) in terp re ta tion . Even had we no access to the extensive docum entation of 
the F ram ers’ in ten t w ith respect to the  F ourth  Amendment, we know  from Cuddihy 
and a w ealth of additional scholarly sources w hat the words “secure in their
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persons” meant a t the tim e of constitutional enactm ent. They m eant th a t 
au thority— any  authority, w hether law enforcem ent agents or proxies acting under 
color of the now -repudiated W rits of Assistance and private-sector Hue and  Cry— 
could no longer search and  seize indiscrim inately. Both the “tex tual” and  the 
“contextual" (original in ten t) historical/pohtical m eanings could not be more clear 
w ith respect to the patern ity  and applicability of the Fourth  Am endm ent. The 
citizens of the nascent U nited  S tates of America prized the ir liberty—and the 
personal privacy requisite for its effective functioning, privacy breachable only upon 
showing of sufficient and ra tional cause.
Privacy and suspicionless drug testing
WTiile Judge Bork and  his philosophical b re th ren  insist on firaming privacy 
issues exclusively in term s of specific individual acts th a t require case-specific 
C onstitu tional evaluation, more than  a century  ago form er Suprem e C ourt Justice 
Louis B randeis alluded to a more general sense of privacy in his sem inal 1890 
H arvard  Law Review article The Right to Privacy: the im plicit made explicit, the 
source of his now oft-cited com m ent on “the right to be let alone.” While B randeis’ 
m onograph was occasioned by and directed tow ard his outrage over the excesses of 
the tabloid “yellow journalism ” sensationalist media of his time, his argum ent for a 
“righ t to be left alone” is easily seen to fit w ith the tex tual proscriptions of the 4th 
A m endm ent. Brandeis and  m any other legal theorists take the 4th  to indeed impel 
recognition of a more general right to privacy.
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W hat are the im plications of this “right to be let alone”—absent cause to 
in trude—in the context of indiscrim inate drug testing? The three previously cited 
Suprem e Court rulings pertain ing to drug testing (Skinner, Von Raab, and 
Vernonia) all include the full text of the 4th Am endm ent and acknowledge its 
centrality  to their holdings, s tipu lating  th a t drug tests  in fact constitute "searches” 
w ithin the purview of the Amendment. The threshold questions the Court saw fit to 
address in these cases were;
1. W hether those seeking to test were “sta te  agents,”
2. W hether the s ta te  or its designee had a compelling interest sufficient to 
trum p individuals’ privacy rights,
3. W hether the privacy intrusions were m inim al relative to legitim ate sta te  
interests, and
4. The purpose of the testing.
The first question owes to the distinction made between Constitutional 
protections afforded citizens against governm ental activities and the to rt rem edies 
applied to privacy violations committed by private parties. This distinction is crucial 
to the legahty of aU m anner of indiscrim inate surveillance of employees and others 
in the private sector (recall C hapter 4). The second question addresses em pirical 
assertions of exigency: are the nature, extent, and cost of drug abuse sufficiently 
adverse to w arran t extrem e m easures? [see C hapter 2] Third, w hat is the severity of 
the intrusion? Collection of a urine sam ple is less invasive than th a t of an  IV blood 
sample, and far less invasive than, say. forced stom ach pumping or body cavity 
exam inations in search of contraband. Finally, the ostensible purpose of the testing
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program: prosecutorial or "adm inistrative?” Following a trend  developed in the 
lower courts over the last generation, the Suprem e Court has allowed 
"adm inistrative” or “special needs” exceptions to the “probable cause” and  "w arran t” 
requirem ents of the 4th Amendment. In short, since positive drug test resu lts  are 
supposedly “confidential” and not referred for prosecution—despite the fact tha t 
they constitute "scientific evidence” of recent crim inal conduct—the Court finds 
them  acceptable as mere non-discretionary adm inistrative functions. Critics point 
out. however, th a t such can am ount to “adm inistrative punishm ent” w ith a 
concomitant denial of the 5th Am endm ent’s guarantee of due process, given th a t the 
employment consequences for an individual testing  positive are Ukely to be far more 
im m ediate and severe than the t>’pical court conviction for drug possession.
One justification the court has set forth in defense of non-cause surveillance is 
seen in a footnote in Von Raab  citing United States vs. E duards  [498 F2d 496, 500 
(CA2 1974), validation of airline passenger searches], la ter cited by Justice  Ginsberg 
in her Vernonia p artia l concurrence opinion. In Eduards  the court noted th a t “the 
passenger has been given advance notice of his liability to such a search so th a t he 
can avoid it by choosing not to travel by a ir.” A sim ilar principle is held to validate 
workplace drug testing: consent constitutes waiver of any 4th A m endm ent or tort 
claim. Job applicants are free to seek work where testing is not policy. Given that, 
according to the American M anagem ent Association, more th an  80% of m ajor U.S. 
corporations now routinely test for drug use, however, employees have little  choice 
in the m atter. Moreover, the E duards  analogy is invalid on its face; those passing 
through airport detectors do not have the ir identities recorded unless they  are
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confirmed to be carrying proscribed item s such as w eapons or explosives. “False 
positives” (those who innocently set off the w alk-through scanners or whose carry- 
on item s ap p ear suspicious under X-ray) are quickly searched by electronic wand 
and/or v isual inspection of personal articles and th en  sen t on their way. W here drug 
screens are  concerned, however, identities are recorded and troublesome vagaries 
exist w ith respect to ju s t who owns the resu ltan t lab data, how long and by whom 
they m ust be kept, w hat criteria exist for breach of confidentiality, w hat the precise 
probabilities are for false positive findings, and w hat (if any) rights of appeal exist 
in the event of contested lab “positive” findings.
A recent exam ple of the potential confidentiality problem s can be seen in the 
suits filed by local law enforcement agencies to s trik e  down the so-called “Brady 
Bill” H andgun Control Act signed into law by P resident Clinton. Local police found 
tha t in the course of the required background checks they would have to search for 
any existing drug test records of handgun applicants because under Brady “known 
drug abusers” are ineligible for a weapons license. Should someone w ith an  
undiscovered “positive" drug test record obtain a w eapon and subsequently use it in 
the commission of a crime, the local agency m ight face liability. WTiile local 
au thorities m ainly object to the “unfunded m andate” character of Brady, the drug 
test record search  requirem ent adds an additional burden, and exemplifies a 
general difficulty w ith “confidentiality” policy issues.
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"Privacy” or "Confidentiality”?
Congressional House Resolution 184, the "Individual Privacy Protection Act of 
199S' sought to update federal laws regarding “privacy.” Section 2(4) of the m easure 
asserts  th a t “the right to privacy is a personal and  fundam ental right protected by 
the C onstitution of the United S ta tes .” A close reading  of the bill's specifics, 
however, leaves no doubt tha t Congress is alm ost exclusively concerned with 
"confidentiality” issues, principally w ith regard  to digitally stored and readily 
dissem inated personal data such as financial and m edical records. Insurers, 
m arketers, and  inquisitors of every’ stripe wish to probe our digital histories in 
furtherance of the ir agendas. E rrors and omissions in and misuse of these 
com puterized repositories can lead to significant harm s, hence the concerns over 
“confidentiality.” As Seth Kreim er points out in Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet 
Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law:
In the course of her job, the bureaucrat learns more intim ate 
details about citizens than  would the police officer or judge . . . 
Inform ation gathered in one arena is available for use in others. 
Sim ilarly, the increasing rationalization and routinization of the 
private sector has generated stores of inform ation potentially 
available to the governm ent. . . Indeed, the governm ent often 
in tervenes to facilitate the process by requiring  private parties to 
compile records.*-®
Endless policy disputes loom large given such realities: Recall the Brady Bül 
background check flap. Another example: In 1997 N ew ark welfare officials sought to
*-° Seth K reim er, Sunlight, Secrets, and  Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between 
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, U niversitv  of Pennsvlvania Law 
Review, Vol. 140, No. 1, Nov. 1991, pp. 3-4.
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im plem ent a com puterized fingerprint ID system  to help crack down on pubhc 
assistance “double-dipping” by welfare clients sim ultaneously registering for 
benefits in m ultiple jurisdictions. Law enforcem ent agencies im m ediately 
announced the ir in ten t and authority  to access the system  in pu rsu it of those w ith 
unrelated ou tstand ing  crim inal w arrants. Another: The 1RS is known to have for 
years indiscrim inately sifted through taxpayers’ credit and  financial data in search 
of suspicious anom alies th a t might signal tax  evasion. Yet another: Also in 1997 the 
CUnton A dm inistration proposed new medical records privacy legislation. D uring a 
Septem ber 11th interview  on National Public Radio, HHS Secretary Donna Shalala 
adm itted th a t the new law would include exceptions perm itting  law enforcement 
access to pa tien t data.
Finally, consider a firm now known as ChoicePoint. As they tout in a recent 
press release:
ChoicePoint offers its custom ers a suite of em ployee-related risk 
m anagem ent tools. These services include drug testing  adm inistration 
and program  m anagem ent, background verifications, public records 
searches, credit reports, motor vehicle records, and employee 
verification database services.
ChoicePoint is a corporate descendant of Equifax, one of the m ajor national credit 
bureaus, one w ith a less than  stellar history of da ta  accuracy. The ChoicePoint 
m arketing slogan w inks a t us: “Information has always been available. ChoicePoint 
makes it accessible.” Amid the ir promotional lite ra tu re  is a curious observation:
Companies are becoming concerned w ith the choice points their 
employees face in the ir non-professional fives. We a t ChoicePoint keep 
ab reast of the issues and trends both in and out of our m arket focus.
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in anticipation of w hat we believe to be a fu tu re  opportunity of risk  
assessm ent information dehverv.
Interesting, no? Should we have any confidentiality concerns here? Is our 
government, given the current predom inantly anti-regulatory  political chm ate, up to 
the task  of constraining inform ation-traffickers such as ChoicePoint, a company 
ever on the lookout for opportunities to help employers monitor and m anage the 
“non-professional” (i.e., private) aspects of the ir employees’ fives? A company now 
also directly in the business of drug  testing?
Don’t worry, be happy? Consider a couple of closing confidentiality tidbits. First, 
MIB. the Medical Information Bureau, w herein reside a good bit of da ta  beyond 
merelv records of vour medical encounters:
MIB, based outside of Boston, is an organization w ith 
approxim ately 750 m em ber insurance companies. It collects and 
furnishes information on consum ers to all MIB members for use in 
the insurance underw riting process. In addition to an individual’s 
credit history, data collected by MIB may include medical conditions, 
driving records, crim inal activity, and participation in hazardous 
sports, among other facts. MIB’s m em ber companies account for 99 
percent of the individual fife insurance policies and 80 percent of all 
health  and disability policies issued in the United S tates and 
Canada.'-*
On November 11, 1993, CBS M orning News reported on a flap invoking MIB 
th a t had to do w ith the supposedly confidential medical records of U.S. 
Congresswoman Nydia Velasquez (D-NY). During the 1992 election campaign, Ms. 
Velasquez’s political opponents leaked inform ation regarding her d is tan t psychiatric
*-* Federal Trade Commission, [http://www.ftc.gov/opa/95G6/mib.htm], 
March, 1998.
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history, including details of her long-ago hospitalization for suicidal depression. The 
CBS report noted th a t no federal laws w ere violated in the acquisition and 
dissem ination of th is inform ation, and  th a t commercial inform ation brokers 
routinely acquired such types of d a ta  w ith  profitable im punity. *--
“Have you ever . . .  ?”
A large, prom inent new spaper ad periodically appearing the Las Vegas 
new spapers in the early  1990’s issued a bold warning: “I f  y o u ’re not pre-employment 
drug testing, y o u ’re h iring  the rejects o f those companies that do!” The assertion  is
*-- VVe have heretofore alluded to the putative “confidentiality” of drug 
testing  resu lts. Video ren ta l records (as an  ironic legislative resu lt of the  Robert 
Bork Suprem e Court nom ination hearings) currently  have more federal privacy 
protection th an  do drug screen resu lts. D rug testing  confidentiality is w eakly and 
tangentially  addressed  in 42.USC.290dd-2 et seq, which goes on to specify the 
conditions under which records may be released. Section (b)(2)(C) provides for the 
breach of confidentiality  if so ordered by “any court of com petent jurisdiction . . . ” 
Congressm an Solomon’s H.R. drug testing  legislative proposals have sought to 
fu rther enfeeble the inviolability of such records. Subm itting to a non-cause drug 
test causes the creation of a quasi-m edical record of uncertain  longevity and 
custody, over which the “donor” has no control or right of review or challenge. Those 
sanguine about the security  of such d a ta  should perhaps ponder the recent eye- 
opening book by Jeffery Rothfeder, Privacy For Sale: How Com puterization Has 
Made Everyone’s P rivate  Life An Open Secret. (NY, Simon & Schuster. 1992) 
w herein is docum ented the ease w ith which professional “da ta  harvesters ”—often 
arm ed w ith  nothing more th an  a telephone and a modem-equipped home 
com puter— m anage to access the most in tim ate  of personal inform ation for their 
clients. Given th a t some facilities record drug test resu lts  as e ither “positive” or 
“negative” or “inconclusive,” and fu rth er given the economic im peratives to cut 
methodological corners in deference to bottom lines (e.g., preem ploym ent “clinical 
quality” unconfirm ed screening), one is ill-advised to take lightly the generation of 
such potentially  destructive, possibly erroneous personal inform ation. Im agine 
having to account some years hence to a prospective employer (or security  clearance 
investigator, etc.) regarding the m eaning of an “inconclusive” (not to m ention a $20 
unconfirm ed false positive) drug screen resu lt of which one was u tterly  unaw are.
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targeted  s tra ig h t a t the anxieties of hum an resources m anagers. As Kim Broadwell 
noted:
A group of m anagers, when asked why their companies had 
in s titu ted  preemployment drug screening, indicated th a t then- 
overriding concern was to avoid h iring  drug-using applicants who had 
failed drug screens a t other companies in their area.*-^
Recall the four hy^pothetical job application questions posed a t the outset of this 
inquiry:
1. Have you ever committed a crime for which you were not apprehended?
2. Do you now engage in ongoing or periodic crim inal conduct?
3. Do you support the w ar against drug abuse?
4. Are you willing to subm it proof of the foregoing?
How about one more?
5. Have you ever been tested  for illegal drug  use before?
5.a. If yes. please hst all places and dates (attach additional sheet if necessary).
More plausibly, since it is certain  th a t questions 1 through 4 would be found 
im perm issible, ju s t place question 5 on the application am id the other routine 
queries. Why could you not? Well, first because prior drug testing records are 
ostensibly “confidential.” But. since a principal justification for employment drug 
screening hinges on m anagem ent im peratives to assess applicant and employee 
physical-fitness-for-duty and to minimize employee health  benefits expenditures, 
these d a ta  are. a t least in part, effectively “medical” records (and relevant thereby
1-3 D. Kim Broadwell, The Evolution o f Workplace Drug Screening, The 
Jo u rn a l of Law. Medicine, and Ethics. Vol. 22, No. 3, Fall 1994, p. 241
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to employer in terests). Should you undergo a physical exam for private health  or life 
insurance, for example, the fine-print waiver you sign on the consent form— 
putative “confidentiality" boilerplate provisions notw ithstanding—gives the 
underw riter perm ission to traffick in your results, exchanging them  w ith others 
perhaps “having a need to know” (in the ir judgm ent) in the “ordinary course of 
business” through data  warehouses such as the Medical Information Bureau. 
(Please: next tim e read the tiny, light prin t on the back of those consent and/or 
claims forms you sign.)
Simply knowing via a records search th a t job candidate X had tested  negative on 
two dozen prior occasions—or, tested positive merely once— would tell a hiring 
decision-m aker essentially everything he or she needed to know w ith respect to 
likely (or actual) prior drug use, w ithout having to waste money on an additional 
screen.
We can rest assured, however, th a t commercial data  harvesters such as 
ChoicePoint, despite the ir soothing m arketing assurances th a t they can make the 
all da ta  you need “accessible,” would demur, given this type of request. They would 
in fact likely be in the forefront of defending the precious “confidentiality” of such 
data—given the ir conflicting financial in terest in selling fu rther drug testing 
services (unless, of course, they could somehow persuade the client to pay actual 
drug testing  prices for the archival data). One can imagine the ir representatives 
testifying before Congress in support of legislation such as H.R. 184, heads nodding 
in solemn sworn agreem ent that, indeed “the right to privacy is a personal and
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fundam ental right protected by the Constitution of the U nited S ta tes .” Lest data- 
dredging com petitors, unencum bered by the m arketing complications of a 
ChoicePoint. divert a big chunk of the drug testing  revenue into m ere digital bio- 
info-assays.
Finally, consider the implications of aU the foregoing in this section in light of a 
recent W 'ashington Post article by Jane  B ryant Quinn:
How Your Credit Could Affect Your Career
By Ja n e  B ryant Quinn. Tuesday. M arch 11. 1997, The W ashington Post
NEW' YORK—When you apply for a  job. you expect the company to 
check your references. But do you also expect it to pull your credit 
report?
Tens of thousands of employers take a peek a t this slice of your 
personal life: Do you have big debts, do you pay bills on time, have 
you ever been sued by a creditor, is there a tax hen on your home or a 
bankruptcy in your past?
Em ployers use these reports “to serve as a general indicator of an 
applican t’s financial honesty and  personal integrity, ” says Experian 
(formerly TRWl, one of the three major credit bureaus . . .
Recall K reim er’s observation above. Don’t worry, be happy? Do any of us have the 
slightest clue ongoing as to w hat our “reasonable expectations of privacy” are across 
the length and  breadth  of interactional domains? Any clue as to the extent of the 
uses to which our personal data are daily being put?
*3̂  Jan e  Bryant Quinn, How Your Credit Could Affect Your Career, The 
W ashington Post, [http://ww w .w ashingtonpost.com /wp-srv/business/longterm /quinn/ 
colum ns/031197.htm], March 11. 1997.
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Beyond confidentiality
Privacy scholars see confidentiality” as only one elem ent in the privacy matrix. In 
1960 William Prosser reported on a content analysis of more than  three hundred 
privacy to rt c a s e s ,  fje noted four basic characteristics of “privacy” as revealed by 
litigation over its breach:
1. An in trusion  into the p la in tiffs  seclusion or solitude, or into his private 
affairs:
2. Public disclosure of em barrassing private facts about the plaintiff;
3. Publicity which placed the plaintiff in a  false light in the public eye;
4. A ppropriation for the defendant’s advantage, of the p la in tiffs  name or 
likeness.
While intuitively sensible, the foregoing is ra th e r tautological in using the word 
“private” in defining certain  aspects of privacy. WTiereas false light issues fall under 
the dom ains of libel and slander law, and m isappropriation of nam e or likeness is a 
“property righ ts” issue, w hat, we are left asking, constitute our “private affairs” and 
“private facts”? Privacy skeptic R ichard Posner observes th a t “[M]uch ink has been 
spilled in try ing to clarify the elusive and ill-defined concept o f  p r i v a c y Posner 
continues:
I will sidestep the definitional problem  by simply noting th a t one 
aspect of privacy is the w ithholding or concealm ent of information.
‘23 R ichard B. Parker, Privacy, Readings in the Philosophy of Law. J. Arthur, 
and  S. Shaw, Ed., (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-H all, Inc., 1984) p. 608.
‘2® Richard A. Posner, A n Economic Theory o f Privacy, Philosophical 
D im ensions of Privacy: an Anthology. F. Schoeman, Ed. (Cambridge, UK, 
Cam bridge University Press, 1984), p. 333.
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This aspect is of particular in terest to the economist now th a t the 
study of inform ation has become an  im portant field of economics. It is 
also of in terest to the regulator, and those affected by him, because 
both the right to privacy and the “right to know” are becoming more 
and more the subject of regulation. ‘2"
Posner goes on to note th a t privacy provides
opportunities for exploitation through m isrepresentation. 
Psychologists and sociologists have pointed out th a t even in everyday 
life people try  to m anipulate other people’s opinion of them , using 
m isrepresentation. The strongest defenders of privacy usually define 
the individual’s right to privacy as the right to control the  flow of 
information about him. A seldom -rem arked corollary to a right to 
m isrepresent one’s character is th a t others have a legitim ate in terest 
in unm asking the m isrepresentation. ‘2®
Posner makes a cogent observation, and his point goes to the heart of the 
suspicionless drug testing issue. Many privacy skeptics view the claim of a privacy 
right as “the guilty m an’s privilege.” Defenders of C onstitutionally-protected 
privacy, on the o ther hand, bristle a t the notion, retorting th a t fundam ental to our 
ju risprudential tradition is th a t the individual need not “prove ” his or her 
innocence—that, absent reasonable evidence of m isrepresentation, adverse 
inference pu rsuan t to a privacy claim is demagoguery, pure and simple, 
inadm issible in court and unethical in social discourse. Posner’s view, while valid to 
an extent, is overbroad in its assum ption th a t deception is a su b stan tia l m otivating 
force of the privacy claim ant.
■2- ibid.
>28 ibid., pp. 334-5.
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The value of privacy
The drug-abstinent person objecting to a suspicionless drug te s t on principle 
stands a t a significant rhetorical disadvantage, given the w idespread view of this 
particular privacy claim as indeed a m anifestation of “the guilty m an’s privilege.” 
and further given the fi-aming of the issue in a way th a t requires the individual to 
justify his or her refusal. In Legislating Privacy: Technology-. Social Values, and 
Pubhc Policy, however, Priscilla Regan argues th a t we m ust re-fram e the issue 180 
degrees for a proper perspective and defense of privacy:
The philosophical basis of privacy policy overem phasizes the 
importance of privacy to the individual and fails to recognize the 
broader social im portance of privacy. This em phasis on privacy as an 
indiv-idual right or an individual in terest provides a w eak basis for 
form ulating policy to protect privacy . . .  As a result privacy has been 
on the defensive, w ith those alleging a privacy invasion bearing the 
burden of proving th a t a certain  action does indeed invade privacy 
and th a t the “social” benefit to be gained firom the privacy invasion is 
less im oortan t th an  the indi\ddual harm  i n c u r r e d . ‘2®
Regan sees in the extensive empirical data gathered to assess “privacy concerns" 
throughout the past twenty-odd years (and which she sum m arizes in  some detail in 
her book) an inadequately articu lated  recognition of privacy as a  social value:
Privacy is a common value in tha t aU individuals value some degree 
of privacy and have some common perceptions about privacy. Privacy 
is also a pubhc value in th a t it has value not ju s t to the individual or 
to aU indivdduals in common but also to the democratic poUtical 
system. The th ird  basis for the social im portance of privacy is derived 
from the theoretical h te ra tu re  in economics. Privacy is rapidly  
becoming a collective value in th a t technology and m arket forces are
'29 Priscilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology. Social Values, and 
Pubhc Policy. (Chapel Hill, NC, University of N orth Carohna Press, 1995), pp. 212-
3.
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m aking it h a rd  for any one person to have privacy w ithout aU persons 
having a s im ilar level of privacy. '3®
For Regan, “viewing privacy as a common value— as a social claim ra th e r  th an  an 
individual claim—would also shift the burden of p roof’:
R ather th an  leaving it up to individuals to show dam ages or to 
prove willful in te n t on the p a rt or the record keeper, the burden 
would be placed on the organization. The organization would be 
responsible for justify ing the need for the inform ation ra th e r  th a n  the 
individual being responsible for justifying w ithholding the
inform ation.‘31
Which, of course, brings us righ t back to 4th A m endm ent “reasonableness" and 
“probable cause” in the  context of drug  testing  policy. Given th a t the proportion of 
people objecting to indiscrim inate d rug  testing  is far g rea ter th an  the  m ost generous 
yet plausible estim ates of the prevalence of drug users, a reflexive insinuation  of 
"guilty privilege" is unsustainable . The vast m ajority of those opposed to 
suspicionless testing  indeed have “nothing to hide.” Beyond an understandable  
sense of indignation, the  practical basis for the ir objections, however inchoate for 
some, cannot be but th a t  they have no inform ation “of value” to add (being drug- 
free), nothing to gain, and  everything to lose should th ings go awry. Moreover, and 
pertinent to the “social value” perspective of privacy Regan advocates—albeit in a 
purely u tilita rian  way—subm ission w ithout cause in fact adds to the probability 
th a t things will go aw ry for some.
‘3® ibid.
‘3‘ ibid., p. 232.
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Finally, w hat of “an understandable sense of indignation” a t being pressured or 
coerced to “prove” one’s abstinence? Is such a legitim ate response? A plausible 
reading of K antian  principles of reciprocity and “universal m axim s” might have us 
conclude tha t, ra th e r th an  framing the privacy issue as one of “right" versus “duty." 
perhaps we have a “duty” to defend th is fundam ental “civil right" as the core 
elem ent of reciprocal autonomy it truly is. K ant was adam ant regarding our duty to 
be tru th fu l. He was equally adam ant w ith  respect to the propriety of indignation as 
response to g ra tu itous or groundless insinuations of cover-up:
The m an who is asked w hether or not he in tends to speak 
tru thfu lly  in the s tatem ent th a t he is now to m ake and who does not 
receive the very question with indignation as regards the suspicion 
thereby expressed th a t he m ight be a Liar, but who instead  asks 
perm ission to th ink  first about possible exceptions—th a t m an is 
already a Har {in potentia). This is because he shows th a t he does not 
acknowledge tru thfu lness as in itse lf a duty but reserves for him self 
exceptions from a rule which by its very n a tu re  does not adm it of any 
exceptions, inasm uch as to adm it of such would be self- 
contradictorv. ‘3-
WeU, th a t begs the obvious rub. insofar as bars  can and do adopt the indignant 
response in ruse. Such has always been the  case, but equally obvious should be th a t 
inverting the due process “presum ption of innocence” fundam ental to our poUtical 
and legal order will have Uttle to no effect w hatever on the mores of the duplicitous. 
It will, however, ensure th a t society in general becomes comprised of those who—as 
Justice  ScaUa s ta ted  so well in his Treasury d issent—“suffer a coarsening of our
‘3- Im m anuel K ant, On a Supposed R ight to Lie Because o f Philanthropic 
Concerns, [430], in Grounding for the M etaphysics of M orals, 3rd Edition, 
tran s la ted  by J.W . Ellington, (IndianapoUs, H ackett PubUshing Co., 1993), p. 67.
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national m anners th a t ultim ately give the Fourth  Amendm ent its content, and who 
become subject to the adm inistration of federal officials whose respect for our 
privacy can hardly  be greater than the sm all respect they have been taught to have 
for their own.”
Sm ith claims she is “clean.” and her resum e tends to back her assertion. Jones 
suspects otherwise, often on the basis of irrelevant or bogus “data .” Beyond “mere” 
legalisms, the m oral burden of proof is on the la tte r. Sm ith has a moral claim to 
indignation in response to groundless inquiry. A duty, even. Adverse inference 
toward such indignation is the moral equivalent of the ad honiinem  attack, 
disdained in rational discourse, ethically bank rup t in policy practice.
A brief cultural and historical sam pling of privacy practices 
(or, K ant in the tund ra  amid the U tkuhikhalingm uit)
Many privacy scholars answer the skeptics by pointing to the considerable 
ethological, anthropological, psychological, and philosophical evidence supporting 
the need for and acceptance of privacy. First, alm ost all higher species tend to 
exhibit cyclical behavior patterns of immersion in and w ithdraw al firom the group.
As Alan W estin observes in The origins o f modern claims to privacy:
M an hkes to think th a t his desire for privacy is distinctively 
hum an, a function of his unique ethical, intellectual, and artistic 
needs. Yet studies of anim al behavior and social organization suggest 
th a t m an’s need for privacy may be rooted in his anim al origins, and 
th a t m en and anim als share several basic m echanism s for claiming 
privacy among their own fellows . . .
One basic finding of anim al studies is th a t v irtually  all anim als 
seek periods of individual seclusion or small-group intimacy. This is 
usually  described as a tendency tow ard territoriality , in which an
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organism  lays claim to an  area of land, w ater, or a ir and defends it 
against intrusion by mem bers of its own species. ‘3®
W estin finds in terpersonal m echanism s of “social distance” a nearly universal 
phenom enon, albeit one w ith broadly divergent culture-specific param eters. He cites 
the research of num erous anthropologists as evidence of varied yet w idespread 
acceptance of privacy, allowing the caveat th a t “[0]ne could compile a long List of 
societies, prim itive and modern, th a t neither have nor would adm ire the norm s of 
privacy found in American culture-norm s which some Americans regard as na tu ra l' 
needs of all men living in society.” However, he goes on to point out th a t
Yet this circum stance does not prove th a t there  are no universal 
needs for privacy and no universal processes for adjusting the values 
of privacy, disclosure, and surveillance w ith in  each society. It 
suggests only th a t each society m ust be stud ied  on its own term s . . . 
to see w hether there are norm s of privacy called by other names, and 
recognizing the difficulties in m aking cross-cultural comparisons. The 
analysis m ust also recognize the fact th a t th e re  are psychological 
ways of achieving privacy . . . which are crucial in those societies 
where communal life m akes solitude or intim acy impossible w ithin 
the living a reas .‘3̂
B arrington Moore provides a detailed account of personal adjustm ents to ju st 
such sp artan  communal living arrangem ents in Privacy, Anger, and  Dependence: 
Notes on an Eskimo Com munity  w herein researcher Jean  L. Briggs reports on her 
experience of seventeen m onths spent living far above the arctic circle w ith the
‘33 Alan W estin, The origin o f modern claim s to privacy, originally from 
Privacy and  Freedom, (New York Bar Association, 1967) in Philosophical Dimension 
of Privacy: An Anthology, Schoeman, Ferdinand, Ed., (Cambridge University Press, 
1984), p. 56.
‘33 ibid., p 60.
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U tkuhikhalingm uit Eskimo tribe of C anada (the “U tku”). Moore notes th a t because 
of the ir atom istic economy.
the U tku cherish independence of thought and action as a na tu ra l 
prerogative and look askance a t anyone who shows signs of w anting 
to tell them  w hat to do, . . . Briggs also found them  a people reluctant 
to answ er questions. They displayed “an  extrem ely strong sense of 
privacy w ith regard to the ir thoughts, th e ir feelings, and their 
m otivations; and 1 feared to offend it.”‘35
Moore notes, however tha t, because of the harshness of their physical 
environm ent and its relentless assau lt on basic survival, “the U tku like other 
Eskimos soften their individualism  w ith a strong em phasis on reciprocity and 
responsiveness to the needs of others.""c On the other hand, this sense of shared 
obligation is tem pered by a distinction between legitim ate and illegitim ate 
obligations;
Briggs reports th a t the U tku resen t any sign of bossiness. Among 
the U tku  nobody has the right to teU o ther people what to do, and 
everybody has the right to reject an  in trusion  on his or her freedom of 
action. The feeling seems to be so strong th a t such intrusions hardly 
ever take place.'3'
A sense of legitim ate reciprocal obligations w ith a concomitant disdain for 
presum ption and intrusion into one’s private zone? R ather Kantian, it would seem.
‘35 Barrington Moore, Anthropological Perspectives, Privacy; Studies in Social 
and C u ltu ra l H istory, (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 1984), p. 7.
‘36 ibid., p. 8.
‘3- ibid., p. 72.
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And a validation of privacy as an ethical principle as seen in one of the harshest and 
most physically restrictive social environm ents.
Moore goes on to examine the nuances of the private in Classical Athenian, Old 
Testam ent Hebrew, and ancient Chinese cultures, concluding th a t nearly all 
societies sufficiently advanced to have an  organized “public” of any consequence 
provide for the “private,” even if only m inim ally through informal cultural norms of 
tolerance, irrespective of the formal s truc tu res of law and political power:
To summarize very briefly, the evidence shows th a t even 
au thoritarian  regimes with universal moral claims on the population 
are capable of developing some institu tions th a t protect ordinary 
subjects from some abuses of power. But there are close fimits on how- 
far such trends can go. Democratic polities provide a more favorable 
setting for such trends and for personal autonomy as well. But in a 
democracy there are also lim its and  obstacles. For various reasons, 
such as w ar and economic despair large sections of the population 
may tu rn  to atavistic forms of loyalty, w ith suspicion of ideas and 
th inkers tha t seem the least bit unconventional. They take up 
Community with a vengeance and in its  nam e suppress all forms of 
dissidence. Out of fear or secret sym pathy (or both) sections of the 
elite may abet or even lead such popular movements. All in all, the 
wonder is not th a t privacy rights have been attacked or suppressed 
but th a t they have managed to grow a t a ll.‘3®
The foregoing observation should have a disturbingly fam iliar ring to anyone 
even mildly fam ihar w ith our present-day “w ar on drugs.”
'38 Moore, op cit., p. 274.
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Beyond empiricism: privacy and virtue
We can cite ethology, anthropology, and political history in em pirical defense of 
privacy. We can argue th a t privacy has proven a necessary tool for the individual to 
employ in the operation of checks and balances against the abuse of power. We can 
point out th a t privacy is perhaps the most fundam ental of democratic political 
rights, requisite for the  functioning of aU others—we do, after all, take the social 
good of the secret ballot as a  given. We can cite the substan tia l and credible 
psychological lite ra tu re  asserting  the central role of privacy in the very form ation of 
a socially com petent persona. But nagging concerns will Linger, w ith skeptics 
insisting th a t privacy thw arts  community w hereas self-disclosure promotes it. As 
Barrington Moore concludes:
Privacy cannot be the dom inant value in any society. M an has to 
live in society, and  social concerns have to take precedence. In both 
ancient Greece and ancient China the words for private and public 
existed, w ith the words for private conveying some hint of the 
antisocial in the ir meaning. Among the ancient Hebrews prior to the 
monarchy, we find no distinctions between public and private. 
Yahweh seem s to have played the role of the public. Thus aU three 
civilizations displayed a feeling of priority for social concerns, but this 
priority does not m ean th a t all social concerns always take 
precedence. The great civilizing achievem ent in the concept of privacy 
has been its questioning of social concerns. T hat was mainly an 
achievm ent of W estern civilization,
Ju d ith  Swanson, in  The Public and the Private in A ristotle’s Political 
Philosophv, agrees. WTiile acknowledging that, “[I]f A ristotle lived in the tw entieth- 
century w estern world, he m ight agree w ith com m unitarian critics th a t
'39 Moore, op cit., pp. 274-5.
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disequilibrium  betw een the public and private exists,”'3® Sw anson insists th a t 
A ristotle’s political philosophy “defends privacy as vigorously as liberalism , but 
better.” Echoing sen tim ents set forth  by Priscilla Regan, Sw anson observes tha t
Liberalism , by conceiving privacy as a set of righ ts  forming a 
protective bubble around every- individual, enabling  them  to do 
w hatever they like w ith in  it, justifies privacy only from the point of 
view of the  individual, not from th a t of the public . . . A ristotle offers a 
corrective to liberalism ’s conception of privacy in  th a t he conceives the 
priv a te  to be virtuous activities th a t discount popular opinion; the 
private th u s  benefits the individual and, thereby, the  public . . .
Aiming a t excellence, private  activity cannot accommodate 
prevailing values (except in the best regimes). This is in fact fortunate 
from the point of vdew of the  regime; by resisting  w hat is merely 
fashionable or politically necessary, private activ ity  embodies a 
s tan d ard  of excellence th a t political activity can asp ire  to u p h o l d . '3i
A ristotle’s defense of the private  is not, however, to be construed as an 
endorsem ent of pure individualism , as we readily see in  Book N ine  of the 
Nicomachean Ethics;
No one would choose to have all good th ings by himself, for m an is a 
social and political being and his n a tu ra l condition is to live w ith 
others. Consequently, even a happy m an needs society. Since he 
possesses w hat 1 by n a tu re  good, it is obviously b e tte r for him to 
spend his days with friends and good men th an  w ith  any stranger 
who comes along. It follows th a t a happy m an needs fidends. [NE 
1169b 20]‘32
‘3® Ju d ith  Swanson, The Public and the Private in  A risto tle’s PoUtical 
Philosophv, (Ithaca, NY, Cornell U niversity Press, 1992), p. 208.
‘31 ibid., pp. 207-8.
‘32 Aristotle, N icom achean E thics. T ransla ted  by M artin  Ostwald, (New 
York, M acM ülan Publishing Company, 1962).
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A ristotle acknowledges, however, th a t it would “seem to be impossible to be an 
in tim ate  friend of many" [NE 1171a 10] and th a t we “m ust be content if we find 
even a few friends of this k ind .” [NE 1171a 20] The cultivation of intim ate 
friendships cannot but assum e the m oral w orth of a private sphere into which the 
pohs may not. w ithout ju s t cause, intrude.
Sim ilarly, A ristotle’s comment in Book Ten th a t “complete happiness consists in 
some kind of contem plative activity ” [NE 1178b 10] fu rther supports Swanson’s 
in terp re ta tion  of A ristotelian defense of the private. The divine bliss of 
contem plative study, again, necessarily assum es the intrinsic worth of a private 
domain. Moreover, A ristotle’s subsequent observation th a t “private individuals do 
not act less honorably but even more honorably than  powerful ru lers” [NE 1179a 5] 
supports Sw anson’s argum ent th a t “private activity cannot accommodate prevailing 
values (except in the best regim es).”‘3®
WTiile insisting  th a t cultivation of cardinal moral habits requires the private, 
Swanson would agree w ith privacy skeptics that, for some, privacy indeed provides 
little more th an  a cover for self-indulgence, a refuge “largely for letting  go of virtue. ”
As a consequence of the ir using the private in th is way, the private 
has little  to offer the public. Moreover, Aristotle would perhaps point 
out th a t the unpreparedness of people today to engage properly in 
private activity is in p a rt the resu lt of laws and educational 
in stitu tions failing to encourage the proper use of privacy. '33
‘33 Swanson, op cit., pp. 207-8. 
‘33 Swanson, op cit., p. 208.
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Well, yes—but for those who would in te rp re t such counsel as justification for 
policies requiring indiscrim inate searches of all in search of the dissolute few. the 
words of John S tu art MiU (On Liberty) regarding m oral education come to mind:
The existing generation is m aster both of the tra in ing  and the 
entire circum stances of the generation to come; it cannot make them 
perfectly good and wise, because it is itse lf so lam entably deficient in 
goodness and wisdom . . . but it is perfectly well able to make the 
rising generation, as a whole, as good as, and  a little  better than 
itself. If society lets any considerable num ber of its mem bers grow up 
mere children, incapable of being acted upon by ra tional consideration 
of d is tan t motives, society has itself to blame for the consequences . . . 
let not society pretend th a t it needs, besides all this, the power to 
issue commands and enforce obedience in the personal concerns of 
individuals, in which, on all principles of justice and  policy, the 
decision ought to rest with those who are able to abide the
consequences. ‘35
Any apphcabüity herein of Mill’s observation must, in fairness, be tem pered by a 
recognition th a t the interdependencies we face today are considerably more complex 
than  those faced by Mill and his contem poraries. The consequences of intoxication 
today hold the potential of w idespread harm  of a severity seldom experienced in 
earlier times. It is im portant to recall, however, th a t th is  thesis is—again—focused 
on those who are drug-free, and it is far from clear th a t the bulk of the abstinent are 
so as a result of continual suspicion and  surveillance during the time of their 
upbringing.
‘35 John S tu a rt Mill, On Liberty and o ther w ritings. Stefan Collini, Ed. 
(Cambridge, UK, Cambridge U niversity Press, 1989), pp. 83-4.
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C hapter sum m ary
V irtuous m oral character is not a  mere function of the ongoing prod of actual or 
th rea tened  surveillance. The virtuous person is one who is m otivated by in trinsic  
goods, who chooses the good even in the absence of observation or the th re a t of 
punishm ent. In the context of th is discussion it is incontrovertible th a t the  vast 
m ajority of Am ericans are  drug abstinent, despite the ready availability and  ever- 
lower cost of drugs. Moreover, this p reponderant preference for sobriety (or a t least 
tem perance) owes to positive m otivating factors (i.e., “moral habituation”) 
considerably more complex th an  any (largely theoretical) anxiety regarding 
detection. T hat a sm all m inority will indulge them selves in proscribed risk -tak ing  to 
som etim es tragic excess—even in the face of surveillance m easures and severe 
sanctions—in no way reflexively legitim ates the  disembowhng of the Fourth  
A m endm ent and the very- real moral good it codifies.
While it is beyond dispute th a t a social order has both right and obligation to 
take reasonable m easures to prevent harm , a tim orous society of chronic suspicion 
which accedes to the a rb itra ry  violation of the private in search of mostly 
apparitional heresies cannot but beget a cu lture of secrecy, expediency, disrespect 
for law, and—ultim ately—political instability . We ought indeed take care th a t we 
not “destroy the village in order to save it.” It required a long struggle en tailing  
much blood and  tears  to build it.
Next: answ ering the critics forthrightly, and  some concluding observations 
(C hapter Seven).
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CHAPTER SE’VEN
Addressing counter-argum ents.
In th is chap ter we address the principal reb u tta l argum ents advanced by those 
who e ith e r actively favor suspicionless drug testing  or are indifferent to the issue 
(seeing in it m uch ado about little  to nothing).
Objection 1: A ll o f this high-m inded hand-w ringing over drug screening vis a vis the 
Fourth A m endm ent is ju st so much hot air— the 4th is not germane here; no job 
applicant, employee, athlete, or student has ever had a positive test result forwarded  
to the authorities for prosecution— the only circumstance which would rightfully  
bring the Fourth Am endm ent into play. A dm in istra tive  privacy violations are 
properly dealt w ith  in tort venues.
A phrase em blem atic of the V ietnam  W ar comes to mind: Grab ’em by the balls, 
and  their Hearts and M inds w ill follow. In South V ietnam  in the early 1960s, 
early  U.S. “pacification” policy in ten t w as to “w in the hearts  and m inds” of the 
peasan ts  in the south in Üeu of bashing them  collaterally amid scorched-earth 
p u rsu it of the Vietcong. M ilitary cynics, however, saw m ass coercion as the only 
effective poUcy for rooting out the elusive enem y—th a t “pacification” constitu ted  
m ere sophomoric th ink-tank  sociological hogwash.
'36 S tanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History. (New York, The Viking Press, 
1983) pg. 435.
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Our Drug W ar policymakers see things much the sam e way (recall the proposals 
of Congressm an Gerald Solomon): th rea ten  you w ith potentially ruinous 
extraconstitutional adm inistrative sum m ary punishm ent by having your (assertedly 
Fourth Amendment-immune) private employer place your job a t risk and perhaps 
you will comply, maybe even get on board with your H eart and Mind to assuage 
your cognitive dissonance regarding your forced participation in “J a r  W ars.” 
Tactically, it’s hard to beat; more or less analogous to the way in which "soft money” 
is used to circumvent campaign finance law: No overt "prosecution” of positive test 
results, no pohcy-impeding Fourth Am endm ent Linkage.
But, as we have already docum ented extensively, it is easily dem onstrated  th a t 
our government is deeply involved in the promotion of suspicionless drug testing 
w ith clear extrajudicial in ten t despite the fact th a t such harks back to the 
historically repudiated General W rits of Assistance th a t inspired revolution and the 
ver}' same Fourth  Amendment th a t should indeed be brought to bear in addition to 
any potential tort relevance. Moreover, as made clear through the stare  decisis 
chain flowing back from the recent Chandler l-. Miller drug testing  decision, the fact 
th a t law enforcement authorities have yet to make overt evidentiary use of positive 
drug test findings does not imply th a t they cannot. They clearly can, for 
prosecutorial use of privately discovered evidence has mostly been ruled 
constitutional. Chief Justice R ehnquist’s continuing “adm inistrative exception” 
apolog}' for suspicionless drug testing  is the classic straw  m an argum ent. 
A dm inistrative of what?, we m ust ask. Sum m ary judgm ent and im m ediate 
adm inistrative punishm ent w ithout due process, th a t’s w hat. Read again the
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Chandler precedents analysis in the la tte r section of C hapter 4. Such may indeed 
have become perm issible, but only in contravention of the original in ten t of the 
Fourth Amendment.
Objection 2: M anagers have ongoing and pressing production work to tend to; they 
cannot be expected to also don the role o f drug detectives endlessly rum inating over 
the legalistic nuances o f “probable cause."Moreover, restricted to “cause” testing, 
managers m ight hesitate to ever invoke it for fear o f being sued by those claim ing  
harassm ent— however frivolously— in the wake o f subsequent negative assays.
M anagers typically m ust and do invoke a host of disciphnary m easures “for 
cause” on a routine basis. It goes w ith the territory, as does the possibility of being 
sued for harassm en t by aggrieved workers. The most effective m anagers, however, 
are leaders who earn  the tru s t and cooperation of their subordinates through 
principled behavior: they find it overwhelmingly unnecessary to rule by th rea t of 
force.
I am, however, acutely aw are of the problems inherent in assessing the m eaning 
of “probable cause.” Go to the dictionary: probable is defined as tha t which is likely. 
Go to likely, and it is defined as th a t which is probable. To the statistician , 
“probable” m inim ally connotes more Ukely than  not, or >50% chance of an event 
(which can only be verified empirically). Finally, as a term  of a rt in law. “probable” 
m eans “th a t se t of facts and circum stances which would lead a reasonable and 
prudent person to conclude th a t an event did in fact occur” (paraphrasing  Black’s 
Law Dictionarv). An attorney of my acquaintance once rem arked th a t “we go to law 
school for th ree years to try  to learn  the m eaning of the word reasonable.” Such is
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nothing new: Cuddihy points out th a t “cause” am biguity  pervaded legal procedure 
during the 18th century':
In most circumstances, judges issued w a rran ts  autom atically  on a 
person’s sworn complaint th a t he suspected, ra th e r than  beheved th a t 
a place or person was connected to a crimed^"
“Probable ” had diverse m eanings in 1789: “likely,” “possible,” even 
“credible.” In the context of contem poraneous usage, the Fourth 
A m endm ent assum ed the least restrictive understand ing  of “probable 
cause” then  available, w hat m ight now be term ed  “plausible cause” or 
“possible cause.”'•‘®
WTiatever the potential difficulties w ith operationally  defining “reasonable” or 
“probable ” cause, however, it is clear th a t no em ployer relinquishes the right to act 
“for cause ” given the presence of random  or b lanket selection procedures in the 
disciphnary tool kit. That employers m ust act w ith  a bit of circum spection in th is 
regard is a good thing.
Objection 3: The “democratic" nature o f m andatory testing: Everyone (ideally) from  
the CEO to the jan itor is treated equally.
This one can be labeled Cram ps and Granny the Wal-Mart Greeters Do Their Bit 
for Corporate Democracy and the War On Drugs. Axiomatic to science are coherent 
sam phng plans. Consider an analogy from the environm ental rem ediation field. 
With respect to random drug tests, th is “dem ocratic & fair” counter-argum ent is the 
methodological equivalent of saying “Well, we know th e re ’s serious environm ental 
pollution out there, let’s ju s t sam ple the  soil and w a te r indiscrim inately to find out
Cuddihy, op cit., p. 1351. 
Cuddihy, op cit., p. 1527.
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ju s t how bad it really is so th a t we can p u t a stop to it and  clean things up.” Such 
may indeed be appropriate should one have no idea w hatever of the ex tent and 
distribution of a problem and  p rehm inary  study is w arranted , but where drug abuse 
is concerned, we have boatloads of d a ta  estim ating  the prevalence ra tes among 
various s tra ta .
There is a humorous vignette in G eneral Cohn Powell’s memoir recounting the 
time his num ber came up for a random  drug test and he was handed his notice as 
he was finishing up a press conference. Does anyone beheve for a moment th a t this 
distinguished American leader needs to be screened for drug abuse? From Gram ps 
to G ranny to the General, such rep resen ts nothing  beyond our 50 mL. Loyalty Oath.
Again, it may be convenient pohcy tak en  on faith to possess significant deterren t 
and symbohc value, but it is not sound epidemiological science.
Objection 4; Employers and co-workers have a right to safe and productive 
enterprises. Moreover, employers that fu n d  life and health insurance benefits have a 
justifiable imperative to m inim ize such expenses. I f  you apply for private life a n d /o r  
health insurance, you will be tested for street drugs in the course o f the physical 
exam. Invasion o f your privacy? What about the rights and  obligations o f the 
underwriter?
The extent of the problem in the workplace is in serious dispute, and the 
wholesale efficacy of suspicionless d rug  testing  in effecting significant gains in 
health , safety, and productivity is not dem onstrated. Recall again the findings of 
N ational Academy of Science’s N ational Research Council/Institute of Medicine 
1994 report U nder The Influence? D rugs and the American Workforce:
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• Most alcohol and other drug users do not develop pa tte rn s  of chnically defined 
abuse or dependence
« Among illicit drug users, polydrug use, most often including the use of alcohol 
and tobacco, is the norm ra th e r than  the exception.
• Any program  th a t addresses drug use by the work force should include alcohol 
the drug m ost associated w ith perceived detrim ental job performance, as a 
priority  (em phasis mine).
• Widely cited cost estim ates of the effects of alcohol and other drug use on U.S. 
productivity are based on questionable assum ptions and weak m easures . . . 
Business decision m akers and policy m akers should be cautious in making 
decisions on the basis of the evidence currently  available.
Given th a t tobacco and alcohol arguably account for in excess of 90% of the 
damage, it is rem arkable th a t we do not seriously propose subjecting all workers to 
random alcohol and tobacco tests, is it not? Why not? Because, the apology 
invariably goes, “those are legal substances." But, one cannot but conclude from 
such a response th a t the suspicionless drug test does in fact serve an expedient 
adjunct law enforcem ent goal.
Moving along: yes most private insurance exam s do entail running the urine and 
serum sam ples for s treet drugs. Interestingly, you will be queried verbally during 
your insurance apphcation interview as to your alcohol and tobacco consumption, 
but such will not be verified through bioassay, even though the far greater 
likelihood of aggregate underw riter loss owes to these legal intoxicants ra ther than  
drugs of the illicit k ind .‘®°
M9 Norm and, et al, op cit., pp. 3-13.
‘50 This may soon change, and is likely to also be highly controversial. See
below:
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But, then, insurance companies frequently  act in ways th a t defy actuaria l sense. 
One need only consider current pohcy hand-w ringing over the  specter of genetic 
profile discrim ination. Indeed, the Chnton A dm inistration recently proposed 
outlawing em ploym ent discrim ination on the basis of genetic tests (see below), and 
David Shenk, in  his recent article Biocapitalism: What Price the Genetic 
Revolution points out tha t a variety of genetic m utations thought to be health 
risk m arkers are  certain  to be sum m arily declared to be “pre-existing conditions" 
m andating underw riting  exclusion. Such knee-jerk exclusionary tactics wül 
undoubtedly be challenged in the courts, w here one hopes the crude natu re  of 
current genetic risk  assessm ent will be exposed.
Test Developed to Find Heavy D rinkers
WASHINGTON (Reuters, 2/9/98) -  U niversity of Iowa researchers said Monday 
they had devised a battery  of tests th a t could help show w hether someone was a 
heavy drinker. Such a test series, if proven to work, could be used by both 
employers and insurance companies, they said.
Dr. A rth u r H artz  and colleagues said 10 commonly perform ed laboratory 
tests, such as checks for chloride, sodium, high density  lipoproteins and blood urea 
nitrogen, accurately predicted who was a heavy drinker w hen taken  and analyzed 
together. "This is a step forward, bu t it needs to be validated to prove its rehability." 
H artz said in a statem ent.
The findings were pubhshed in the Jo u rna l of Clinical Enidemiologv. H artz 's 
team did 40 separa te  tests  on 426 self-described heavy drinkers and 188 fight 
drinkers. They said  the ir 10 tests correctly identified 98 percent of the heavy 
drinkers and 95 percent of the fight drinkers.
‘51 David Shenk, Biocapitalism: What Price the Genetic Revolution, H arper’s 
Magazine. December, 1997, pp 37-45. Also: on May 1, 1997 the Associated Press, 
citing a study published in the May 1997 issue of M olecular Psvchiatrv . reported the 
isolation of a “heroin abuse” gene. Will we see a pre-em ploym ent drug abuse “gene 
screen” once the  assays become price-competitive w ith cu rren t methods? Absent 
legal proscription, such is certain.
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Clinton seeks genetics protections
WASHINGTON, Jan . 20 (UPI) The Chnton adm in istra tion  has 
endorsed legislation in  Congress th a t would prohibit companies from 
discrim inating against w orkers in hiring or promotion on the basis of 
the ir genetic m akeup. The endorsem ent was announced today by Vice 
President A1 Gore, who argued: “The fear of genetic discrim ination is 
prom pting Am ericans to avoid genetic tests  th a t could literally save 
the ir fives.”
The proposed legislation would ban companies from requiring or 
requesting a genetic test or genetic inform ation as a condition of 
em ploym ent or benefits, and ban the disclosure of such information 
w ithout the p a tien t’s full consent. It would also prohibit employers 
from using genetic inform ation to discrim inate against workers or 
otherw ise lim it job opportunities, w ith some exceptions in cases 
involving workplace health  and safety.
The adm inistra tion , which last sum m er endorsed legislation to ban 
genetic discrim ination in health  insurance, issued a new study 
predicting a significant increase in the potential for m isuse of genetic 
inform ation. Although some critics have called such fears prem ature, 
the study describes some women as already rejecting genetic 
screening for the risk  of b reast cancer out of concern the resu lts wül 
be m isused by em ployers or insurers.
A survey last year of more th an  1,000 people by the non-profit 
N ational C enter for Genome Resources in S an ta  Fe, N.M., found 65 
percent said they would not take genetic tests  for diseases if health  
insu rers or employers would have access to the resu lts. It said 85 
percent said em ployers should be barred from obtaining information 
about an  individual's genetic conditions, risks and predispositions.
A final thought on th is question: There is no law requiring th a t employers 
provide insurance of any kind to the ir employees. C iting employer health  benefits 
cost concerns to justify  privacy intrusions, consequently, is irrelevant.
Objection 5: The irrelevance o f prevalence: As Justice Kennedy observed by the way o f 
analogy in Treasury, (subsequently echoed by Justice Ginsberg in Vernonia), the fact 
that airport passenger screening alm ost never turns up weapons in no way negates 
the utility  o f the policy. Deterrence is often necessary—critical, even,— and cannot be 
evaluated solely by post-hoc empirical measures. Drug abuse prevalence m ight very
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well be considerably higher absent mandatory testing.
Invalid analogy, period. If you are a “false positive” a t the airport m etal detector, 
you or your carry-on baggage are quickly checked fu rther to verify the error and you 
are sent on your way. Your name and other personal data are not recorded. Should 
you erroneously te st positive for illicit drugs on the other hand, you are likely in for 
a protracted, aggravating, and expensive battle to clear your name— or to just 
obtain employment.
Moreover, Your Honors, the relative risks posed by illegal weapons aboard 
aircraft versus illegal drug metaboUtes in workers’ specimens are utterly  
incomparable; the la tte r  are on average trivial by comparison.
Justice  G insberg m ade an additional in teresting observation th a t m erits 
comment. She opined th a t one could avoid airport screening by opting to eschew air 
travel. The clear im phcation is th a t one can avoid workplace drug screening by 
foregoing employm ent where testing is pohcy. Given th a t approxim ately 80% of 
major U.S. corporations conduct drug screening programs, those who object to 
suspicionless testing  on principle find themselves increasingly boxed in. and one’s 
capacity for ethical fortitude becomes a function of the depth of one’s pockets as 
commercial labs aggressively m arket their services to virgin employm ent territory-— 
abetted by pohticians eager to posture as “tough on drug abuse” (recall 
Congressm an G erald Solomon, self-appointed drug w ar general and champion of the 
indiscrim inate em ploym ent drug test).
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Objection 6: Your fastidious concern for privacy principle m ay be ju s t fine on the 
ground and  at home, but at 30,000 feet and  500 knots, the airline passenger has no 
need o f a stoned flight crew.
This is a  staple argum ent of the suspicionless drug testing  advocate. Well, one 
extreme (and remotely likely) example deserves its reciprocal. Yes, I’m a hving-on- 
the-edge rogue airhne pilot, always willing to risk  years of expensive training, a 
prestigious job, and the hves of others (to say nothing of my own) ju s t to get high 
when I’m due to fly. On the way to the airport, I smoke a jo int and  swig down some 
Quervo Gold. In the parking lot I do a Line of cocaine and pop a barb to take the edge 
off. then head for the office where I provide a urine sam ple for my drug test. No 
problem; the drug metaboUtes have yet to appear in my excreta, and  the assays do 
not even check for alcohol. I’m off to do my pre-ffight and  rev the engines.
Objection 7: With respect to the private sector, your argum ent fa ils to take into 
account the utterly legal norm of “em ploym ent-at-w ill.” Employers have the right to 
monitor you at will on the job, and terminate you for any reason, however arbitrary.
Recently a Texas man was sum m arily term ina ted  for w earing a G reen Bay 
Packers sh irt to work during the 1996 NFL playoffs. His boss and the great majority 
of his co-workers were Dallas Cowboys fans. Such constitu tes an lam entable episode 
of “lose-lose” stupidity, and is, of course, bound for the courts, w here issues of 
excessive w orker m onitoring and wrongful term ination  a re  yet to be definitively 
settled. Legal Scholar Laura B. Pincus, J.D. enum erates the crazy quilt of state 
legislation and contradictory case law ruUngs in a collaborative Am erican Business 
Law Jo u rna l article However custom ary the practice of em ploym ent-at-will may be, 
it is incontrovertible th a t such does not provide employers total discretion in
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m atters of a rb itra ry  surveillance and term ination. Pincus and  T rotter call for 
legislation th a t would a t the very least upgrade private sector privacy protection to 
the equivalent of th a t enjoyed by pubhc sector employees. These au thors fram e their 
case w ith four core assertions:
1. P rivate  sector protection is clearly w arran ted  in hght of the frequency and 
extent of in trusions perpetra ted  by employers and  o ther commercial 
snoopers.
2. The power of the modern business corporation over the individual citizen is 
every bit the equal of th a t of government.
3. In te rna tiona l privacy regulations will require th a t the  U.S. upgrade its 
privacy law s as in te rna tiona l free trade becomes the commercial norm. We 
lag far behind o ther industrialized nations in th is  regard.
4. Federal legal recognition of private sector privacy rights will actually benefit 
m ulti-sta te  firm s by rehe\nng them of the necessity to deal w ith the current 
patchw ork of s ta te  and local privacy laws.‘5-
While I agree w ith all of the foregoing, 1 would ju s t add th a t they speak only to 
u tilitarian  and  em pirical issues; they fail to address the more fundam ental 
historical basis for our very Bill of Rights as it perta ins to privacy, as discussed in 
C hapter Five.
As alluded to above, issues of excessive private sector w orker m onitoring 
(including drug testing) have yet to be definitively settled  a t the federal judicial 
level. For example, could private employers actually  forward positive drug test 
findings to the  au thorities? The relevant Suprem e Court precedents—such as those
‘52 L aura  B. Pincus & Clayton Trotter, The D isparity Between Public and  
Private Sector Employee Privacy Protections: A  Call for Legitim ate Privacy Rights  
for Private Sector Workers, Am erican Business Law Journal. Vol. 33, 1995, pp. 51- 
89.
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we have exam ined in C hapter Five—while contradictory to an ex tent and  lacking in 
compellingly analogous case a ttribu tes, seem to indicate th a t, yes, em ployers could. 
Well, could private employers strip-search employees in search of drugs or o ther 
“contraband”? W hat are the C onstitu tional lim its—if indeed there  are any—on 
proactive private investigation of crim inal (or any) conduct? W hat the m ajority 
deem “reasonable”? (By whose assessm ent? Surveys have from tim e to tim e 
indicated a m ajority sentim ent for ripping up the obstructionist Bül of Rights in 
furtherance of law enforcem ent efficiency.)
Could the Disney Corporation require th a t both employees and paying 
custom ers w ear the new drug-detecting sk in  patches (now coming into vogue for use 
on parole, probation, and chnically-rem anded “substance abuser” populations) while 
on the prem ises? After all, Disney has a valuable m arket “in te re st” in providing its 
custom ers with a “wholesome, family-oriented, drug-free” environm ent. Sim ilarly, 
could private apartm en t complexes or gated m aster-planned communities, eager to 
assure  the ir m arket prospects of “safe and drug-free” habitats, require th a t ren ters 
or buyers subm it to drug testing? Would such controversies not involve federal 
constitutional questions sim ilar to o ther civil rights violations?
They certainly would. And perhaps the Court will have the good sense to 
adjudicate such issues in the spirit of O riginal In ten t as so thoroughly exam ined by 
Cuddihy. Recall from Boyd: Obsta Principiis.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Conclusions
First, shall we “regress" for a moment? If we th ink  of a hiring decision 
assessm ent as com parable to w hat sta tistic ians call a logistic m ultiple regression 
analysis, the questionable predictive u tility  of a negative drug screen resu lt becomes 
readily apparent. Let us first review briefly the  essence of sta tistica l regression 
techniques.
Regression analysis simply refers to m athem atical techniques used to predict an 
outcome or “dependent” variable from one or more independent variables. Recall 
from Algebra 101 the sim plest general form of a m athem atical “function” where y = 
ax + b. We call such a “determ inistic” function in th a t y is “exactly” determ ined from 
values associated w ith x (“a” being the coefficient of “x” and “b” the y-intercept). The 
“probabüistic” function is sim ilarly expressed in its sim plest form as y = ax + b ± e, 
w here “e” is some “erro r factor.” (A confusing term  of art. “erro r” in this context 
implies inherent phenom enal variability, not “m istake” or “blunder.”)
M ultiple regression m erely adds into the equation additional independent (“x”) 
variables th a t one hopes will minimize the erro r term  (“e”) and improve our 
predictive ability. For example: If I know your height, can I guess your weight?
200
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Well. yes. but if I also know your age. sex. w aist size, shoe size, hat size, body fat 
ratio, and so forth. I am much b e tte r able to calculate your weight more accurately. 
Each additional “x” variable adds predictive power in excess of the sam pling 
variabüity  it also contributes to the analysis.
Logistic regression is merely one w here “y.” the outcome variable, is expressed 
as a percentage. Widely used, for example, in health care for projected m ortahty  
estim ation where sta tistica l models are derived to predict expected death  ra tes 
given a particu lar mix of independent factors, in such equations the “y” variable is 
the proportion of patien ts expected to die. say, during a hospital stay, or w ith in  a 
specified length of time.
A hiring decision-m aker is subjectively perform ing the functional equivalent of a 
m ultiple logistic regression analysis. The dependent variable “y” can be expressed as 
■p(s)”, the probability of a successful hire, where “success” m eans th a t the candidate 
wül tu rn  out to be an effective employee—a worthy, value-adding hire. So then, as a 
general logistic expression we can s ta te  that:
p(s) = aixi + a-2X2 + ajX3 + a4X̂  + a.̂ x.̂  -t- a^xe + avx? + asxs + asxg -t- . . . + anXn ± e
where perhaps
aixi = high school record
a2X2 = undergraduate record
asXj = graduate school record
a4X4 = additional tra in ing  and/or certifications
a.5X.5 = prior employment
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aexe = prior employment 
a:x: = prior employment 
asxa = references
agX9 = interview  evaluation [Note: “a” is the  “regression coefficient” for each 
independent variable.]
and so forth (however o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d . on out to “anXn,” which we wül posit as our 
drug screen result, where 0 = “negative” and  1 = “positive” (sta tisticians call th is 
type of dichotomous indicator a “dum m y” variable). O ur employment decision-
‘52 Building such a regression model (not to mention even acquiring sufficient 
representative, stratified, and blinded d a ta  in the first place) would be fraugh t with 
research  and m easurem ent difficulties w orthy of an  additional thesis. W ith respect 
to educational records, would we use the  raw  G PA. or one weighted for difficulty of 
m ajor and/or “quality” of institution(s). W hat of prior employment? On advice of 
counsel, most previous employers are  tight-lipped regarding the quality  of former 
em ployees’ tenures (an obstacle th a t has spaw ned a gray-m arket industry  of 
su rrep titious background-check da ta  harvesters). Can we infer previous 
perform ance success from a confluence of indirect m easures such as length  of 
employment, salary level, and/or repu ta tion  of prior employers, etc,? W hat type of 
consistent metric m ight we derive to assess personal and professional references? Is 
p(s) m erely a hnear function of the independent variables? C urvihnear? Loghnear? 
N on-linear? Difficult questions, all.
Moreover, the most difficult aspect of all would be neither the operational 
definitions of independent variables nor a viable aggregate m athem atical model 
struc tu re , but the very acquisition of em pirical employment da ta  w herein subjects 
across s tra ta  had been evaluated as successful despite a positive drug te s t resu lt in 
th e ir employm ent histories; If you test positive, you are not even hired, or. if already 
on the job, you are usually fired or coercively rem anded to “trea tm en t” and 
sum m arüy branded as a “problem ” employee. Such renders objective research in 
th is a rea  problematic. O ur theories concerning “drug addiction” in general suffer 
from th is built-in bias; one cannot random ly select normal hum an subjects to sort 
into experim ental and control groups, w ith  experim ental cohorts dosed w ith illicit 
drugs for sustained periods to observe addiction effects. Consequently, our 
observations concerning addiction derive from clinical problem sub-populations, 
leaving us w ith an inheren t generahzability  lim itation.
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m aker is interested in an  outcome as close to 1.0 as possible, and  seeks permissible 
pre-employment data  th a t maximize p(s), the probability of m aking a good hire.
A variety of unknow ns confound the quest for p(s) = 1.0, i,e., the perfect hiring 
decision. A stellar set of academic GPAs, excellent work history, laudatory 
references and so on, do not guarantee fu ture job success; some factors are ju st 
inherently  unknowable in advance. A ctuarial probabüities also shghtly  reduce p(s); 
the employee might be ru n  down by a truck three months hence, or be diagnosed 
w ith a previously undetected  fatal or otherwise debüitating m alady (genetic testing 
may change this, however; see below). Moreover, some data elem ents’ inclusion are 
proscribed by law, a t least in theory. U nder Title VII, race, national origin, rehgion, 
gender, age, political affiliation and other non job-related da ta  are also among those 
disallowed. The Target discount store chain, for example, was successfully sued 
several years ago over its use of the MMPI (M innesota M ultiphasic Personality 
Inventory) in assessing em ploym ent candidates’ “character.” The MMPI is a clinical 
diagnostic instrum ent appropriate  only for the evaluation of psychopathology in 
clinical settings.
But what about the drug screen ( x n ) ?  Surely, sobriety is a relevant employment 
factor, is it not? One obviously cannot disagree with that, but here is w here things 
get interesting. Let us pu t aside for the moment the issue of w hether a positive drug 
test always provides dispositive evidence of employment undesirabifity. Of
‘5̂  See Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., No. A052157, 10-25-91. See also 
G etting Personal, ABA J o u rn a l  Vol. 78. J a n .1992, pp.66-67.
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necessity, we stipulate  th a t m otorists testing  “positive” for DWI (usually defined as 
>0.10% blood alcohol concentration) are. in the aggregate, tem porarily mechanically 
incom petent and unacceptably dangerous to others. Is a positive employment drug 
te s t always equivalently dispositive evidence of employment incompetence or 
otherw ise prohibitive hiring fiability? WTiile I ra ther doubt it, I am more interested 
in the value of the “negative” drug test and its role as a decisive employment 
criterion.
The central question: Is a negative employment drug screen result invariably 
sufficiently im portan t and accurate to confer upon it the prim ary determ inant 
s ta tu s  Title VII and good judgm ent demand?
No, it is not. Why? A conventional regression analysis method statisticians 
routinely use is th a t of the “backw ard stepw ise” iterative procedure, in which data 
for all independent variables are included in a tentative model expression and then 
assessed and elim inated if necessary one-by-one until all rem aining predictors are 
above a pre-determ ined predictive “significance level.” Variables falling below the 
significance threshold given the presence of the other “significant” predictors are 
discarded on each successive evaluation until an equation containing only 
sufficiently significant predictors rem ain. O ur goal, remember, is to arrive a t a 
m echanism  w ith optim al predictive power, one th a t maximizes p(s), one th a t yields 
the sm allest error term .
It is my contention th a t our drug screen dummy variable Xn would be discarded 
by the stepw ise regression procedure for nearly all employment s tra ta  were we able
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to acquire the requisite da ta  and  run  the num bers. A binary (0/1) Xn pales in 
predictive power aside more finely calibrated  (and relevant) directly job-related 
predictors. Consider th a t Xn is itse lf highly correlated w ith the other, more powerful 
elem ents: the probabihty of testing  positive is inversely proportional to the tra in ing  
and skill levels reflected in the rem ainder of employees’ resumes. Drug use is not 
randomly distributed throughout the  workforce.
In this sense, a negative Xn is overwhelm ingly redundant: it adds no new 
information where the applicant brings verifiable, job-related inform ation to the 
evaluation. Yet we continue to assign it “controlling force” in employment, in direct 
contravention of Title \T I requ irem ents and common sense. One more simpfistic 
trium ph of symbol over substance.
One m ight legitim ately object, however, about the qualifier “verifiable, job- 
related inform ation.” W hat about the  transien t, low-skilled sector w herein w orkers 
often encounter strenuous, dirty, and  dangerous assignm ents and bring little in the 
way of verifiable work history docum entation to the hiring process? Such is indeed a 
vahd objection, particularly  since such em ploym ent sectors also tend to be those 
with higher drug use prevalence. But, if we th ink  in term s of a labor continuum  
from the highly educated and credentialed  employee to the unskilled, 
undocum ented day-laborer, we cannot but guess a t where to draw the fine from a 
purely u tilitarian  cost/benefit perspective, given the highly suspect quality of the 
available data. We can, on the o ther hand, be certain  th a t those “below the fine” will 
feel unfairly singled out.
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Moreover, as s ta ted  previously, the high prevalence s tra ta  w ere long-ago 
consigned to testing. Testing vendors, desperate for revenue and m ark e t share  in a 
tight-fisted  low-bid environm ent, increasingly purvey “a solution in search of a 
problem ” in pitching the ir services to ever-lower prevalence em ploym ent sectors. It 
is perhaps telling th a t, when apologists for surveillance vendors are  challenged on 
em pirical necessity grounds, the ad hom inem  u hat-have-you-to-hide adverse 
inference weapon is reflexively brandished.
Reciprocity failure
If an employer is justified in coercing a worker to abstain  from potentially  
harm ful indulgences such as illicit d rug use on health, safety, and productivity 
grounds, would not then  the reciprocal of such be justified? Could an  em ployer’s 
in te rest in optim al w orker u tility  justify  requiring th a t employees partake  of 
activities or substances w ith output-enhancing potential?
Nicholas J . C aste poses ju s t such questions in Drug Testing and  Productivity.
One of the justifications for the m andatory drug testing  of 
employees is the  negative effect which drug use is said to have on 
employee productivity . . . Since productivity is negatively affected by 
the use of drugs the employer is seen to have the right to discourage 
th e ir use by the  imposition of sanctions including outright d ism is sa l.
. , I will argue th a t the acceptance of the “productivity argum en t” 
commits one logically to consequences which would be morally 
repugnant to m any of its supporters . . .
The productivity argum ent essentially  s ta tes th a t since the 
employer has purchased the employee’s time, the  employer has a 
p roprietary  righ t to ensure  th a t the time purchased is used as 
efficiently and  productively as possible. Since it is the employee’s tim e  
th a t  is purchased ra th e r th an  a finished product (as would be the  case 
w ith  independent contractors) the employer m ust be concerned w ith
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
207
“contract enforcement” and  m ust a ttem pt somehow to m otivate the 
employee to a tta in  maxim al production capacity. In the case of drug 
testing, the abuse of drugs by employees is seen as dim inishing the ir 
productive capacity and is thus subject to the control of the employer
The productivity argum ent thus seems to allow the e.nployer the 
“right” to m anipulate employees and to interfere w ith those aspects of 
the ir hves which affect production. But the argum ent if taken  to its 
logical conclusion yields too much. ‘55
Caste proposes a “simple thought experim ent" involving the use of two 
hypothetical drugs, “Hedonine” and “Pononine.” Both of which are proven to be 
w ithout health  risks and both of which can be shown to enhance productivity. 
Hedonine is a euphorant, while Pononine— though equal in productivity enhancing 
effect—produces painful but otherwise harm less tran sien t side-effects. Pononine is 
in fact the polar opposite of the common illicit drugs against which em ployers 
screen—drugs which provide tran sien t p leasure while allegedly compromising 
employee health  and productivity.
Caste points out th a t the productivity rationale legitim ating coercive action 
against illicit drug consumption, when taken  to its inevitable end, forces us to 
logically conclude th a t partak ing  of drugs such as Hedonine or Pononine could 
indeed be required as a condition of employment.
Step outside the “thought experim ent” and consider some propositions much less 
theoretical and much more likely to come into actual dispute. M any employers 
currently  offer inducem ents such as health  club m em berships to encourage
‘55 Nicholas J. Caste, Drug Testing and  Productivity Journal of B usiness 
E thics. Vol. 11, 1992, pp. 301-303.
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employees to improve and m aintain the ir health, but one doubts th a t routine health  
club participation  could be made a condition of em ploym ent absent optim al physical 
condition as a direct job requirem ent. Another hypothetical, one a bit closer to 
C aste’s thought experim ent: If optimal “m ental” capabihties are the requisite job 
a ttribu tes , could employers require—via Hedonine/Pononine logic—th a t employees 
take daily dietary  supplem ents such as St. Johns Wort (som etim es called "natu ral 
Prozac”) and  Ginko Biloba? Both are thought to improve m ental functioning w ithout 
any dam aging side-effects. Ju s t w hat are the acceptable eth ical lim its of employer 
control over the personal life of the employee in pursu it of m axim al productivity?
Finally, a point th a t Caste failed to address entirely: W hat if  the em ployer’s s ta r  
perform er—the most reliable, productive, and apparently  the health iest and 
happiest employee in the office—tests positive for illicit d rug  use? Term inate him? 
Rem and h e r to “trea tm en t”? T reatm ent of w hat—besides her apparen t “bad” 
a ttitu d e  tow ard legal authority. It is a recurrent source of consternation among 
em ployers and co-workers when the “good” employee tu rn s  up positive. As Elinore 
Schroeder pointed out in the Kansas Law Review:
Presum ably, cu rren t employees who test positive on a random or 
b lanket drug screen have been perform ing a t a satisfactory  level; 
otherw ise the employer would already have disciplined them  . . . more 
th an  one m anagem ent lawyer has received a call from a cUent asking, 
“ O ur best w orker has just tested  positive. Do we have to fire him?”‘5®
“We never even suspected he had a drug problem. ”
'56 Ehnore P. Schroeder, On Beyond Drug Testing: Employee Testing an d  the 
Quest fo r  the Perfect Worker, Kansas Law Review. Vol. 36, 1988, p. 874.
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Maybe he didn’t.
Two m anagem ent worldviews
No one can argue against the  goals of safe and  productive en terprise. D isputes 
are about causes of danger and loss, and choices w ith  respect to effective rem edies. 
Those who a ttribu te  causal factors of suboptim al workplaces to the  dissolute 
character of the employees will na tu ra lly  be among those who favor top-down, 
autocratic m anagem ent, and its tactical corollary, surveillance (“Taylorism ,” i.e.. 
“Theory-X,” which posits a negative view of w orker m otivation and m orals '5').
'5' Frederick Winslow Taylor’s 1911 book The Principles of Scientific 
M angem ent (New York, W.W. N orton & Co., Inc, 1967) was for decades considered 
“The Bible” of commercial m anagem ent theory. Among his fundam ental postulates: 
“surveil and coerce,” for he viewed the w orking classes cynically, insisting  th a t  most 
employees m alinger whenever possible. An excerpt from his book illu s tra tes  his 
view:
“..The Enghsh and A m erican peoples are the  g rea tes t sportsm en in the 
world. W henever an American w orkm an plays baseball, or an English w orkm an 
plays cricket, it is safe to say th a t he s tra in s  every nerve to secure victory for his 
side. He does his very-
best to m ake the largest possible num ber of runs. The universal sen tim en t is so 
strong th a t any m an who fails to give out a ll there is in  him in sport is branded as a 
q u itte r.’ and trea ted  w ith contem pt by those who are  around him.
“W hen the sam e w orkm an re tu rn s  to work on the  following day, in stead  of 
using every effort to tu rn  out the  largest possible am ount of work, in a m ajority of 
the cases th is m an deliberately p lans to do as fittle as he safely can—to tu rn  ou t far 
less work than  he is weU able to do— in m any instances to do not more th an  one- 
th ird  to one-half of a proper day’s work. And in fact if  he were to do his best to tu rn  
out his largest possible day’s work, he would be abused by his feUow-workers for so 
doing, even more th an  if he had proved him self a ‘q u itte r’ in sport. U nderw orking, 
th a t is, deliberately working slowly so as to avoid doing
a fuU day’s work, ‘soldiering,’ as it is called in th is country, ‘hanging it out,’ as it is 
called in England, ‘ca canae,’ as it is called in Scotland, is alm ost universal in 
in d ustria l establishm ents, and prevails also to a large extent in the  building trades; 
and  the w riter
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Those, on the other hand, for whom organizational system s them selves are the 
prim ary source of trouble, see the issue more in term s of cooperative 
em pow erm ent—a philosophy associated w ith the views of psychologist Abraham  
Maslow (“Theory-Y," in which individuals are seen to be overwhelmingly 
predisposed to w ant to succeed, i.e. the innate hum an drive tow ard "self- 
actuahzation"). This la tte r  model forms the core of the theory and  practice of “TQM” 
(Total Q uahty M anagem ent) and its tactical corollary “CQI” (Continuous Quality
Im provem ent).'58
Dilbert Zone^^ lampooning notw ithstanding, evidence of plant-floor and service 
organization effectiveness of the TQM/CQI model is compelling. John Güliom once 
again;
Evidence presen ted  by Noble (1986) suggests th a t empowered 
employees who have the au thority  to tru ly  partic ipate  in all key 
aspects of workplace m anagem ent m ay be the best long-term  solution 
to the safety problem. If th a t is the case, then  top-down disciphnary 
pohcies th a t bypass and displace worker control m ay actually  work 
against safety . . .
Noble’s com parative analysis suggests th a t safety program s th a t 
empower w orkers ra th e r than  exclude them  . . . more strongly serve 
safety in te rests  because monitoring is in the hands of the workers
asserts  w ithout fear of contradiction th a t th is constitutes to be greatest evil w ith 
which the working people of both England and America are  now affhcted . . . ” ( 
In ternet source: [http ://w w w .tiac.net/users/eldred/fw t/tl.h tm l], March, 1998. )
'58 Dr W. Edw ards Deming is regarded by m any as the “father of TQM.” His 
basic view of m anagem ent is often sum m arized as “fix the process, not the blam e.” 
Dr. Deming’s sem inal book on m anagem ent theory is O ut of the  Crisis (Cambridge, 
MA, M assachusetts In s titu te  of Technology* C enter for Advanced Engineering 
Study. 1982). Much of Dr. Deming’s work is available on the in te rn e t at 
[http://ww w .caes-m it.edu/products/dem ing/]
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ra th e r than  a vulnerable and poHticized government bureau.
A consulting firm known as The Rehability Group conducted a longitudinal 
study beginning in the mid-1980 s focusing on safety and operating rehabih ty  issues 
among major U.S. m anufacturers. Their report. How To Insure Success in Safety 
and Operating Reliability (1997). makes for instructive reading;
Since the mid-1980 s. The Reliabihty Group has conducted chent 
studies w ithin Fortune 100 organizations designed to identify the true 
causes of industria l accidents, injuries, and unreliable events. Safety 
perform ance and operating rehability result from the complex 
interaction of factors such as supervisory style, job design, 
communications, and group norms & expectations (the organizational 
culture). Employees can dehver incredible results if given the 
opportunity: one chent reduced both accident frequency and  severity 
by over 80% w ithin  a three year period.
The H um an System s Rehabihty Survey is a comprehensive 
exam ination of factors th a t have exhibited a strong relationship  to the 
occurrence of accidents in the workplace. The survey m easures 
organizational variables (such as m anagem ent’s com m itm ent to 
safety, degree of vertical communication, and organizational culture), 
work group characteristics (such as cooperation/teamwork, cross-job 
knowledge, and the degree of safety emphasis), physical and  am bient 
characteristics of the workplace (such as physical conditions, degree of 
stress, and the quahty  & appropriateness of equipm ent), job-level 
variables (such as job autonomy, task/skill variety, and job 
satisfaction), and safety-related factors (incidence of “near m isses ” or 
“close caUs”, accident investigation procedures, and employee 
recognition). Altogether, 120 variables are m easured. Em ployees are 
asked to anonymously complete a w ritten  questionnaire. Respondents 
who experienced accidents (within the last three years) were 
compared to those who had not along all the variables m easured. 
D iscrim inant analysis, a statistical procedure th a t forms hn ear 
combinations of independent variables, was used to identify the
Survey m easures th a t most accurately classified respondents into 
the two groups (i.e., those who has experienced accidents versus those 
who had not). The variables tha t were identified as the best 
“predictors” were then  exam ined further through analysis of various
'59 Gilhom op cit., p. 46.
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procedures. That is. the m ean scores along these variables for those 
who had experienced accidents w ere com pared to the m ean scores for 
those who had not, and the significance of the differences tested  
through the use of the F statistic .
Among the conclusions of The R ehability Group investigations:
O rganizations th a t allow w orkers more control over the ir job 
environm ent are significantly more have a safer workplace th an  those 
who re ta in  control a t the top. In a one-year study of 30 m anufacturing 
organizations conducted w ith a  m ajor in ternational insurance 
company, researchers found th a t lower loss organizations typicaUy 
allow employees g rea ter control over the ir speed of work, the tim ing 
of breaks, and how they do th e ir jobs. In addition, researchers found 
th a t work groups w ithin safer organizations were given sufficient 
autonom y and au thority  to m ake necessary decisions.
A predictive model developed by R ehabihty  Group consultants 
correctly classified 95% of the organizations into “high” and “ low” loss 
categories based on m easurem ents of both hum an and workplace 
factors. The data suggests th a t the accuracy of loss predictions can be 
greatly  enhanced through the consideration of hum an factors. 
According to Rehability Group President H ank Sarkis, organizations 
can improve loss ratios by em phasizing the  development of hum an  
factors strongly re la ted  to safety. “This study reinforced prior findings 
th a t hum anistic, people-centered organizations th a t place a high 
priority on constructive in terpersonal relationships often have 
superior safety records,” he rem arked.
Noteworthy in th is report is the absence of any m ention of drug testing.
Internationally-renow ned m anagem ent consultan t Tom Peters (au tho r of the 
book and PBS series In Search of Excellence) echoes the foregoing sen tim en ts  in 
ra ther, weU, colorfuhy unequivocal language:
>60 The full 1997 Rehabihty Group report is available on the in te rn e t at 
[http://www.quahty.org/TQM -M Sl/hdsqual.pdf]. Also, an enorm ous b read th  of 
progressive quahty  m anagem ent resources are available a t the w ebsites of 
Q uahty.org [http://ww w .quality.org] and  ASQ, the  American Society for Q uahty 
[http ://www .asq.org].
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Q: W hat’s your reaction to the w idespread use of drug  testing  as a 
condition of em ploym ent and random  testing  as a condition of 
continued employm ent?
A: U tter, unad u lte ra ted  rubbish! . . . P u t aside productivity problems 
and safety issues. Let’s talk  about w hat m akes any business tick: 
Super folks who tru s t one another, care about one another, and are 
com m itted to working hard  together to create g rea t outcomes for each 
other—and  th e ir custom ers.
T rust. Respect. Commitment. M utual support. Each is wholly a t odds 
w ith in trusive, im personal assessm ent m easures. T hat is. drug tests. 
(And. to my mind, canned psychological assessm ent tests; and secret 
snooping on telem arketers et al; and, heaven knows, he detector 
tests.) . . .
No, I’m not p issing in no bottle. And nobody who works for me is going 
to be forced to do so either. And if there  were a law th a t required me 
to ask them  to do it. I’d close my place down before I’d comply.
If you w an t an  environm ent of tru st, care, compassion—which is the 
only kind of environm ent th a t will lead to tru st, care, and  compassion 
for custom ers—then stay  the heU out of people’s personal hves.‘6*
A closing observation regarding the safety and productivity issue: A recent 
darhng of the pro-business, anti-regulatory pohtical constituency is Phihp K. 
Howard, au thor of the best-seUing book The D eath of Common Sense: How Law is 
Suffocating A m erica. '̂ 2 While some view Mr. Howard a b it cynicaUy as an articulate  
right-w ing equal-opportunity  bureaucrat basher (albeit one w ith a special zest for 
OSHA-baiting). a core elem ent of his argum ent is quite in accord w ith the findings 
of organizational “em pow erm ent” advocates such as those sam pled above. For Phihp 
Howard, in d u stria l safety  is em phatically not enhanced by the m indless zeal of
>61 Tom Peters, The P ursu it of Wow! every person’s guide to to psv -tu rw  
times. (Vintage Books, NY. 1994), pp. 88-90.
>62 Philip K. Howard, The D eath of Common Sense: How Law is Suffocating 
America. (New York, Random House, 1994).
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otherw ise detached governm ent inspectors who issue costly citations over safety 
railings out of spec by a fraction of an inch. Tangible results come from those 
“closest to the bone,” working in harm onious ra ther than adversaria l environm ents 
w herein is cultivated an ethos of m utual respect and concern—and  shared  
en terprise vision.
And such requires more leaders and fewer spies.
One last point here: As John Gilliom so astutely observed, it is no sm all 
hjTDOcrisy th a t the business community so eager to buy into the suspicionless drug 
testing  proposition is the ver>' sam e executive cohort tha t never passes up an 
opportunity to otherwise angrily inveigh against and lobby against industria l health  
and safety legislation and regulations.
A second “thought experim ent”
Let us consider another scenario. It is also fashionable of late in progressive 
m anagem ent theory circles to insist th a t employers cease viewing labor as 
“overhead” and instead regard workers as “capital assets.” The concept has 
considerable appeal and ostensible m erit, but begs w hat should be an  obvious 
question. Employers clearly w ant to verify the wisdom of the ir labor “investm ents” 
by a variety of methods, drug testing  being but one. A basic appeal of employment 
drug screening is its  relative economy as an inferential index of employee “health”
Gilliom, op cit., p. 43.
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and “character.” But. w hat if cost is of no account? W here then do we (can we?) draw 
the hne on the proper extent of employee scrutiny?
Imagine tha t you are William Cates. C hairm an of the info-tech leading 
Macrosoft. and you are in ten t on hiring (“investing in”) a  key executive operative 
who is to be groomed to assum e the corporate reins upon your retirem ent. The 
choice is critical because— popular notions regarding your vast w ealth 
notw ithstanding—the overwhelming bulk of your net w orth is not liquid and is 
tightly coupled to the value of M acrosoft stock. The long-term w orth of your esta te  
will be determ ined in large m easure by the long-term effectiveness of your 
successor.
A fter much winnowing you now have a short list of three distinguished 
candidates with essentially identical inventories of education, experience, skills, and 
accomphshments. A deciding criterion wül be the relative “health” of the finahsts— 
and prudence dictates th a t you construe the term  “hea lth ” quite broadly. You 
require, therefore, tha t your finalists subm it to comprehensive evaluations th a t 
include not only drug screens and complete “conventional” physicals, but also 
chnical exams extending to EEGs. CAT-scans. MRIs, bone scans, colonoscopies, and 
genetic tests. Moreover, your aversion to any potential boardroom “character” 
unpleasantness dictates th a t your candidates also subm it to thorough background 
investigations and psychopathology assessm ents such as the MMPI (M innesota 
M ultiphasic Personahty Inventory) and handw riting analysis. The sum  of the 
invoices for these services will come to a m ere $30,000 or so, pocket change for
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Macrosoft, and well w orth the expense in light of the stakes for the  company you 
founded and the equity th a t wül underw rite  your anticipated lengthy and 
comfortable retirem ent.
Finally, the w inner of this “heir ap p aren t” competition will be required to sign 
an employm ent agreem ent containing hfestyle restrictions sim üar to those agreed to 
by NASA astronauts: no “risky” off-the-job activities countenanced whatsoever. 
Given the lavish com pensation accorded the eventual hire and  the fundam entally 
"job-relatedness” of aU of the foregoing (in your estimation), your private-sector 
m arket in te rest is compelling. Those who dem ur can take the ir vexed privacy 
sensibilities elsewhere. These p latinum  handcuffs are. in your best business 
judgm ent (and who can question that, in hght of your long-dom inant industry  
position), essential.
You are u tterly  unencum bered w ith respect to such tactics by the logical end of 
Justice  G insberg’s “Fourth  A m endm ent does not apply to the private sector” 
declaration in Chandler and the consequent “we-have-our-own-laws-at-Disneyland” 
commercial worldview, are you not? If not, then  how and by whom are the lim its to 
employer investigatory discretion and lifestyle control to be established?
Ultim ately, by the C onstitution and the Supreme Court of the U nited S ta tes 
acting on behalf of a free people, th a t’s how and by whom.
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Common Knowledge
J u s t  as it is “common knowledge” among drug w arriors and  th e ir supporters 
th a t—again—“10% of all Am erican babies are born addicted to drugs.” th a t there  
are “500.000 drug-related em ergency room visits a year.” th a t “1 in 6 U.S. w orkers 
has a drug problem ”—and so on. it is also “common knowledge” th a t the laboratory 
ra t in the experim ental cage will press the bar th a t delivers the dose of cocaine until 
he or she dies or lapses into unconsciousness. We’ve all heard  this, correct?
Well, perhaps yet another psycho-social urban m yth is afoot. In the scholarly 
journal Common Knowledge comes a monograph entitled  Drugs: In the Care o f the 
Self. This lengthy and thoughtful essay dism antles one widely held drug abuse 
m yth after another. With respect to our friend the lab rat;
Not only are drug use and  drug addiction contingent occurrences, 
dependent on the user’s hfe history, but these occurrences, 
appearances aside, are not drug centered. Despite reports in the 
1960’s and 1970’s of laboratory anim als overdosing on 
psychostim ulants under conditions of general im poverishm ent but of 
unlim ited access to drugs, more recent studies of ra ts, prim ates, and 
hum ans have effectively shown th a t high levels of drug seeking and 
drug taking can be reduced, or even eliminated, w hen a lternative  
activities are introduced. Laboratory studies have moreover 
dem onstrated th a t drug tak ing  can even be prevented by enriching an  
environm ent with non-drug activities prior to m aking a drug 
available. A behavioral pharm acologist who studies these effects w ith 
reference to cocaine sum m arized them  in observing th a t “although 
curren t rhetoric would often have one beheve otherw ise . . . the self­
adm inistra tion  of cocaine is governed by the sam e laws th a t govern 
behaviour m aintained by o ther positive reinforcers.” In other words, 
“the reinforcing effect of cocaine is the result of an  interaction
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between a drug, and organism , and an environm ent
It will be unfortunate  if d rug w arriors of the William J . B ennett camp choose to 
chng to their Just-Say-No.-Or-EIse “bootstrap m orality” drug policy model and 
continue to dism iss such as the above as mere “hberal environm ental root causes' 
baloney.” DeGrandpre and W hite’s observations on the pharmacological, in tra- and 
interpersonal m atrices th a t characterize drug-related behavior from abstinence 
through addiction are backed up by a breadth of current clinical lite ra tu re  th a t 
em phasizes the relevance of personal and social values as key factors in intoxication 
issues. A h te ra tu re  search quickly re tu rns recent titles such as
Critical Analysis o f Drug War Alternatives: The Need for a Shift in Personal and  
Social Values, Linda S. Wong, The Journal of Drug Issues. Vol. 20. No. 4. 1990. 
pp. 679-688.
.4 Values Approach to Addiction: Drug Policy that is Moral Rather Than  
Moralistic, S tan ton  Peele, The Journal of Drug Issues. Vol. 20, No. 4, 1990, pp. 
639-646.
Prepubertal Sons o f Substance Abusers: Influences o f Parental and Fam ilial 
Substance Abuse on Behavioral Disposition, IQ, and School Achievement, Moss, 
Vanyukov, M ajum der, Kirischi, and Tarter. Addictive Behaviors. Vol. 20. No. 1. 
1990, pp. 345-358.
The Effects o f Fam ily Structure and Family Relations on Adolescent M arijuana  
Use, The In ternational Jo u rn a l of the Addictions. Vol. 30, No. 10, 1995, pp. 1207- 
41.
A Moral Vision o f Addiction: How People’s Values Determine Whether They 
Become and Rem ain Addicts, S tanton Peele, The Jo u rna l of Drug Issues. Vol. 17. 
No. 2. 1987, pp. 187-215.
R. J. D eG randpre and  Ed White, Drugs: In  the Care o f the Self, Common 
Knowledge. (W inter 1996, Vol. 5, No. 3), pp. 31-32.
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In *4 M oral Vision o f Addiction, for example, Peele succinctly exam ines the 
history" of our chnical ambivalence w ith respect to values discussion in the area of 
addiction;
The scientific study of addiction has strongly opposed value 
considerations in addiction, regarding these as rem nan ts of an 
outdated, religious-moral model. Behavior th e rap ists , experim ental 
psychologists, and sociologists hold th is view in common w ith  disease 
theorists who have cham pioned the idea th a t a moral perspective 
oppresses the addict and impedes progress tow ard a solution for 
alcohohsm and addiction. Many social scien tists and others, however, 
beheve the disease approach actually is ju s t ano ther form of the  moral 
model, and th a t “the acceptance of the ‘disease’ concept . . . [has] 
covertly intensified rigid m orahzing” (F ingarette, 1985;60). I t has 
accom phshed th is by embodying the evil of addiction in the use of the 
substance— in any use of such drugs as cocaine and  in any kind of 
drinking by those w ith alcohol problems—and by urging abstinence as 
if it represented  a m odern scientific and therapeu tic  invention.
N onetheless, the aim of “dem orahzing” addiction re ta in s  a strong 
appeal for hberal observers and for social an d  behavioral scientists. In 
fact, social researchers firequently bemoan the  strong tendencies for 
both general populations and trea tm en t personnel to continue to see 
addiction in moral term s even as most people ostensibly endorse the 
fashionable model view of addiction as a disease (O rcutt et al., 1980; 
Tournier, 1985). In o ther words, as scientists, they wish to stam p out 
en tirely  people’s continuing tendency to regard  addiction as a 
reflection of the addict’s moral quahties and  to hold people 
responsible for addictive behavior. The view of the p resen t paper, on 
the other hand, is th a t appetitive behavior of all types is crucially 
influenced by people’s pre-existing values, and  th a t the best way to 
combat addiction both for the individual and the society is to inculcate 
values th a t are incom patible w ith addiction and  w ith  drug—and 
alcohol—induced misbehavior.
Peele s paper reviews and analyzes cu ltu ral differences revealing the range of 
intem perance w ith respect to alcohol and o ther “drugs of abuse” seen across hum an
'G3 S tan ton  Peele, A  M oral Vision o f Addiction: How People’s Values 
Determine Whether They Become and Rem ain Addicts. The Jo u rn a l of D rug Issues. 
Vol. 17, No. 2, 1987, p. 188.
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social, religious, and political groups. His conclusion? A call for values em phasis and 
m oral education th a t would certainly receive approving nods from W illiam Bennett:
The issue is not only to get through to the large num bers of the 
young who seem  not to be hearing us. but to estab lish  bedrock m oral 
principles for our society. As it is. we seem to be falling fu rther behind 
in creating a m oral environm ent in which we w an t to hve. and in 
giving children a  se t of values th a t are adequate for such a world. 
Some of the values we need more of. as outlined in th is paper, are 
values tow ard health , moderation, and self-control; achievement, 
work, and  constructive activity; larger purposes and  goals in Hfe; 
social consciousness, concern for the community, respect for o ther 
people, and m utuaH ty in hum an relationships; in tellectual and self- 
aw areness; and  acceptance of personal responsibiHty for our actions. 
These are the value choices th a t confront all of us, and  not ju s t drug 
users.'®®
The m onographs cited above all report on the im portance of environm ental and 
in terpersonal influences (i.e., “m oral education”) on the form ation and  m aintenance 
of the internaHzed value system s th a t drive drug-seeking behaviors. Psycho-social 
chnical researchers have come a long way from the decades-ago period w hen "moral 
neu tra lity” seem ed to hold sway in appHed psychosocial investigation. Yet too many 
of our leading national “m orahty” advocates such as Dr. B ennett continue to reject 
or ignore these jou rnals as purveyors of “pro-drug psychobabble” w hen the works 
therein  actually support m any of the “trad itional family values” principles Bennett 
and his conservative poHcy kin espouse. Even the hard-line “Our-Right-to-Drugs" 
polemicist Thom as Szasz cites the I79 I words of Edm und B urke in the  overleaf of 
his 1985 book Cerem onial Chem istry:
Men are quaHfied for civil liberty in exact proportion to th e ir 
disposition to p u t m oral chains upon the ir own appetites: in
‘®® Peele, op cit., p. 210.
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proportion as th e ir love of justice is above the ir rapacity: in proportion 
as the ir soundness and sobriety of understanding  is above their vanity 
and presum ption; in proportion as they are  more disposed to Usten to 
the counsel of the  wise and good, in preference to the  flattery  of 
knaves. Society cannot exist unless a controlling power upon wül and 
appetite be placed somewhere, and the less of it  there  is within, the 
more there  m ust be without. It is ordained in the e te rn a l constitution 
of things, th a t  men of in tem perate minds cannot be free. Their 
passions forge the ir fetters.*®*
A perhaps curious citation, given Dr. Szasz’s uncom prom ising stance concerning 
w hat he asserts  to be one’s inalienable right to “self-m edicate” for w hatever reason 
w ithout the oversight or intervention of w hat he disapprovingly refers to as “the 
therapeutic s ta te .” However, in Cerem onial Chem istry and his la ter work Our Right 
to Drugs. Dr. Szasz argues forcefuUy in  favor of personal autonom y and concomitant 
individual accountability. Echoing a very A ristotelian sen tim ent in emphaticaUy 
pointing out th a t arguing  for a right to take drugs is not tan tam oun t to advocacy of 
self-intoxication. Szasz opines tha t
Em erson has put it perfectly: “We gain the s tren g th  of the 
tem ptation  we resist.” By acquiring self-control, m an frees himself 
from the law s of reflexive subjection to needs, pleasures, and 
tem ptations.”’®®
The refrain  of A ristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics rings clear from these words of 
Burke, Em erson, And Szasz:
. . . praise or blame depends on w hether or not a m an successfully 
resists compulsion [NE 1110b] . . . the appetitive elem ent in us must
*®" Thom as S. Szasz, Ceremonial Chem istry: The R itual Persecution of 
Drugs. Addicts, and  P ushers . (Holmes Beach, FL., Learning Publications, Inc., 
1985).
‘®® Szasz, op cit., p. 157.
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be guided by the bidding of reason. Consequently, the appetitive 
elem ent of a self-controlled man m ust be in harm ony w ith the 
guidance of reason. For the aim of both his appetite and his reason is 
to do w hat is noble. The appetite of a self-controlled m an is directed at 
the right objects, in the right way, and  a t the right time; and this is 
w hat reason prescribes. [NE 1119b 15]*®®
Perhaps Dr. B ennett’s an tipathy  has som ething to do w ith the fact th a t these 
types of research findings and moral observations also tend  to provide modern 
em pirical and  historical philosophical vahdation for the argum ent of John S tuart 
Mill in C hapter I \ ’ of his sem inal work On Liberty— O f The L im its To The Authority 
O f Society Over The Individual. Mill had scant sym pathy for or patience w ith a 
political/social order th a t would readily resort to coercion while fading its offspring 
in their m oral development.
Recall, from C hapter 1 of this thesis and Dan Baum ’s Smoke and M irrors that, 
for Dr. B ennett and  his colleagues, however, the prim acy of “A uthority” over the 
individual is beyond dispute or diminution.
To which Mill would reply:
. . .  I am the last person to undervalue the self-regarding virtues; 
they are  only second in importance, if even second, to the social. It is 
equally the business of education to cultivate both. But even 
education works by conviction and persuasion as well as by 
compulsion, and it is by the former only tha t, when the period of 
education is past, the self-regarding virtues should be inculcated. 
H um an beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from 
the worse, and encouragem ent to choose the former and avoid the 
la tte r. They should be forever stim ulating  each o ther to increased 
exercise of their higher faculties, and increased direction of their 
feelings and aim s towards wise instead  of foolish, elevating instead of
169 A ristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. T ransla ted  by M artin  Ostwald, (New 
York. M acM illan Publishing Company, 1962).
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degrading, objects and contem plations. But ne ither one person, nor 
any num ber of persons, is w arran ted  in saying to another hum an 
c rea tu re  of ripe years, th a t he shall not do w ith  his life for his own 
benefit w hat he chooses to do w ith it. He is the  person most in terested  
in his own well-being, the in terest which any o ther person, except in 
cases of strong  personal attachm ent, can have in it. is trifling, 
com pared w ith th a t which he him self has: the in terest which society 
has in  him  individually (except as to his conduct to others) is 
fi-actional. and altogether indirect: while, w ith respect to his own 
feehngs and circum stances, the most o rd inary  m an or woman has 
m eans of knowledge im m easurably su rpassing  those th a t can be 
possessed by any one else. The interference of society to overrule his 
judgm ent and purposes in w hat only regards himself, m ust be 
grounded on general presum ptions: which m ay be altogether w rong, 
and even if right, are as likely as not to be m isappfied to individual 
cases, by persons no be tte r acquainted w ith the circum stances of such 
cases th an  those are who look a t them  m erely from with- out. In th is 
departm ent, therefore, of hum an affairs. Individuality  has its  proper 
field of action. In the conduct of hum an beings tow ards one another, it 
is necessary th a t general rules should for the  m ost p a rt be observed, 
in order th a t people may know w hat they have to expect; but in each 
person 's own concerns, his individual spontaneity  is en titled  to free 
exercise. Considerations to aid his judgm ent, exhortations to 
s tren g th en  his wül, may be offered to him, even obtruded on him, by 
others; but he, himself, is the final judge. AU errors which he is likely 
to com m it against advice and warning, are fa r outweighed by the evü 
of aUowing others to constrain him to w hat they  deem his good.*"®
It is w orth  noting again, in light of the foregoing MiU quote, th a t th is thesis is 
not a defense of recreational intoxication, w hether of the legal or ülegal variety. I 
fuUy concur th a t  we “owe to each other help to d istinguish  the be tte r firom the 
worse.” This thesis does not argue th a t drug use is wise, nor does it argue th a t aU 
social and sanctions pertaining thereto  are ethicaUy invalid. This thesis likewise 
does not argue th a t aU preventive m easures are beyond the moral pale. It does, on 
the o ther hand, in s ist th a t the indiscrim inate surveülance s ta te  is beyond the
Jo h n  S tu a rt MiU, op cit., pp. 76-7.
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pale— th a t the upright and healthy m oral order we seek requires considerably more 
su sta in ed  and intelligent effort th an  our policym akers seem willing to provide 
w here “drug abuse” is concerned.
Policy recom m endation
Given the moral, legal, and u tilita rian  shortcom ings of cu rren t suspionless drug 
testing  poUcies, we m ight consider a lternatives sim ilar to the one hypothesized 
below—one th a t is a t once strict, rational, and  ethical:
H ypoThetical Corporation substance abuse policy statem ent
C ongratulations on your succcessful hiring evaluation, and 
welcome to our company. We need and welcome your skills and your 
energy, and we anticipate a m utually  rew arding association w ith you.
The following is to fam iliarize you w ith our corporate substance abuse 
policy.
HypoThetical Corporation (HTC) supports the goals of a drug-free 
workplace, nam ely those of a healthy, safe, and productive business 
environm ent. When you agree to em ploym ent w ith us you agree to the 
substance abuse policy contained herein. This policy complies with 
and  exceeds the requirem ents of the federal Drug-Free W orkplace Act 
of 1988. You will not, however, be asked to subm it to a  p re­
em ploym ent drug screen as a condition of employment, as the  1988 
Act does not require it, and we regard  such testing  as a w aste of 
resources th a t commences our relationship in bad faith. Additionally, 
we do not conduct random nor otherw ise indiscrim inate illicit drug 
and/or alcohol testing. We do, however, expect all employees to refrain  
from consum ption of intoxicants in  a m anner th a t resu lts in 
docum entable adverse im pact on job perform ance. In addition to poor 
personal perform ance, adverse im pact includes im pairm ent th a t  pu ts 
o ther individuals a t risk  of death  or injury or resu lts in dam age or 
clear risk  of dam age to company property.
In accepting em ploym ent w ith  HTC, you agree to the following:
Use of intoxicants on company property during work hours, 
including alcohol or tobacco products, non-medical use of prescription 
drugs or o ther psychoactive chem icals (e.g., inhalants), and  all illegal
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drugs is expresssly prohibited. Violation of this policy elem ent is 
cause for im m ediate term ination. Additionally, evidence of onsite 
employee use of illegal drugs shall be turned over to the authorities 
for prosecution.
Any employee found to be under the influence of intoxicants during 
work hours, even if the consum ption of the intoxicant(s) occured 
during non-work time, is Likewise subject to im m ediate term ination. 
“U nder the influence” shall be assessed by a competent medical 
pro\dder according to accepted clinical criteria.
HTC expressly reserves the right to test employees for intoxicant 
use in the event of reasonable cause as determ ined by m anagem ent 
personnel. Reasonable cause shall be defined as those circum stances 
in which an employee is visibly impaired, has been observed to be 
consuming or in possession of intoxicants on the prem ises or its 
im m ediate environs, or has been involved in an on-the-job accident 
resulting  in physical injury, dam age to workplace property or clear 
danger of such injury or loss.
In hght of the potential severity of sanctions in the wake of a 
positive test result, the company shall do everything possible to 
preclude the possibüity of false accusation. Consequently, HTC 
substance abuse testing  shall be performed in accordance w ith 
evidentiary (i.e. “forensic”) s tandards a t a laboratory independently 
certified as perform ing to such accuracy and precision criteria.
A positive te s t for intoxicants in the wake of a loss incident is 
regarded as a rebu ttab le  presum ption of proximate cause and may 
additionally resu lt in civil habh ity  action. Anyone testing  positive 
under the provisions of th is pohcy, however, retains the right of 
review of and challenge to the laboratorj' results.
All events involving invokation of “for cause” testing shall be 
reviewed by senior m anagem ent, w ith employees accorded the right of 
participation in such review. Hypothetical Corporation considers it 
“harassm en t” and cause for term ination for a supervisor or m anager 
to invoke a “for cause” employee intoxicant testing circum stance 
neghgently or in otherw ise bad faith. Adversarial intracom pany 
hum an relations compromise our corporate mission, and we work 
hard  to m ain ta in  a business culture in which tru s t and cooperation 
are the rule. HTC does not perm it workplace harassm ent of any  sort. 
Any incident of workplace harassm en t is to be reported in complete 
confidence directly to the  D irector of Employee Relations.
HTC provides a  com prehensive Employee Assistance Program  
(EAP). This em ploym ent benefit is w ithout cost to you and is totally 
confidential. HTC m anagem ent is prohibited from access to your EAP 
records. We recognize th a t no one is immune from personal problems.
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Employees encountering adverse individual or family circum stances 
are urged to avail them selves of the broad range of services of our 
EAP—for your success is our success. Read the EAP booklet provided 
in your employee packet. Call 1-800-EAP-HELP should you need 
assistance.
Finally, the HTC substance abuse policy shall conform to the 
requirem ents of the Am ericans with Disabilities Act.
Wliile some would undoubtedly object strenuously to the proposition to tu rn  over 
positive “for cause” drug te s t resu lts to law enforcement, it is clear from the stare 
decisis precedents alluded to by Justice G insburg in Chandler v. M iller  th a t private 
parties have the right to tran sm it such “evidence” under the F ourth  Amendm ent 
“plain view exception” principle. Moreover, the foregoing pohcy s ta tem en t makes it 
clear tha t any type of intoxication th a t results in risk and/or loss is equally 
actionable. C urrent suspicionless drug testing pohcy excludes alcohol, the drug 
responsible for the great m ajority of non process-related ind u stria l accidents. This 
proposed policy also addresses harassm ent concerns, m aking it clear th a t the 
invokation of "cause” w ithout tru ly  having cause wiU not be tolerated.
Methodological and procedural safeguards such as com m itm ent to forensic quahty 
testing and rights of review and chaUenge are built in. FinaUy. this hypothetical 
policy is more in keeping w ith the spirit of effective, progressive m anagem ent 
strategy" leading companies ostensibly value—a business cu lture  of cooperation and 
m utual concern ra ther than  one of im personal coercion.
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Thesis Sum m ary
A core question posed in th is  thesis is w hether one should be required to pass a 
drug screen to obtain and/or re ta in  em ploym ent as a general proposition, e ither 
through exphcit legal enactm ent or ex tra  judicially through governm ental 
acquiescence to corporate-institu tional pohcy. The long answ er is no. While there 
are broader suspicionless drug  testing  issues—such as m andatory screening in 
athletic or a variety of “custody” dom ains (e.g.. parole, probationary, schools, or 
"drug rehab” settings)—. in concluding and sum m arizing the argum ent and 
evidence heretofore presented. I wül focus on the employment domain, as it 
constitu tes the bulk of the m ark e t for testing  services and brings into sharpest focus 
the ethical problems th a t a tten d  th is form of search and surveülance.
Mass indiscrim inate em ploym ent drug screening is unwise, unscientific, 
unconstitutional, and unethical.
• It is unwise first because it cannot justified on the basis of the shaky, often 
absurd em pirical evidence purporting  to legitimize it (including our confused 
history of contradictory and naive a ttitu d es  toward intoxication and "addiction." 
C hapter Two). Surveülance policy th a t puts citizens a t risk of being labeled 
"drug abusers” and de facto  convicted crim inals subject to summary- 
adm inistrative punishm ent ought be held to a much higher s tandard  of 
risk/cost-benefit analysis th an  has heretofore been the case. Speculative 
assertions by testing  vendors and the ir coUaborators as to the extent of the drug
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abuse “problem” and  “prophylactic” virtues of m ass testing should be seen for 
the self-serving hyperbole they are (Chapter Three).
M ass drug testing  is unwise on the second count in th a t it cannot but be a waste 
of clinical bioassay resources. To repeat: forensic-quality drug testing  cannot be 
done in m ass quan tity  for the m inuscule price th a t employers are willing to pay 
(and it properly should be forensic quality, given the stakes for those tested). 
Moreover, given th a t the num ber of aggregate “confirmed positives” continues to 
be well below official estim ates of workplace prevalence, the “negative predictive 
value” (a.k.a. “s ta tistica l power”) of m ass screening is dubious (C hapter Four). 
The analytical chem istry in frastructure  has much more im portant work 
aw aiting it. We need to accurately assess the health  of the environm ent, the 
safety of our foods and  pharm aceuticals, the integrity of a b readth  of raw 
m aterials and finished products, and the disease indices of our medical patients 
more than  we need a u rinary  M aginot Line erected against a phantom  horde of 
stoned employees.
A nation whose security and surveillance methods prove inadequate to keep 
illegal drug m etabolites out of the urine of a Charles Manson ought take pause 
and savor the u tte r  silliness of the proposition th a t it can do so en masse on the 
cheap in the general population.
Suspicionless drug testing  violates the Fourth  Am endm ent to the Constitution, 
no m atter how you slice it (C hapter Five). Conservative “Original In ten t” your 
cup of tea? While m any aspects of “original in ten t” will forever rem ain murky.
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this one could not be more clear. Both the F ram ers’ an tipathy  tow ard the British 
W rits of Assistance and G eneral W arrants, and M adison’s in ten t to put core 
“unalienable rights” beyond the ready reach of “factitious m ajorities” eager to 
run riot (via. among other tactics, perpetuation of the “hue and cry” principle) 
over the real or imagined social crisis du jour, are compelling in this regard. 
Liberal “Living C onstitution” more to your liking? Evidence of the growing need 
for personal protection of privacy from snoopers of every stripe and the 
corporate-adm inistrative state  could not be more stark . We may indeed “have 
our own laws a t D isneyland.” but we still have a C onstitution th a t properly 
supersedes them . Recall M adison’s lam ent: "If men were Angels, no government 
would be necessary . . . ” And if Angels governed, from corporate boardrooms to 
the Congress, perhaps we w ouldn’t have to be so vigilant w ith respect to civil 
rights.
Suspicionless drug testing also violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act with 
respect to illegal employment discrim ination, given th a t it accords the negative 
drug screen across-the-board controlling force in employment decisions in the 
absence of across-the-board evidence of job-relatedness and compeUing need. 
Recall from the introduction to this work: Your perhaps otherwise extensive and 
stellar C.V. counts for nothing should you refuse a required employment drug 
screen. Such is not only empirically and legally indefensible, it is ethically 
destitu te.
• Indiscrim inate drug testing is unethical (C hapter Six). It goes beyond J.S. Mill, 
beyond “liberty” and “tolerance” of disapproved indulgence (recall th a t our focus
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
230
is on those who are drug-free), and  into an  A ugustinian sense of hum ility  and 
w ariness of overweening pride th a t begets the  autocratic state, w ith its 
inevitably tragic delusions of infallibility. I t goes into a K antian respect for 
persons as ends, a reciprocal respect for basic hum an autonomy, freedom, and  
dignity th a t only a secure sense of self can provide—an inviolate sphere of the 
private self requisite for social competency. The coercive panoptic s ta te  (to which 
we m ust now attach  the adjective “corporate”) begets neither social competency 
nor effective, willing compliance. As was s ta ted  a t the outset: "Bentham got it 
wrong: the Panopticon is a net loser, devoid o f enduring moral force w ith respect 
to the dissolute, irrelevant at best w ith respect to the upright."
Again, th is  thesis assum es the continuation of harsh  crim inal sanctions against 
curren tly  proscribed recreational drugs. Laws exist: enforce them  properly. Credible 
science exists for the quantification and assessm ent of risk; use it, for a change, in 
the prom ulgation of drug policy. Ethical preventive and harm -reduction 
inducem ents exist (Chapter Eight); employ them  honestly.
And above all exists a hard-won, m orally-anchored Constitution th a t disavows 
the expedient tram pling of individual rights; obey it.
Any m orally serious person cannot but desire and work toward a healthy  and 
“uprigh t” social order. An unrestra ined  m etabolite police, however, will not help us 
get there, for a tru ly  healthy social order cannot bu t be one in which civil righ ts are 
reciprocally accorded their due—among them  the right of our youth to real m oral 
education ra th e r than  m oralistic neo-“Reefer M adness”/ “Just-D on’t-Do-It”
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platitudes, and  also among them  the right of ad u lt citizens to not have to 
symbolically “prove” their rectitude in deference to clamorem et ethusium  
m achinations or pay with their HveUhoods.
Again, as s ta ted  at the outset of th is  investigation, "there are ethically 
appropriate methods available to a society for dealing with risk and loss. It is my 
contention, however, that indiscrim inate drug testing is not am ong them." The body 
of this thesis  has sustained th a t claim. Obsta Principiis.
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EPILOGUE
Why take on such an  acrimonious topic?
From Jan u ary  of 1986 through about May of 19911 served under a series of 
personal services contracts w ith a laboratory owned by a major environm ental 
engineering and rem ediation firm. We perform ed environm ental and health  physics 
support analyses for clients w ith radiation and  mixed waste contam ination and 
exposure problems (mixed w aste is th a t which is composed of conventional chemical 
toxins and radionuclides). Since much of our work involved litigation support, we 
were tra ined  to— and continually rem inded of the need to—perform to forensic 
standards (i.e., to a quality  level sufficient for our analytical resu lts to s tand  up as 
viable evidence in court).
It was my job to develop, install, and m ain tain  custom, procedure-specific 
software for use by the technicians in calculating radionuclide concentrations and 
dose exposures. I also worked on sta tistica l quality control applications, applied 
research tow ard developm ent of analytical correction factors, and helped w rite and 
subsequently adm inister our Software Q uality Assurance procedure. While a t this 
complex I worked am id much of the very sam e analytical technology (e.g.. High 
Perform ance Liquid Chrom atography, Gas Chromatography/M ass Spectrom etry) 
also employed by drug testing  labs, as much of our specimen workload consisted of
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urine sam ples suspected of contam ination. I also learned ju s t how difficult it can be 
to substan tia te  analytical resu lts. We underw ent frequent adversaria l lab audits 
tha t would be the envy of a Spanish Inquisitor. I have been audited  right down to 
my rounding algorithm s.
During this period a couple of emotionally charged episodes involving 
suspicionless drug  testing  h it the news in E ast Tennessee. F irst, the local school 
board sought to enact a m andatory drug te st pohcy aim ed a t teachers. W hen the 
teachers' union protested  and sued to enjoin the pohcy. Board S uperin tendent Earl 
Hoffmeister w ent balhstic in the press, accusing the teachers of “hiding behind the 
Constitution” in order to cover up drug abuse among th e ir members.
There was no evidence of drug abuse among Knox County teachers.
Also during th is period, Knoxville Pohce Chief Phil K eith made an incredible 
statem ent during an on-the-record interview with the local paper. He opined th a t he 
should have the power to order anyone “to go take a drug te s t righ t now; don’t ask 
me any questions, ju st go do it.” He had been fighting w ith his pohce officers over a 
proposed random  drug testing pohcy for the departm ent, a pohcy the rank-and-file 
vigorously opposed.
These highly visible controversies made for in teresting  lunchroom conversation 
at our lab. O ur chem ists derided the notion th a t commercial chnical labs could do 
high-quality work on the cheap in m ass production mode. The CEO of a large local 
chnical lab th a t perform ed the bulk of the drug testing  in E ast Tennessee, had
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s ta ted  to the  press th a t his lab’s technology was “absolute: if we do everything 
correctly th e re  is no possib ility o f error" (Knoxville Jo u rn a l. 12/13/90, em phasis 
mine).
A very big “if.” This com m ent brought forth torren ts of rebuke in our facility.
The m anager of our mixed w aste lab, a bright and experienced chem ist himself, 
rem arked; “I'm exem pt from th a t s h - ;  I’d have to think long and  hard  before going 
to work for a company th a t w anted  to m ake me take a drug te s t.”
The local teachers’ union P resident was a member of my church. We talked 
about the d ispu te  w ith the school board a t length, and 1 provided him with 
extensive technical lab inform ation to use in his fight against the policy. The 
teachers u ltim ately  won a perm anent federal court injunction against the board, 
and the whole idea w as dropped and faded from public view.
By th is tim e, though, the issue had gotten my continuing atten tion , and 1 
followed the progress of sim ilar disputes around the country. Suspicionless drug 
testing  program s expanded rapidly in the late 1980’s in the wake of President 
Reagan’s Executive O rder 12564 (Drug-free Federal Workforce) and the federal 
Drug-Free W orkplace Act of 1998. At every turn , those who objected to forced 
testing  were subjected to w ithering  ad horninein attacks. D issent was equated with 
“support for drug abuse” or the d issen ters’ need to hide th e ir im puted drug use and 
legalization agenda. Indeed, several years ago former “D rug C zar” Lee Brown, 
publicly rebuking then-Surgeon G eneral Joycelyn Elders for her m usings on the
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utility of scientific study of d rug  legalization issues, flatly declared th a t “[T]here will 
be no discussion on drug legalization; even the discussion is harm fu l.”
In 1992 the issue became far more than  an ethical abstraction  to me. My wife 
was transferred  to Las Vegas by her employer—the very sam e corporation I had 
also worked for in Oak Ridge, where she was a senior Q uality Assurance m anager 
in another division—to oversee the QA program of the ir new environm ental 
restoration contract based in Nevada. The operations m anager in her new office had 
learned of my background and prior contract work for the com pany and offered me a 
"part-tim e tem porary” job. He was trying to help us out with our resettlem ent while 
getting some of his short-term  service needs filled as painlessly as possible by end- 
running—through the "temp” process—the Hum an Resources D epartm ent 
proscription against spouses w orking in the same office.
After we had agreed on money and scope of work, a secretary  came in and put a 
consent form in front of me authorizing a pre-employment drug screen. Oh . . .
Uh . . .
The m om ent of tru th  had arrived. Would the exigency of try ing  to find work 
while negotiating a new m ortgage in a new town on one income override ostensibly 
deeply held ethical principle? Even though I knew they’d find nothing in my urine 
beyond w hat I jokingly described as “a large spike in the GC/MS Yuban Auto-Drip 
region” (along w ith some occasional Mouton Cadet Bordeaux m etabolites), I found 
the whole episode one of lose-lose irony and idiocy. Unlike m any a prospective hire.
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I was utterly  fam iliar to th is  company; I had once been cited w ith a corporate 
quarterly  quality aw ard (even though technically I was not a t the tim e an 
"employee”) and had been twice thanked by the company w ith cash aw ards and 
handsome engraved plaques extolling my contributions to technical knowledge for 
papers I had w ritten  and presented on their behalf while in Oak Ridge. Their St. 
Louis laboratory was stiU using software 1 had w ritten  while in Oak Ridge and  had 
modified for use in the St. Louis operation. I had produced and directed a 4-hour 
radiation fundam entals and  safety video training series for the Air Force 
Radiobiology Research In stitu te  a t Bethesda (AFRRI) under a H ealth Physics Group 
contract aw arded the company. My documented record and portfoho scream ed out 
“this m an cannot possibly have had the time to be a drug abuser.” Indeed, during 
the period coincident w ith my tenure at the firm I frequently worked from six in the 
morning to eleven p.m. or midnight, six to seven days a week a t tim es, either a t  the 
lab or in my struggling academic audio-video production studio sideline business.
My drug of choice and necessity was in fact ( and rem ains) Yuban Auto-Drip.
No m atter; spouse-hire policies are artfully malleable, drug screening poUcies 
are not. The Ops m anager was sym pathetic to my position on the issue, but insisted 
tha t his hands were tied. In fact they were not—I had a copy of the section of the 
company’s H um an Resources policy th a t addressed pre-employment drug testing; it 
had the usual weasel phrases giving the firm the option to eschew drug screening 
(e.g., say, in the case of having headhunted an extrem ely sought-after senior 
scientist or executive who m ight take offense a t the requirem ent to be tested  and
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hire on elsewhere). However, he was unwilling to risk  his neck by contravening the 
pohcy for a “part-tim e tem p.”
I chose not to rub his nose in this document. The well had been irrem ediably 
poisoned, and discretion dictated  th a t I not take any action th a t m ight have in ternal 
repercussions rebounding on my wife. Lose-lose.
R ather ironically, during the entire 5-t- years I had served th is  company I had 
never had to subm it to drug testing  because of my s ta tu s  as a “contractor.” (to the 
aggravated envy of my “employee” coUeagues) despite the facts th a t I had my own 
keys to the buildings, supervisory s ta tu s  on the Novell network, full access to all 
m anner of confidential in te rna l operations data, and served a m ission-critical role at 
the lab.
As Bob Dole says: W'Tiaieuer.
No Sale. I would ju s t move on. We got our house; 1 got a job w ith  the Medicare 
Peer Review, an d  joined the excellent graduate program  a t the UNLV Institu te  for 
Ethics and Policy Studies, w here I am now completing my degree work.
An in teresting  aside: Prior to signing on w ith the Peer Review, I answ ered a 
REECO new spaper ad soHciting a com puter analyst—one which m eshed w ith my 
recent data-processing background. Reynolds Electrical Engineering Corporation 
(REECO) was then  a long-time prime contractor for the D epartm ent of Energy at 
the Nevada T est Site. A fter 1 finished filling out the job application, I read the fine 
p rin t s ta tem en t I would have to sign, one authorizing a background investigation. It
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essentially  said: “REECO is hereby authorized to obtain personal information 
regarding the applicant from any source w hatever, w hether m ateria l or not and 
w hether docum ented or not, and apphcan t hereby indem nifies REECO against any 
and all hability  regarding any subsequent breach of confidentiality w ith respect to 
any inform ation obtained in the course of said investigation.” I paraphrase  here, for 
when I objected and declined, they refused to allow me to take  the document w ith 
me.
Again, No Sale. An overwrought concern? Perhaps. But, a t some point, someone 
has to just say no to these things.
Las Vegas is the surveillance capital of the known universe, and  drug testing in 
the casino industry" is a given. The leading clinical lab here runs firequent large 
new spaper ads extoUing the virtues of its  drug screening operation. One ad 
repeatedly and  breathlessly claimed: I f  you 're not pre-employ nient drug testing, 
you ’re hiring the rejects o f those companies that do! No m atte r th a t credible evidence 
supporting such a b lanket assertion is nowhere to be found.
Ironies go unnoticed: C aesar’s Palace touts its highly visible RIAH® hair drug 
test pohcy while its huge billboard out front promotes the m ost recent re tu rn  
engagem ent of the “Doobie Brothers. ” Of course the fans flocking to the 
perform ances nearly  all recall w hat the 6 0 s  slang term  “doobie” refers to, and, 
although I’ve not been to one of th e ir shows a t C aesar’s, I’ll bet there are usually 
periodic w afts of a certain  pungent sm ell in the air.
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More ironies accrue as one surveys the general social, political, and legal 
climates pertaining to intoxication. As W alter K. Olson has pointed out, current 
operative in terpreta tions of ADA, the  Americans w ith D isabihties Act. define 
"addiction” as a  protected disability w ith respect to em ploym ent discrim ination (see 
Life, Liberty, and  the Pursuit o f a Good Beer in The W ashington M onthly. Sept.
1997, excerpted from his book The Excuse Factory). Moreover, while "addicts" of the 
illicit drug variety  m ust subm it to " trea tm en t” and absta in  from their habits to be 
protected under ADA, “alcohohcs” are  afforded blanket protection. If you allow 
yourself to be officially defined as an  alcohohc, you cannot be fired for "falling off the 
wagon” even if your continuing or episodic indulgence in terferes with your abdity to 
function a t work. That this is so is testam en t to the ubiquity of alcohol in our 
culture and economy, a “drug” th a t lubricates our leisure and  funds our publications 
and our en terta inm en ts (and our politicians) to an ex ten t unrivaled by all but the 
now-besieged tobacco. Propositions to legislatively rem ediate  the epidemiologic 
traum a a ttribu tab le  to alcohol and tobacco are  invariably m et with derisive clucking 
by Uberal and conservative political apologists alike adm onishing us to “heed the 
lessons of our failed prohibition experim ent.” This while they  never pass up an 
opportunity to muck up the "drug abuse” data  w ith alcohol and tobacco statistics, as 
we have seen. And this while it is concom itantly thought an ethical and efficacious 
pohcy proposal th a t we re tu rn  violent predators back to the streets early  to firee up 
cell space to send the hapless m arijuana “mule” to prison for Life w ithout parole.
(Or, as Mr. Gingrich would prefer, to adm inister the le th a l injection.)
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The political rhetoric concerning suspicionless drug testing  has heated up 
dram atically in the past few years, as I have alluded to elsew here on these pages. I 
am dism ayed and  offended by the to rren t of abuse heaped upon those who oppose 
any aspect of our mindless “War on Drugs.” My father tau g h t me to revere the 
founding principles of this nation. For him. such were no mere civic homilies; now in 
his 80 s. he suffers to this day from the acute lifelong residual effects of the leg he 
left behind on a European World W ar 11 battlefield more th an  fifty years ago.
Mine was a young childhood lived down the s tree t from George W ashington's 
Revolutionary' W ar headquarters in Morristown. New Jersey . Mine was an 
education replete w ith class trips to our principal founding sites in New York and 
Philadelphia. Mine was a boyhood fascination w ith the works of Jefferson and 
Madison and th e ir colleagues. Mine was a youth when the Fourth  of July and 
Veterans' Day stood for more than an excuse for the la te s t DoUar-Daze m arketing 
blitz.
Mine is a patrio tism  having no need of cheap legislative whips and chains tha t 
sully the dignity of our Constitution.
Mine is now also a sad adm iration for the likes of a K athy Sohar. ABC World 
News reported on M arch 8th. 1997 th a t Ms. Sohar. an  accom phshed senior 
employee of Global Access Communications of Boston, was sum m arily  fired by the 
company’s new corporate owner. Vyvx, Inc.. for refusing on privacy principle to 
subm it to a ha ir te st—this after she had already taken  and  passed a urine drug 
screen.
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Lose-lose s tup id ity . Ms. Sohar, you are to be congratulated  for s tand ing  on 
principle. I th ink  I know exactly how you m ust feel.
John Gilliom, an  au th o r cited in the course of this inquiry, views the w idespread 
use of drug testin g  as merely one of the  high-tech panoptic m eans of ensuring, as he 
puts it “the au tom atic  functioning of power.” and  the ideal employee/citizen is the 
one who passively subm its to policy, regardless of its u tility  or propriety. For 
Gilliom. the p u ta tive  drug screening policy rationales proffered (e.g.. health, safety, 
and productivity) are  ju s t so much tra n sp a ren t window-dressing. The real goal is 
one of behavioral homogeneity, one of reflexively deferential a ttitu d es  tow ard 
authority, how ever a rb itra ry  (or illegitim ate) th a t au thority  might be.
I have to agree w ith  Gilliom. But, 1 do not th ink  th a t th is is w hat M essrs. 
Jefferson and  M adison and  the ir colleagues had in m ind as they forged th is  nation, 
and we ought tak e  more serious pause before tam pering w ith the elegant m oral and 
legal arch itectu re  they bequeathed us.
Coda
This inquiry began w ith a quotation from the autobiography of the late, 
venerable Eric Sevareid. 1 close it w ith  an equally fitting one excerpted from the 
m onthly journal column of Lewis Lapham .
from New wine in old bottles
Lewis L apham , Editor, H am er’s M agazine. February, 1998
. . . A lthough I have often heard  it said  th a t the tru th  shall m ake men 
free. I’m never sure th a t everybody in the  room attaches the sam e 
m eaning to the  phrase. The tru th  isn ’t  about the assim ilation of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
242
doctrine or statistics, not even about the discovery of term ites in the 
w ainscotting of the White House. I t’s about acquiring the courage of 
one’s own thought, and if i t ’s impossible to have courage w ithout 
convictions, it's  equally impossible to have convictions w ithout 
knowledge and  understanding. The task  is never an easy one, 
especially in a society th a t encourages its citizens to w ander through 
the ir hves in a passive stupor. I’m told th a t as a nation we spend S350 
billion a year on liquor, pornography, and drugs, and the cold w ar 
against the American Intellect constitu tes a more profitable business 
than  the old arrangem ent w ith the Soviet Union.
The new spapers meanwhile worry about the extinction of w hat the 
editorial pages sometimes call “the educated citizen”—i.e., yet another 
endangered species. Like the taw ny ferret and  the giant auk. But to 
the best of my knowledge 1 have never m et such a person. Even the 
idea of an  educated citizen strikes me as preposterous. I can conceive 
of a “self-educating citizen,” and have had the good fortune to meet a 
num ber of them  who can be so described, none fool enough to proclaim 
them selves educated. W ithout exception they possess the valor of 
the ir ignorance, conceiving it neither as a blessed sta te  of being 
(comparable to attendance a t one of P resident C linton’s Renaissance 
weekends) nor as a m aterial good sold in a store (even a t H arvard’s 
rate  of 830,000 per annum) bu t as a ceaseless process of learning and 
relearning. If in sixteen years they have spent 10,000 hours in a 
classroom (roughly the equivalent of fourteen months), they expect to 
spend ano ther fifty years revising w hat they thought they had learned 
in school.
I count am ong the major good fortunes of my fife my tim e spent in recent years 
in the company of my fellow studen ts and faculty m entors w ithin the UNLV 
Institu te  for E thics and Pohcy Studies, a wise, collegial, compassionate, and diligent 
lot engaged steadfastly  in the rew arding work of Lapham ’s “self-educating citizen. ” I 
leave this in stitu tion  with much gratitude, and I emerge much better equipped to 
continue the “ceaseless process of learn ing  and relearning.”
-  Robert E. Gladd, February 1998
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APPENDIX A
The N ational Alliance for Model S ta te  Drug Laws: Pushing the envelope on 
1RS § 501(c)(3) non-profit “charitable organization” regulations
The In te rna l Revenue Service charters  tax-exempt non-profit charitable 
organizations meeting certain  criteria  pertain ing  to non-partisan cultural, reUgious, 
scientific, educational and other public service activities. § 501(c)(3) organizations 
are specifically prohibited firom engaging in political cam paigns and legislative 
lobbying. In the words of the 1RS:
The exempt purposes set forth in § 501(c)(3) are charitable, 
reUgious, educational, scientific, Uterary, testing for pubUc safety, 
fostering national or in ternational am ateur sports competition, and 
the prevention of cruelty to children or anim als. The term  charitable 
is used in its generally accepted legal sense and includes reUef of the 
poor, the distressed, or the underprivileged: advancem ent of reUgion: 
advancem ent of education or science: erection or m aintenance of 
pubUc buildings, monuments, or works: lessening the burdens of 
government: lessening of neighborhood tensions: eUmination of 
prejudice and discrim ination: defense of hum an and civil rights 
secured by law; and combating community deterioration and juvenile 
deUnquency . . .
. . .  A § 501(c)(3) organization may not engage in carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attem pting, to influence legislation as a 
substan tia l p a rt of its activities. W hether an organization has 
a ttem pted to influence legislation as a substantia l p a rt of its activities 
is determ ined based upon all relevant facts and circum stances.
Source: U.S. In ternal Revenue Service § 501(c)(3) regulations, 
[http:// www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/bus_info/eo/exempt-req.html], March, 1998.
243
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
244
A curiosity obtains: “The N ational Alliance for Model S ta te  D rugs Laws.” a tax- 
exem pt organization directly funded w ith taxpayer dollars, one boasting of a 
m andate to influence anti-drug legislation a t the s ta te  level, in ap p aren t direct 
contravention of § 501(c)(3) in tent. The following is excerpted from th e ir website 
located a t  http://w w w .natlalliance.org.
The N ational Alliance for Model S ta te  D rug Laws began as the 
P resident's  Commission on Model S ta te  D rug Laws (Commission), a 
Congressionally established body charged w ith creating a model code 
of laws to help s ta tes effectively address alcohol and  o ther substance 
abuse . . . [The Commission developed] 44 model laws and policies 
which offer a comprehensive continuum  of responses and services to 
fully address a lcoho l, tobacco and o ther substance abuse problems. 
Tough sanctions punish those persons who refuse to abide by the law. 
Equally im portant, the sanctions are designed to be constructive, 
prom ote prevention, and a ttem pt to leverage alcohol and other 
substance abusers into treatm ent. The 44 legislative rem edies are in a 
F inal Report comprising five volumes:
1. Economic Remedies.
2. Community Mobilization
3. Crimes Code Enforcement
4. T reatm ent
5. Drug-Free Families, Schools & W orkplaces
In December 1993, the Commissioners subm itted  the ir model laws 
to the N ational Governors Association, the N ational Conference of 
S ta te  Legislatures. Attorney G eneral J a n e t Reno and Dr. Lee Brown, 
then  Director of the Office of National D rug Control Policy. President 
C linton d istributed  the Final Report and  the accom panying trea tm en t 
study by Rutgers U niversity to s ta te  an d  local leaders early  the 
following year.
Recommendations, no m atter how prom ising, become reality  only 
w hen they are acted upon. The Com m issioners feared th a t sim ply 
m ailing out the F inal Report would lead to th e ir model law s collecting 
d u st on shelves. Their solution was to create  The N ational A lliance for
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Model S ta te  D rug Laws (Alliance), a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, 
to serve as an  ongoing resource on the model laws and  related  s ta te  
legislation.
Funded by Congressional appropriations, the Alliance, in 
coordination w ith the B ureau of Justice  Assistance and the Office of 
N ational D rug Control Pohcy, are holding state  model drug law 
conferences across the country. These one-day events are intense, 
hands-on workshops designed to educate sta te  individuals about the 
model laws and  pohcies . . .
We offer our model laws as a m enu of options from which the 
individuals select those which they beheve will most effectively help 
the s ta te . The ultim ate decisions about w hat to do rest w ith the 
conference participants, streng then ing  their com m itm ent to see th e ir 
recom m endations to fruition. The Alhance has already co-sponsored 9 
successful s ta te  conferences, and  plans to hold m any more such 
events in  the coming years.
D rugs . . . Everybody's Problem.
• Illegal drugs burden society w ith  approxim ately S67 billion in 
social, health  and crim inal costs each year.
• N early 1 out of 5 Federal dollars spent on Medicaid is a ttribu tab le  
to substance abuse.
• Up to 50% of all general hospital adm issions are alcohol and drug  
related.
• U n trea ted  alcoholics incur general health  care costs th a t are at 
least 100% higher than  those of non-alcoholics.
College
• Of the 12 million cu rren t undergraduates, more will ultim ately die 
from alcohol-related causes (240.000 to 360,000) than  will earn  
MAs and PhDs combined.
• 95% of violent crime on cam pus is alcohol-related
• 90% of all reported cam pus rapes occur when alcohol is being used
by e ither the assa ilan t or the victim.
• One in 3 college s tuden ts now drinks prim arily to get drunk.
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Crime
• 60%-80% of crim inal defendants are addicted to drugs and/or
alcohol.
• 33% of all m urders or m anslaughter incidents are re la ted  to illicit 
drug and alcohol use. Over 50 % of spousal m urders are drug-or- 
alcohol-related.
• In 1993. 54%-81% of adult m ales a rrested  and  42%-83% of adult 
females arrested  tested positive for drugs.
Fetal
• More than  5% (221,000) of the 4 m ühon women who give birth 
each year use illicit drugs during their pregnancy.
• Overall hospitalization costs for drug-exposed infants and fetal 
alcohol syndrome create an annual economic loss to the country of 
SO.6 to S3.3 bülion.
Prescription Drugs
• Over 20 million people abuse or misuse prescription drugs in the 
US.
• Approximately 15% of all legal controlled substance medications 
are used Ulicitly. th a t is 33 million prescriptions w ith 1 billion 
dosage units each year.
Tobacco
• C igarettes kül more Americans th an  AIDS, alcohol, car accidents, 
m urders, suicides, drugs and fires combined.
• 90% of all smokers begin to smoke before they tu rn  18 years old.
• Expected lifetime medical expenditures of the average smoker 
exceed those of the average nonsm oker by 28% for men and 21% 
for women.
W orkplace
• 71% of all current illicit drug users age 18 and  older (7.4 mülion 
adults) are employed.
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• The cost of alcohol and illicit drug use in the workplace, including 
lost productivity, medical claims and  accidents, am ounts to $140 
billion per year.
• 68% of all adu lt cocaine users in 1995 were employed e ither full­
er part-tim e.
Youth
• The average age a t which youth begin drinking is 13.
• In 1995. among youths aged 12-13, 4.5% were cu rren t illicit drug 
users. The highest rates were am ong young people age 16-17, 15.6 
% and age 18-20, 18%.
• N early 1 in 20 of today’s high school seniors and 1 in 30 of today’s 
10th  graders is a current daily m arijuana user.
• 10% of Americans age 18-20 are heavy alcohol users and 15% have 
used illicit drugs in the past m onth.
Mission
“To promote comprehensive model s ta te  drug laws which significantly 
reduce, w ith the goal to eliminate, substance abuse through effective 
use and coordination of enforcement, trea tm ent, education, 
prevention, community and corrections resources.”
Goals
1. To educate sta te  legislators, governors and other s ta te  and local 
individuals about the purposes and application of the model laws, and 
the m ulti-disciphnary partnerships built into the laws.
2. To help sta te  legislators, governors and  other sta te  and local 
individuals tailor, revise and update the  model laws to address 
particu lar s ta te  problems and needs.
3. To m aintain  a legislative clearinghouse which provides information 
on the model laws and supporting documents, and re la ted  sta te  laws 
and bills.
4. To facüitate and  coordinate collaborative coalition building among 
enforcement, treatm ent, education, prevention and com m unity 
groups, and between these groups and  sta te  leaders.
The Alliance’s resource center activities include:
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• Providing our model laws and  rela ted  s ta te  s ta tu te s  on 44 alcohol 
an d  o ther substance abuse topics.
• H elping compare our model laws w ith existing s ta te  s ta tu tes .
• H elping analyze s ta tes’ versions of the model law s and rela ted
s ta te  s ta tu tes .
• S haring  legislation, policies, and program  ideas am ong sta tes.
• Offering drafting  tips and language to tailor our model laws to
individual s ta te  needs.
• Identifying s ta te  resource people on the model law s and related  
topic areas.
• Providing access to a nationwide network of legal, policy, and 
program  experts on the model laws and rela ted  topic areas.
• G iving guidance on pohcy, legal and substantive issues re la ted  to 
the  model laws and topic areas.
• F ac ih ta tin g  partnersh ips among s ta te  officials and  substance 
abuse professionals.
• P artic ipa ting  in and conducting educational briefings, sum m its, 
m eetings, etc. on the model laws and related alcohol and  other 
substance abuse topics.
O ur portfoho of legislative proposals help s ta tes  provide a continuum  
of re sp o n ses- enforcem ent, trea tm en t, education, prevention, housing 
and com m unity and workplace— which:
• In tervene early  w ith children w ith substance abuse re la ted  
problem s and  refer them  to trea tm ent.
• Provide insurance and M edicaid funding for appropria te  levels 
and  m odahties of treatm ent.
• Reduce crim e and prison overcrowding.
• Teach youth healthy a ttitudes and  the benefits of leading a 
substance free fife.
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• Shut down crackhouses and tu rn  boarded buildings into recreation 
centers and o ther useful neighborhood centers.
• Stop the laundering of billions of dollars in illegal drug  profits.
• Provide consum er safeguards regarding m anaged care.
• Decreasing alcohol and  drug-related highway fa ta lities.
• Prevent the illegal distribution and diversion of prescrip tion  drugs 
and chemicals.
• Decrease absenteeism , accidents, sick claims and  disciplinary 
actions in the workplace.
A “charitable organization” involved w ith facilitating and  coordinating 
“enforcem ent” by lobbying (for th a t is indeed the appropriate  verb) statehouses to 
enact legislation such as “The Model Drug-Free Private Sector W orkplace Act.” a 
m easure focused on suspicionless drug testing? This is a legitim ate § 501(c)(3) 
function?
Before exam ining “The Model Drug-Free Private Sector W orkplace Act,” it is 
in teresting  to note the s ta tistics the Alliance proffers to justify  th e ir ends. Once 
again we w itness the custom ary em pirical am biguities (spaw n of the by now 
fam iliar dubious paternity) and  CASA-esqe m antra  of “alcohol, tobacco ’n drugs” 
drug w ar partisans feel compelled to employ to inflate the ap p aren t extent of the 
illicit drug “problem” (see C hapter 2). Look closely: most of the  s ta tistics asserted by 
the Alliance speak to alcohol and  tobacco consumption, w ith  a bit of “prescription 
drug abuse” throw n in for good m easure.
None of which are relevant to the particu lars of “The Model Drug-Free Private 
Sector Workplace Act.” This legislative proposal, sim ilar in th ru s t  and  content to
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those proposed by The In stitu te  for a D rug-Free Workplace— another organization 
promoting m andatory  drug testing legislation a t the statehouse level—focuses 
significantly on providing near-blanket indem nification for private sector employers 
conducting suspicionless drug  testing. Em ployers would be immune from law suits 
resulting from false negative tests (i.e., where an  employee tested  negative, 
subsequently caused an injury accident, and was found to have indeed been using 
drugs proxim ate to the incident. See Section 16.c) and would limit “defam ation” 
liability in the wake of false positive resu lts  '"if the em ployer’s reliance on a ‘false 
positive' was reasonable and  in good faith"  (Section 16.b.2).
WTiile the  Act declares th a t private-sector suspicionless drug testing is not 
“m andatory,” it s ta tes  in Section 11.b th a t an employer is required to conduct both 
suspicionless and  for-cause drug testing "in order to qualify as a private sector drug- 
free workplace and to qualify for the provisions o f  Section 5."
Section 5, Applicable Conditions for a Legal Policy, s ta tes  th a t
[I]t is lawful for an employer to test employees or prospective 
employees for the presence of alcohol or o ther drugs, in accordance 
w ith the provisions of th is [Act], as a condition of continued 
em ploym ent or hiring However, in order to qualify for protection from 
Litigation regarding certain  legal claims for acting in good faith on the 
resu lts  of a substance abuse test, employers m ust im plem ent and 
m ain ta in  a com prehensive drug-free workplace program  and adhere 
to the procedural safeguards th a t dem and accuracy and fairness as 
included in subsequent sections of th is [Act].
While the specifications pertain ing  to "procedural safeguards that dem and  
accuracy and fairness" do in fact represent a bit of im provem ent over the cu rren t
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patchwork of state  laws and regulations th a t leave employees w ith widely varying 
levels of procedural and methodological protection.*"- the  principal th ru s t of this 
Model Act is to provide employers com prehensive au thority  to test employees a t will 
w ith Little fear of liability. Section ll.c : "Nothing in this section shall prohibit a 
private employer from conducting random testing or other law ful testing o f 
employees." Section 19; "No physician-patient relationship is created between an 
employee or job applicant and  an employer, medical review officer, or substance 
abuse testing laboratory per-form ing or evaluating a substance abuse test solely by 
the establishment, im plem entation, or adm inistration o f a substance abuse testing  
program." Section 22: "All laws and  parts o f laws in conflict with this fActJ are 
repealed."
U nfortunately, such s tandard iza tion  is not assured; the Alliance m akes 
much of the purported virtue of the “flexibility” of the ir approach in modifying the 
Model Act in accordance w ith s ta te s ’ individual preferences—which are  likely to be 
deferential to favorable provisions proffered by testing  vendors to the ex ten t th a t 
individual s ta te  laws and absence of political opposition perm it. The uneven 
procedural safeguards patchw ork is likely to re-emerge, ranging from forensic 
standards in a rights-vigüant s ta te  such as California to much more lax oversight in 
the deep south.
If the history of the regulatory  specifications process concerning Executive 
O rder 12564 (Drug-Free Federal W orkplace order) and CLIA 88 (the federal Clinical 
Laboratories Improvement Act of 1988) are any guides, analytical vendors’ 
advocates will fight tooth and claw for the removal or em asculation of “overly 
burdensom e” quality assurance regulations. One has only to peruse the “pubfic 
review and comment period” docum entation of the E.O. 12564 and CLIA 88 
regulatory processes in the Federal Register to see such quiet commercial self- 
in terest a t work. Phrases such as “too restrictive.” “too costly,” “excessive burden,” 
and “fewer challenges . . . would be adequate . . . ” are sprinkled throughout the 
record. See, for example. Federal R egister. Vol. 53, No. 69, April 11, 1988, pp. 11970 
- 11989.
We should sim ilarly expect back-door efforts to a ttenuate  any AUiance- 
progeny Model Act methodological protections to commence as soon as a Governor’s 
ink has begun to dry.
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Section 19 is particu larly  interesting. V endors of drug testing  services routinely 
and prom inently  tout th e ir  use of MROs (M edical Review Officers) to review lab 
resu lts. An MRO is a licensed physician (M.D.) w ith  additional tra in in g  and 
experience in  toxicology, pharmacology, and analy tical chem istry. Critics point out 
th a t the  MRO function is overwhelmingly one of providing an au ra  of professional 
respectability  to the suspicionless drug testing  process—but one doing violence to 
the e th ical duty  of the physician under the H ippocratic O ath and the dictates of the 
physician-patien t relationship. In th is type of tactic (“/lo physician-patient 
relationship") we see drug testing advocates try ing  to have it both ways. 
Justification  for m andatory  testing is invariably anchored to interw oven employee 
health, safety, and  productivity concerns. As Section M-210 (Policy Statem ent) 
declares:
J u s t  as schools offer an appropriate platform  for in tervention  with 
children and  youths w ith alcohol and o th er drug problems, the 
workplace is an appropriate platform  for intervention w ith adults. 
Tw o-thirds of adu lt drug users are employed. Adults also have little 
opportun ity  elsew here to become educated about alcohol and o ther 
drug  abuse problem s and to be directed to any needed assistance.
Em ployers have two im portan t reasons for w anting  to establish  
alcohol and  o ther drug-free work-place program s. F irs t and  foremost, 
em ployers are concerned about the health , safety, and  well-being of 
th e ir  employees. Second, alcohol and o ther drug abuse costs 
businesses billions of dollars each year in increased m edical claims, 
m edical d isability  costs, decreased productivity, injuries, theft, and 
absenteeism .
This legislation establishes com prehensive private sector alcohol 
and  o th er drug-free workplace program s. In the past, some employers 
have considered drug  testing in and of itse lf to be a complete 
w orkplace substance abuse program . However, the existence of a 
substance abuse testing  program  by itse lf  wiU only serve to identify
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alcohol and other drug abusers. Testing does nothing to educate, 
trea t, or rehabü ita te  alcohol and o ther drug abusing employees.
In o ther words, it purportedly is a health  issue (and employers are properly 
medico-social workers). But, declaring there  to be no physician-patient relationship 
effectuated by drug testing  puts the MRO in an ethically untenable position and 
begs the question of ju s t w hat type of encounter the indiscrim inate drug test truly 
is. We know w hat it is: Law enforcement by proxy'.
Consider the observations of D. Kim Broadwell in The Evolution o f Workplace 
Drug Testing: .4 M edical Review Officer's Perspective:
Ethical concerns about employee drug testing  have been voiced, 
particu larly  by occupational medicine physicians. Drug testing  
program s potentially destroy m utual tru s t between the employee and 
the employer, and punishm ent for behavior off the job— which may 
have no direct influence regarding on-the-job performance— is not the 
environm ent most workers would choose. Although created to protect, 
in practice, the role of the physician acting as an MRO is unique to 
the degree th a t the doctor is p itted  against the employee. No 
physician-patient relationship is required or suggested, contrary' to 
custom ary medical practice. The accused is generally contacted by 
telephone and not examined, and the MRO participates in labehng as 
a drug user (and usually the firing of) an individual he or she never 
sees. Issues of diagnosis, therapy, and  rehabilitation are peripheral to 
the in ten t of the contact. None of these factors fits the paradigm  of 
eth ical practice of the healing arts , and m any physicians feel 
unethically bound by MRO requirem ents, which are forensic, not 
medical, in na tu re  . . .
Drug testing  does not diagnose addiction or im pairm ent, and 
concerns persist about the ability of poorly tra ined  or m otivated 
doctors to carry out the prim ary safeguard  function of the MRO—to 
prevent falsely positive test resu lts. A zealous physician who, for
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personal reasons, views his role as a  drug enforcement officer may not 
provide the employee much protection.
A 1997 monograph firom the Journal of Medical Ethics echoes the concerns:
CONCLUSIONS: Workplace screening for drugs of abuse raises 
m any ethical issues. If screening is considered as being p a rt of 
medical practice w ith the involvement of occupational health  
physicians, as suggested by the Faculty of Occupational Medicine, 
then  the ethical requirem ents of a norm al medical consultation are 
fully applicable. The employee's full and informed consent to the 
process m ust be obtained and the employee should have an unfettered 
righ t of access to all the relevant records and to the urine sample 
he/she has provided in the event th a t he/she wishes to challenge the 
opinion expressed by the physician. If the process is not part of 
medical practice then  employees should have the same rights as they 
would have if required to provide in tim ate body sam ples in the course 
of a crim inal investigation, given the potentially serious consequences 
of an erroneous positive finding for the ir livelihood.
It should be clear th a t the intended and  actual function of the MRO from the 
perspective of the testing vendor is th a t of the methodological fig leaf, nothing more. 
The fact th a t issues "of diagnosis, therapy, and rehabilitation are peripheral to the 
in tent o f the fMRO] contact" is actually irrelevant, given the fram ing of legislation 
such as the Model Act hawked by The Alliance and its auxiliary law enforcement 
brethren—for it is assum ed a priori th a t a positive drug test resu lt means th a t 
therapy and rehabilitation are necessary, w ith summary' term ination the 
consequence for dissenters. As recounted elsewhere in this thesis, “if  you use illegal
D. Kim Broadwell, The Evolution o f Workplace Drug Testing: A Medical 
Review Officer’s Perspective, The Journal of Law. Medicine, and E thics. Vol. 22:3 
Fall 1994, pp. 244-45.
A.R. Forrest, Ethical aspects o f workplace urine screening for drug abuse. 
Journal of Medical Ethics. Vol. 23, No. 1, pp 12-17.
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drugs and claim to do so w ithout adverse consequences, you are by definition in 
Denial; your very dissent proves you to be an addict."
Some closing observations: Again, while the term  “alcohol” is referred to 
repeatedly in th is model legislation, there are no explicit provisions in the Act for 
indiscrim inate alcohol testing—nor any for tobacco. And— broken record, broken 
record—such is because those are  legal substances. The fact th a t alcohol abuse and 
routine tobacco consum ption account for nearly all aggregate health , safety, and 
productivity losses a ttribu tab le  to “drugs” is somehow ignored w hen it comes to 
m andatory “substance abuse” surveillance, which only looks for m arijuana, cocaine, 
am phetam ine, PCP. barb itu rate , and opiates indulgence.
To sum m arize: Section M-210 (Policy Statem ent) the  Model Act declares, in (5) 
Substance abuse testing. “Employers must im plem ent substance abuse testing as 
part o f any comprehensive drug-free workplace program. Pre-employment, 
reasonable suspicion, medical fitness, and post-accident testing w ould be required by 
a comprehensive drug-free workplace program in compliance w ith this Act. Random  
drug testing is neither prohibited nor m andated by this Act."
A sta te  enacting th is proposed legislation would subsequently  be in the business 
of “certify ing” p rivate en terp rises as “Drug-Free W orkplaces.” It is but a short hop 
from there  to requiring  th a t private businesses be “certified” should they “directly or 
indirectly” receive public funds (recall from C hapter 1 41.USC.701, the federal 
D rug-Free W orkplace Act of 1988, which m andated th a t  all businesses “directly or 
indirectly” receiving federal funds have in place a docum ented Just-Say-N o
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program). Moreover, commercial drug testing vendors and  th e ir lobbyists would 
undoubtedly m ake much use of adverse inference tow ard those firms th a t rem ained 
“uncertified."
T hat such as th is  “Model Drug-Free Private Sector Workplace Act” might be 
enacted a t the s ta te  level through federal taxpayer-funded abuse of the § 501(c)(3) 
charter would be an outrage. Recall from the 1RS regulations th a t one function of 
the § 501(c)(3) is the “defense of hum an and civil rights secured by law.” The 
activities of The Alliance rep resen t an a ttem pt to surreptitiously  use the very 
federal governm ent charged w ith defending  such rights to subvert them.
We m ight recall fu rth er how Representative Gerald Solomon raged on in 
Congress not too long ago, angrily  caUing for revocation of tax-exem pt charters of 
non-profits “supporting drug legalization” and dem anding th a t financial supporters 
of such organizations be taxed  retroactively on their contributions.
P ro-testing lobbying organizations, continued
Drug testing  m easures are  also promoted around the nation a t the statehouse 
level by an  organization calling itse lf the “Institu te  for a Drug-Free W orkplace.”'"  ̂A 
quick review of the  In s titu te ’s membership roster—which includes some of the 
major testing  vendors—m ight impel one toward concluding th a t th is organization is. 
a t least in part, a commercial d rug  testing industry  lobbying group.
In s titu te  for a D rug-Free Workplace, 
[http://www.drugfireeworkplace.org/], March, 1998.
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The Alliance and the “Institu te” will no doubt be ram ping up ever more 
feverishly in these legislative arenas in the wake of th rea ts  to a rb itra ry  testing 
posed by developments such as the one reported recently in USA Todav:
Low jobless ra te  hinders drug pohcies 
By Del Jones, USA TODAY, 6/20/97
Job apphcants in South Carolina have become so confident th a t 
jobs are easy to find th a t some are refusing to take pre-em ploym ent 
drug tests. A m anufacturer in Arizona has postponed for six weeks 
the firing of 30 videotaped in te rna l users and sellers of m arijuana  and 
cocaine while it seeks replacem ent hires to keep the p lan t operating.
Last year, th a t would have been almost unheard  of, says C harles 
Carroll. CEO of ASSET, which contracts w ith companies to infiltrate  
the workplace in search of employee drug abuse. “There’s been a 
dram atic change.”
The 4 8% unem ploym ent ra te  in May, lowest in more th an  23 years, 
is good news for workers. But it has forced many employers to relax 
hiring standards. Drug users usually are screened out by large 
employers. Drug testing  is now used by 95% of Fortune 500 
companies. M any sm aller companies had s ta rted  testing  because the 
cost is offset by increased productivity, reduced absenteeism  and 
fewer accidents. Drug use is a factor in employee theft and fraud  th a t 
cost businesses S400 billion a year.
“Safety is being jeopardized by leaving them  on the job,” Carroll 
says. But today’s applicants sense they have an advantage and  can 
refuse to subm it to drug tests  because the company will give them  the 
job anyway, or they’ll go down the street, figures Ray Owens of the 
Federal Reserve’s Fifth D istrict in Richmond, Va.
While collecting data for the  la test “Beige Book,” the Fed’s periodic 
report on regional economic conditions, Owens was told of job 
prospects refusing drug tests  in South Carolina. He was stunned, and 
is now on the lookout for a trend. “This one caught our eye.”
Companies can’t  reverse drug  testing policies overnight w ithout 
risking discrim ination law suits, says Clifford Thom as of P inkerton 
Services. But Carroll says even Fortune 500 companies are becoming 
“softer” within the ir policies. For example, workers are being 
suspended and quickly brought back after second and th ird  drug 
offenses ra ther th an  being fired. “It w ouldn't surprise me if employers
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are loosening the ir practices to get bodies,” Thom as says. Companies 
are stuck, Carroll says. They m ust choose between a p lan t w ith drug 
abuse th a t “runs a t 50% efficiency, or having no workers a t all.”
Thom as says the dilem m a will likely worsen in August and  
Septem ber when retailers, normally big on pre-employment drug 
screening, begin hiring for the holiday season.
Once again we see it taken  on u tte r faith th a t workplace drug testing has 
provided effective deterrence and is principally responsible for a decade-long decline 
in workplace drug abuse incidence. An article in Forensic Drug Abuse Advisor, 
however, casts doubt on the assum ption, concluding th a t “[N]o study has ever 
demonstrated that this decrease (in recent workplace drug abuse rates) is due to the 
work testing program, nor has it been demonstrated with any certainty that, in 
commonly used doses, any o f the widely abused drugs significantly im pacts on job 
performance.
The article goes on to quote JAVIA au thor Craig Zwerling who noted th a t
[A] large industry  of drug testers has arisen w ith a financial stake in 
expanding the m arket for workplace drug tests. The industry  includes 
the com panies th a t m anufacture the equipm ent and chemicals used in 
drug testing, the laboratories th a t carry out the test, the companies 
th a t collect the urine specimens, the medical review officers (MRO's) 
who review the test results, and the consultants who advise 
companies on drug testing.*”
*'** Fed Panel Says Value o f Workplace Drug Testing Unproven, Forensic 
Drug Abuse Advisor. Vol. 7, No. I.
[http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/M isc/forensic.htm ], March, 1998., p. 6.
177 JAM A. 272 [18] 1467-1468.
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This financial im perative is also noted by D. Kim Broadwell in The Evolution o f 
Workplace Drug Testing: A M edical Review Officer’s Perspective:
The societal and governm ental pressures to foster d rug  testing 
program s have led to the developm ent of a su b stan tia l drug testing  
industry. At a conservative cost of $50 per test, direct costs for ju s t 
the m andated  random testing  of the 7 million DOT (Dept, of 
Transportation) workers exceeds $175 million yearly . . . Drug testing  
service companies, sam ple collectors, physician MROs, laboratories, 
employee-assistance program s, and courier services are a few of the  
vendors who benefit directly from these program s, and this 
constituency will continue to support drug and  alcohol testing  
program s th a t fu rther its economic interests.*"®
Which is why we have dubious “A lliances” and “In s titu te s” forever fanning  the 
flames of a questionable workplace d rug  abuse “crisis.”
*'® D. Kim Broadwell, The Evolution o f Workplace D rug Testing: A  M edical 
Review Officer’s Perspective, The Jo u rn a l of Law. Medicine, and  Ethics. Vol. 22:3 
Fall 1994, pp. 244.
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.APPENDIX B
W ar on Drugs and drug testing updates 
in the wake of Chandler:
Gerald Solomon Watch, 1997 
105th Congressional Update
Conservative New York Republican Representative G erald B.H. Solomon, 
renewing his 104th Congress drug w ar agenda, has re-introduced a spate of random  
drug testing and  re la ted  drug w ar legislative proposals in the first session of the 
105th Congress:
• House o f Representatives 88. denial of federal education benefits for those 
convicted of drug offenses.
• House o f Representatives 89. pre-employment drug testing  of all federal job 
apphcants.
• House o f Representatives 90. random testing of Executive Branch personnel.
• House o f Representatives 92, random testing of Judicial Branch personnel.
• House o f Representatives 309, to prohibit the use of any federal funds for 
research into drug  legahzation issues.
• House o f Representatives 310. random testing of Legislative Branch 
personnel.
• House o f Representatives 313, to ehm inate court discretion in connection w ith 
denial of various federal benefits for those convicted of drug offenses.
260
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• House o f Representatives 314. the “Drug Kingpin D eath Penalty 
Enhancem ent Act.”
• House o f Representatives 333. to require th a t courts notify employers of 
employee drug offense convictions.
Mr. Solomon is also against gun control, for legislation outlaw ing the pandemic 
of flag-burning, against use of the in ternet to dissem inate drug legalization 
information, and for denying tax-exempt s tatus to non-profit organizations “favoring 
drug legahzation” (and retroactively taxing those who have contributed to such 
organizations).
On October 7. 1994. however, Mr. Solomon sta ted  the foUowing during the 
course of rem arks concerning house debate over “U nfunded M andates" legislation: 
“Today is the beginning o f the second Reagan Revolution that w ill shrink the size 
and power of the federal government. No longer will there be an arrogant attitude 
around here that says Big Brother federal government knows best." (see 
Congressional Record. 10-7-94)
Newt Gingrich watch, 1997
House Majority Leader Newt Gingrich (R-GA), determ ined th a t he not be 
outdone in the drug w ar rhetoric departm ent, is again caUing for legislation 
requiring hfe im prisonm ent and the death penalty for certain  drug offenses:
Gingrich Drug-free by 2001
House Speaker Newt Gingrich says he plans to move full steam  
ahead in an effort to eradicate drugs, the Associated Press reported 
May 8. Speaking before the N ational Rehgious B roadcasters in 
W ashington, Gingrich said he hopes to eradicate the drug problem by 
Jan . 1, 2001. The end resu lt would mean “such an am azingly
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health ier society,” he said. “T hat would be a vastly  g rea ter 
achievem ent th an  the balanced budget.”
Talking specifics, Gingrich is proposing a m andatory  life prison 
term  for those who cross borders w ith or produce commercial 
q uan tities of illegal drugs. He would also like to see the death  
sentence imposed for repeat offenders. “If you seU it. we’re going to 
kill you,” he warned. To also help conquer the drug problem. Gingrich 
said  he would Like Air Force reconnaissance planes to m onitor drug 
trafficking, and for federal funds to im plem ent faith-based 
rehabilita tion programs.*'®
Never one to shrink  from Herculean tasks. Mr. G ingrich proposes to eradicate in 
four years the mülenias-old hum an appetite for intoxication. Interestingly, his 
legislative definition of “commercial quan tities” of illicit drugs is “100 tim es the 
norm al dose,” so the hapless college studen t or street-level dealer caught with. say. 
m arijuana sufficient to roll 100 joints becomes a “D rug Kingpin ” eligible for the 
most severe of sanctions.
We will leave aside the logistical question of how an  offender gets to commit the 
second, “cap ital” offense, after receiving life (presum ably w ithout parole) for the 
first episode of drug possession or sales under the Gingrich proposal.
June  10, 1997 Associated Press Update:
Consider this: Charles Manson has been found guilty of trafficking 
in drugs in prison and has been ordered into the isolation tank .
M anson was selling and using drugs, and twice tested positive for 
narcotics. Which raises a question about Newt G ingrich’s p lan  to 
essentially  eradicate drug use in the U nited S ta tes  by 2001. If you
*"9 05/09/97 Source: Join Together O nline, [http://www.jointogether.org/], 
M arch, 1998.
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can’t keep drugs out of the hands of m axim um -security prisoners, how 
can you prevent them  from crossing the porous borders? Ju s t 
asking."*®®
June  1997 update: Clueless in Carson City
The Nevada Legislature recently considered Senate Bill 371, which would 
exphcitly authorize all employers in the Silver S ta te  to enact suspicionless drug 
testing  program s (as if they needed legislative authorization: Nevada already leads 
the nation in employee surveillance, and drug testing  has long been virtually 
universal in major employm ent sectors here). The bül provides for, among other 
things, term ination  of any employee refusing to subm it to testing, and once again 
reaffirm s th a t the drug test has controlling force in hiring decisions (Section 11.1), 
Title VII notwithstanding.*®*
SB 371 m andates th a t employers who test m ust inform employees th a t illegal 
drugs are—well— illegal (Section 9.2), th a t employees testing  positive m ust agree to 
be rem anded to "treatm ent" or be fired (Section 22.1), and th a t employers w ith drug 
testing  program s be accorded a 5% reduction in employee health  benefit expenses. 
This la tte r  provision (Section 26.2) sounds suspiciously like a “Nevada Clinical 
Laboratories Relief Act of 1997. ” w herein revenues are re-routed from insurers to 
laboratories courtesy of the legislature.
*®o Las Vegas Review -Journal. June  12th, 1997.
*®i N evada Senate Bill 371, [http://ww w .leg.state.nv.us/97bills/ 
SB/SB371.HTM]
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SB 371 contains nothing regarding epidemiological or economic criteria  
justifying enactm ent of drug testing  program s (read it: click on the link above); it 
cannot be other than  one more piece of “J a rs  W ars” lawmaking, symbolic in intent, 
in direct contravention of the recent Chandler Supreme Court decision cited above.
Drug testing  errata:
• Item: Drug testing initiatives have resurfaced in school system s around the 
nation, mostly notably in Dade County, Florida in the fall of 1997. Unlike the 
program  imposed in Oregon, which precipitated the Suprem e C ourt case 
Vernoriia School District 47J  v. Acton et ux (Docket 94-590, 1995), the Florida 
random  testing includes all students, not ju s t student athletes.
• Item: Drug testing  critics lost ano ther court battle recently w hen the U.S. 
Suprem e Court, w ithout comment, declined to hear the appeal of a Caüfornia 
decision upholding the right of the City of Glendale to require drug testing  of job 
applicants and employees up for promotion. Inexplicable, in hght of Chandler.
• Item: In October of 1997, the Executive Director of the Illinois Crime 
Commission decided it was time to take illicit drug use m atters into his own 
hands:
Group W ants to Drug-Test Illinois Politicians
Politicians in Illinois will be asked to voluntarily take random  drug 
te s ts  by a group th a t says it w ants to “keep everyone honest,” the 
Chicago-Sun Times reported Oct. 7. The challenge comes from the 
Illinois S tate  Crime Commission.
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“I t’s e ither pu t up or shu t up,” said Executive D irector Je rry  Eisner. 
“We have lost the w ar on drugs. Now le t’s see who’s using the drugs 
and who’s not.” The challenge w ül appear in an editorial in the first 
issue of the Commission Reports, the anti-crime organization’s 
new spaper. Political figures who agree to subm it to such tests  will 
have th e ir  nam es published in the newspaper. Those who refuse to 
take a drug test will also have th e ir nam es in print. “The agreem ent 
is th a t we can show up a t anytim e, any place,” E isner noted. “It could 
be a fte r one of your fund-raisers or while you’re coming out of church. ”
E isner added th a t s ta te  senators and representatives, as well as 
those running  for higher offices, will be receiving a form al request by 
mail in the next few weeks. One law m aker already com m enting on 
the upcoming challenge is Rep. B arbara Flynn C urrie (D-Chicago), 
who says although she personally does not support random  drug- 
testing, she will agree to it if her constituents say yes. “But I don’t 
th ink  random  tests are a good way to fight drug abuse. I don’t th ink 
the findings in this population, like others, would be d ram atic  or 
in teresting .” said Currie.
Critics m ight observe th a t Mr. E isner’s plan is neo-M cCarthyism to the core. It 
is. however, quite in keeping w ith the b latan tly  unconstitutional “prove-your- 
innocence” a ttitu d e  and legislative proposals of U.S. Congressm an Gerald Solomon, 
who has tried  to have refusal to subm it to arb itrary  drug testing  made a violation of 
federal law, for which one would be sum m arily declared as having tested positive.
• Item: Louisiana Task Force Proposes Sweeping Drug Tests
In Louisiana, the governor’s drug-testing task  force has 
recom m ended th a t $5 million dollars be set aside each year to test 
welfare recipients, elected officials and state  college s tuden ts  for ülicit 
substances. The task  force was appointed after legislators approved a 
d rug-testing  law several m onths ago. Reuters reported Nov. 4.
In response to the recommendations, a spokesm an for the 
Louisiana S tate  U niversity Board of Supervisors said, “It seems th a t 
would be patently  unconstitutional, a t the very least.”
Source: JoinTogether Online, 10/17/97, [http://www.jointogether.org/]
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A spokesm an for Republican Gov. Mike Foster said it would take 
about a week for the governor and his s ta ff to analyze all the 
recom m endations.
As should be apparen t from the foregoing, the  legal and  political w rangling over 
the issue of suspicionless drug test is unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future.
Source: JoinTogether Online. 11/05/97, [http://ww w .jointogether.org/]
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GLOSSARY
Accuracy: Closeness of agreem ent of a m easurem ent w ith an au thorita tive  reference 
standard . Not the  same as “precision.” It is im portant to rem em ber tha t, beyond the 
counting of discrete objects, there  is no such th ing  as an “exact” value; reference 
standards are often them selves a rb itra ry  or estim ates derived by other 
m easurem ent(s). For example, laboratory reference standard  solutions distributed 
by authoritative sources such as NIST (the N ational In stitu te  for S tandards and 
Technology) are usually expressed as an average concentration of an analyte ± some 
sm all percent “erro r” or variability  in the originally supplied container.
Aliquot: The portion of a laboratory specimen prepared for analysis.
A nalvte: The chemical substance of in terest in a laboratory analysis. Also 
sometimes called a “param eter."
Bioassav: Laboratory analyses of biological substances.
B lank: A sam ple “known” not to contain the analyte of in terest. There are num erous 
types of blanks, e.g.: “DI blanks,” those containing nothing bu t distilled (“de­
ionized”) w ater; “trip  blanks,” those transported  with sam ples to control for 
contam ination in transit; “m atrix  blanks.” sam ples of the ac tua l m aterial (e.g.. 
urine, blood, hair, etc.) “known” not to contain the analytes under investigation.
Cohort: A statistically  or cUnicaUy relevant group or category w ith in  a larger 
population.
Correlation: S ta tis tica l relationship wherein two or more m easured phenom ena “co- 
re la te” or vary in  a more or less system atic fashion ranging from zero (no 
relationship) to + 1.0 (perfect 1:1 direct relationship) or -  1.0 (perfect 1:1 inverse 
relationship). Correlation “coefficients” are expressed as percentages. Correlation is 
often confused w ith causation. For example, shoe size correlates “significantly" with 
h a t size, but large feet do not “cause" large heads.
Cross-reactivitv: Substances w ith m olecular structures sim ilar to those of target 
analytes are said  to be “cross-reactive,” m eaning they could be m istaken  for the 
ta rge t analytes, given th a t they react in sim ilar fashion to the laboratory methods, 
resulting in false positive determ inations.
Cut-off concentration: An adm inistrative concentration level above which sample 
analysis resu lts for the target analy tes are declared to be “positive,’ and below 
which they are deemed “negative” (called “qualitative” analysis: See “Q uantita tion” 
below). U sually set well above the M inimum Detectable C oncentration (MDC, see
267
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below) of the analytical method in commercial labs to guard against false positive 
errors.
CV ( Coefficient of Variation): The ratio of the s tandard  deviation to the mean. In 
plain English, the expected, or average variability of a set of m easurem ents around 
the average itself, expressed as a percentage. See S tandard  Deviation and RSD 
below.
DW (Detection Window): The period after consum ption of a substance such as a 
drug during which the resulting  “m etabohte(s)” is/are detectable in a specimen such 
as urine, blood, saliva, or hair. The DW for cocaine m etabohte in urine, for example, 
is 1-2 days, w hereas the DW for m arijuana metabolite is on the order of 30 days.
One major drug testing vendor tellingly now refers to the DW as the “SW.” or 
“Surveillance Window. "
Epidemioloerv: The scientific study of characteristics and transm ission  pathw ays of 
diseases in large populations.
False negative: Test result finding no analyte of in te rest in a sam ple when it was 
actually present a t a m easurable level.
False positive: Test result finding an analyte of in te rest in a sam ple when it was 
actually not present. “False accusation” in the context of ülicit d rug testing.
G C/MS (Gas Chrom atography/M ass Spectrometry): The most accurate and precise 
laboratory technology used in commercial drug testing  labs. GC/MS is generally 
assum ed to be “forensic” quality, i.e., sufficiently reliable for use as crim inal 
evidence.
Im m unoassav: Laboratory technology employing genetically engineered antibody 
substances which compete for “binding” with the targe t analyte(s) during laboratory 
processing. The presence or absence of an analyte is indirectly inferred from the 
antibody concentration after processing.
Incidence: Epidemiologically, the num ber of new cases of a disease observed during 
a specified period.
M atrix (pi. M atrices) : The m ateria l of the specimen. Urine, blood, saliva, hair, and 
tissue are aU bioassay m atrices.
MDC (Minimum Detectable Concentration): The lowest concentration level a t which 
a chemical substance can be reliably assayed.
M ean: The arithm etic average of a set of m easurem ents. A “concentration level” of a 
substance, often expressed in “ng/mL.” (nanogram s per m illiliter) is an estim ate of a 
“m ean” or average concentration.
M etabolite: Biochemical derivatives of originally ingested substances. Drug test 
assays a ttem pt to quantify the m etabolites of drugs initially  consumed, not the 
chemicals p resen t in the drug them selves a t the tim e of consumption.
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N anosram s per m illiliter (ng/mL.): Billionths of a gram  (“nano”) per thousandths 
(“milli”) of a liter. The conventional unit of analysis in drug bioassay.
Norm al d is tribu tion : A distribution of a set of m easurem ents in which the m ean is 
located a t the mid-point and  the variability  is sym m etrically dispersed above and 
below the m ean in decreasing proportions. Sometimes referred to as the “BeD 
Curve” or “G aussian D istribution.”
O perational Definition: Defining a phenomenon according to m easurable criteria.
Precision: Closeness of agreem ent of repeated m easurem ents of the sam e object or 
substance. Not the sam e as “accuracy.”
Prevalence: Rate. The proportion or percentage of a population w ith a characteristic 
(e.g. drug use, cancer, diabetes, etc.) of in terest.
Q u an tita tion : Laboratory analysis yielding a num erical estim ate of a concentration 
level of an  analyte. “Q ualitative” analysis, on the o ther hand, sim ply reports 
“positive” or “negative” according to operational criteria.
R adioim m unoassay: Im m unoassay in which a radioactive “in te rna l tracer” is added 
to the sam ple. The analyte presence or absence is indirectly inferred  by counting the 
rem aining radioactive disin tegrations after processing.
RSD (Relative S tandard  Deviation): Same as the CV (Coefficient of Variation): The 
ratio  of variabüity  (the S tandard  Deviation) to the average, or “expected value.”
Replicate: Take a sam ple specimen, divide it into m ultiple “aliquots,” analyze them 
all using the sam e method, and you have perform ed “replicate” analysis.
Sensitiv ity : The ability of a te st method to correctly identify true  positives. A test 
th a t is highly sensitive is frequently also prone to yielding a high proportion of false 
positives. Analogy: if police a rre st everyone in an area, they will surely apprehend 
all of the otherw ise undetected crim inals a t large, bu t a t a cost of detain ing many 
innocent people (false positives).
Specificity: The ability of a te s t method to correctly identify true  negatives. 
M ethodologically the inverse of “sensitivity .” In any assessm ent, there  is always a 
sensitivity-specificity trade-off. S im ultaneously maximizing sensitiv ity  and 
specificity is not easily accomplished: expensive, in a word.
Spike: A sam ple adu lte ra ted  w ith a “known” quan tity  of a  reference standard . As 
w ith blanks, there are various types—e.g., “Dl spikes,” (reference solution in 
distilled w ater) or “m atrix  spikes,” actual specimens assum ed to be absent 
m easurable concentrations of the ta rge t analyte(s).
S tandard  D eviation: The “average” variability of a se t of m easurem ents around the 
average itself. Som etim es called the RMS or Root M ean Squared Deviation, because 
it is derived by squaring all variations around the mean, adding them  up, and then
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calculating the square root of the sum. Denoted m athem atically  by the Greek 
symbol “sigm a.” ( a  ), the S tandard  Deviation is often sim ply called “the sigma.”
S tra tum  (pi. S trata): A category of in terest for purposes of analysis. See “cohort.” in 
the context of drug testing, some s tra ta  would be, for example: Unskilled males age 
18-25 in  the  construction industry; m anagem ent fem ales age 35-45, banking 
industry; airline pilots (predom inantly male), sem i-retiree W al-M art greeters. etc. 
One a rea  of sta tistica l analysis generally glossed over in drug abuse research is tha t 
of “stra tification ,” i.e., objectively assessing d isparate  cohorts to avoid making 
overbroad generalizations th a t resu lt in ineffective poUcy.
Vector: In Epidemiology, a “vector” is a disease carrier. Economically and socially 
successful illicit drug users are regarded by some drug  abuse pohcymakers as 
“addiction vectors.”
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